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There is general consensus that mercenarism is and should remain prohibited. The difficulty 
that has arisen is firstly one of defining the exact nature of mercenarism, and more 
specifically what actions constitute mercenary actions. A further difficulty arises in that much 
of the legislation intended to outlaw mercenarism is impacting on the legal activity of private 
military and security contractors, who fall short of the definitional requirements of 
mercenarism. The two groups being so closely linked that they are often mistakenly conflated 
. There is currently a need to develop a response to the private military security industry, 
which is better suited to effectively regulate their activities, whilst also effectively 
criminalising the activities of those who actions amount to mercenarism. 
 
The dissertation therefore sets about analysing how these two distinct sectors: mercenaries 
and private military security companies, are regulated at an international and domestic level. 
It then uses the lessons learnt from these regulator attempts, and the various policy 
considerations which countries have to make, to propose a way forward in creating an 
effective regulatory system for mercenaries and private military companies at an international 
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Mercenaries can be traced back to ancient times when armies where comprised mainly of 
professional soldiers with records of the ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman armies using 
mercenaries.1 During this time in history and before the rise of the modern nation state and its 
ability to conscript men to create their standing armies, mercenaries were essential in any war 
and played an important role in the eventual development of the nation states of Europe2, who 
strongly depended upon a class of warriors to forge and defend their nations.3 Moving 
forward to 1870 and the early years of the colonisation of Africa, mercenaries were once 
again widely used by the invading nations.4 There was another surge in the use of 
mercenaries in post-colonial Africa during the 1960s and this has continued to the modern 
day with continual internal conflicts and civil wars.5 The reasons for the resurgence of 
mercenaries within post-colonial Africa is based on several factors which include colonial 
regimes using mercenaries in order to fight off liberation movements. The downsizing and 
disarmament of armies following the end of the Cold War resulted in a large and ready 
supply of men and weapons and as the interests of Western powers shifted away from Africa 
the security vacuum created an ideal environment for mercenaries to thrive.6  
 
Throughout this history the activities of mercenaries have always been viewed in a negative 
light7 with strong criminal undertones.8 In more modern times this perception has been 
enforced by mercenary activities resulting in a loss of human life, an adverse and substantial 
impact on national economies and the threat they pose to the integrity and constitutional order 
of countries in which they are involved.9 Their negative impact can briefly be categorised 
                                                 
1 C Lumina, ‘Counting the cost: The impact of corporate warfare on the human rights of women and children in 
Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 101, 102. 
2 The role of mercenaries in the development of the nation states of Europe in the fifteenth to seventeenth 
centuries will not be discussed further in the dissertation as the focus of this dissertation is that current role of 
mercenaries, rather than their historical role.  
3 H.C Burmester, ‘The recruitment and use of mercenaries in armed conflicts’ Volume 72 The American Journal 
of International Law 37, 40. 
4 S. J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and G. A Dzinesa, ‘One man’s volunteer is another man’s mercenary? Mapping the 
extent of mercenarism and its impact on human security in Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 75, 79. 
5  Note 1 above, 102. 
6 S. J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and G. A Dzinesa, ‘One man’s volunteer is another man’s mercenary? Mapping the 
extent of mercenarism and its impact on human security in Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 75, 79. 
7 Note 3 above, 40. 
8 M Foaleng, ‘African mercenarism’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 45, 52. 
9 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’ Human Rights Resolution 2005/2. 
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into the three areas of commercial violations, human rights and natural resources. In terms of 
commercial violations, these include invasions of privacy via phone tapping as well as the 
suppression of trade union activities.10 Human rights violations are more obvious and include 
attacks on civilian populations, torture, executions as well as sexual violence and human 
trafficking.11 The natural resources of countries involved with mercenary activity are often 
exploited by granting mercenaries considerable mining concessions which not only affects 
the country’s economy but also its people who are not able to benefit fully from their 
countries natural resources.12 
 
More recently there has arisen the private military security company. These started making an 
appearance as early as the Vietnam War where the United States Army was utilising 80 000 
private contractors at any one time.13 It was however in the 1990s when private military 
security companies really started to grow and spread into other arenas of conflict.14 Private 
military security companies have donned the appearance of corporate companies, with codes 
of practice and internal checks and balances15, in an attempt to rid themselves of the negative 
image associated with mercenaries.16 The role of a private military security company is 
generally considered to be to provide security for people as well as property, as well as 
providing training and tactical support. This includes providing guidance on military 
decisions, and involvement in non-direct operations; such as mine clearing and destruction.17 
With their corporate identity and internal checks and balances private military security 
companies are largely considered as legitimate actors within the international arena as well as 
forces for potential positive change.18 Private military security companies are currently filling 
the gaps created by the downscaling of many militaries which occurred after the Cold War 
ended. States have also begun to rely on private military security companies due to their 
                                                 
10 J.J Messner, ‘Working towards effective legislative and regulatory solutions for the private security industry 
in Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 145, 146. 
11 Note 1 above, 112. 
12 Note 10 above, 147. 
13 Note 10 above, 147. 
14 Supra Note 1 103. 
15 K. E McCoy, ‘Organisational frames for professional claims: Private military corporations and the rise of the 
military paraprofessional’ (2012) 59 #3 University of California Press 322, 332-333. 
16 M Foaleng, ‘African mercenarism’ 52. 
17 S Gumedze, ‘The role of the private security industry in Africa’s peacekeeping missions’ (2007) 4 ACCORD 
1, 4-5. 
18 S Schulz, ‘The good, the bad and the unregulated: Banning mercenarism and regulating private security 
within Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 123, 133. 
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ability to perform tasks previously done by the army themselves faster and cheaper than if the 
states had provided these services for themselves.19 
 
The problem that these two non-state actors create in terms of international law is that 
conflict has generally been understood to fall within the exclusive domain of states.20 The 
regulation therefore, both domestic and international, which currently exists around actors 
involved within conflict areas has been focused not on non-state actors, but rather solely on 
states and state actors.21 With the twentieth century seeing a significant increase in the 
participation of non-state actors such as mercenaries and private military security companies 
in armed conflicts, this has challenged the traditional view of conflict around which 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and domestic regulation was initially conceptualised. 
Consequently the efficacy of both IHL and domestic regulation pertaining to armed conflict 
has been called into question.22 The reality is that existing IHL and domestic legislation is ill-
equipped to monitor and control mercenaries and private military security companies.23  
 
The response from the international community to mercenaries and private military security 
companies has been solely focused on mercenaries. The response from the UN General 
Assembly was to categorically outlaw, as criminal, the activities of mercenaries. This was 
achieved by the passing of Resolution 2625 in 1970.24 Seven years later the Additional 
Protocol I of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in Article 47 
provided a treaty based prohibition for the actions of mercenaries, which the OAU adopted in 
drafting a regional Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa of 3 July 1977.25 
Both the API and the OAU convention define a mercenary as any person who: 
 is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict 
 does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities 
 is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, 
is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in 
                                                 
19 Note 10 above, 147. 
20 S Chesterman and C Lehnardt, ‘From mercenaries to market: The rise and regulation of private military 
companies’ (2007) Paper 55 New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 1, 1. 
21 Ibid, 2. 
22 Note 20 above, 2. 
23 B Perrin, ‘Modern warfare: Armed groups, private militaries, humanitarian organizations, and the law’ (2012) 
University of British Columbia Press 1, 2.  
24 Declaration on principles of international law friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations U.N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 (1970). 
25 Note 8 above, 47. 
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excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed 
forces of that party 
 is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party 
to the conflict 
 is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict 
 has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member 
of its armed forces 
This definition is at best extremely narrow and considered ineffective26 for a variety of 
reasons which will be explored further in a more detailed analysis in Chapter 2. Sadly the 
deficiencies which lie at the heart of this unworkable definition has impacted negatively upon 
human security27, international legitimacy28, as well as the ability of the international and 
domestic community to properly regulate conflict zones.29  
 
The conventions listed above are incapable of addressing the advent of private military 
security companies and their focus on mercenarism means that private military security 
companies are not capable of falling under the current definition of mercenaries.30 The 
international community has not been able to develop regulations and conventions fast 
enough to keep up with the growth of the private security industry.31 There have been moves 
towards the creation of conventions designed to regulate private military security companies, 
such as the Montreux Document32, but until then the regulation of private military security 
companies remains an issue, dealt with almost solely by domestic legislation. 
 
The onus placed on states by international conventions is clearly one to criminalise 
mercenary activity.33 The fact that international conventions are currently silent about private 
military security companies coupled with the fact that states clearly have no intention of 
stopping their use of private military security companies, means that domestic regulation 
                                                 
26 Note 8 above, 48. 
27 Note 6 above, 86. 
28 Note 23 above, 2. 
29 Note 10 above, 145.  
30 Supra Note 1 107. 
31 Note 10 above, 148. 
32 The Montreuz Document ‘On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict’ International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Switzerland. 
33 Declaration on principles of international law friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations U.N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 (1970). 
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needs to be exist in order to regulate private military security companies.34 The problem that 
domestic legislation faces however is that insufficient accurate regulation means that a clear 
line cannot be drawn between the legitimate operations of private security companies and the 
criminal operations of mercenaries.35 Overly broad regulation of mercenarism risks limiting 
the legitimate operations of private military security companies.36 It is this balance between, 
on one hand criminalising the activities of mercenaries and on the other allowing for the 
operation of private military security companies which domestic legislation needs to find.  
 
1.1 Research Hypothesis and Rationale 
 
As highlighted above, whilst there is considerable agreement as to the harm posed by 
mercenaries, and that their activities and operations are outlawed.37 There is also agreement 
within international and domestic arenas that the work done by private military security 
companies is legitimate, until such time as it falls into the realm of mercenarism.38 The issue 
at present therefore is how to regulate mercenaries in such a way as to effectively deal with 
the problem, but not encroach on the work of private military security companies, whilst at 
the same time not granting too much leeway as to allow mercenarism to continue.  
 
This dissertation will therefore focus on answering two questions. The first is to ask whether 
or not current international and domestic regulatory mechanisms are effective or at least to 
what degree they are effective. The second question is if they are not effective what is then 
the best way forward for the regulation of the private military security industry. This question 
will be answered by proposing a solution in the form of regulatory mechanisms which will 
exist at the three levels of international convention, domestic legislation and at an industry 
self-regulation level.  
 
1.2 Research Framework 
                                                 
34 L Juma,’Mercenarism: Looking beyond the current international and regional normative regimes’ (2008) 147 
ISS Monograph Series 215. 
35 S Gumedze, ‘Pouring old wine into new bottles? The debate around mercenaries and private military and 
security companies’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 21, 22. 
36 Note 10 above, 145.  
37 United Nation’s General Assembly resolution 2625 Declaration on principles of international law friendly 
relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations U.N. Doc. A/5217 
at 121 (1970). 




1.2.1. Literature review 
 
Chapter 2 will begin by reviewing existing literature so as to unpack the legal terminology 
but more so will look at effectiveness of international law (from both treaty and customary 
international law sources) in regulating mercenarism as well as will looking at international 
interventions aimed at regulating the private military and security industry.  
 
1.2.2. Domestic comparative analysis 
Chapter 3 to 5 will focus on the domestic regulation of private military security companies 
and mercenaries in the countries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and 
South Africa. These three countries have been chosen because they represent unique 
responses or at least stages of response to the rise of the private military security industry. 
The system in the United States is widely regarded as being a model for future regulation39, 
whilst the South African system is seen as being the harshest in the world40 and the United 
Kingdom is in limbo and has yet to adopt a system of its own.41  
 
1.2.3. Conclusion: the way forward 
Chapter 6 will then deal with the proposed way forward, by attempting to deal with the 
problems identified in the previous chapters, as well as dealing with the criticisms levelled 
against the private military security industry but still maintaining the benefits gained from the 
industry.
                                                 
39 C Walker & D Whyte, ‘Contracting out war?: Private military companies, law and regulation in the United 
Kingdom’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative law Quarterly 651, 668. 
40 S Bosch & M Maritz, ‘South African private security contractors active in armed conflicts: Citizenship, 
prosecution and the right to work’ (2011) 14 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 71, 102. 
41 E Krahmann, ‘Private military services in the UK and Germany; Between partnership and regulation’ (2005) 






This chapter will review the literature which pertains to the two primary private military 
security contractors which are the subject of this dissertation: mercenaries and private 
military security companies. This chapter will review the current attempts at regulating the 
activities of both mercenaries and private military security companies at an international and 
regional law level. In reviewing the literature this dissertation intends to arrive at an 
assessment as to whether these regulatory regimes are achieve their intended goals, and to 
what degree they can be said to be are effective and whether they have unintended 
repercussions on each other. 
 
1. MERCENARIES 
Mercenaries, and the relevant international conventions and protocols dealing with 
mercenarism, shall be discussed by firstly understanding why there exists a need to regulate 
mercenarism, what the current attempts at regulation are, followed by analysing their 
effectiveness and what therefore the current legal position regarding mercenaries is at an 
international level. 
 
1.1. The Rationale Behind the Regulation of Mercenarism 
Mercenaries are generally considered to be individuals, who tend to act alone and operate in 
countries other than their home country and are motivated by political, ideological or 
financial motives.1 These individuals partake in direct conflict, either in internal or external 
wars and offer their experience and abilities to whoever is paying them or whichever side 
they align with in terms of their ideological or political views.2 The problem that arises within 
the international law is that conflict has always been considered to be within the exclusive 
domain of states and that only the actions of states and state actors can be considered 
legitimate.3 Mercenaries who act independently and often without the authority of a state fall 
                                                 
1 S Gumedze, ‘Pouring wine into new bottles? The debate around mercenaries and private military and security 
companies’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 21, 24-25. 
2 H Burmester, ‘The recruitment and use of mercenaries in armed conflicts’ Volume 72 The American Journal 
of International Law 37, 37-38. 
3 S Chesterman and C Lehnardt, ‘From mercenaries to market: The rise and regulation of private military 
companies’ (2007) Paper 55 New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 1. 
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outside of this domain.4 This means that mercenaries are not regulated and therefore not 
accountable for their actions. To try and deal with this several international conventions and 
treaties have been created to try and regulate mercenaries (these will be dealt with later in this 
chapter). The ultimate failure however of these conventions and treaties5 means that 
mercenaries continue to act outside of the international legal framework and without any 
form of accountability.6 This lack of accountability and effective regulation is why the 
international community views mercenaries to be a threat. It is this lack of accountability and 
effective regulation which allows for the human rights abuses that are often carried out by 
mercenaries to occur.7  
The scourge of mercenarism has been most acutely felt on the African continent. This is 
because African states seldom have the strong state and state regulated military which are 
commonplace in Western countries such as the United States, Britain and France.8 As a 
result, while Western countries merely outsource certain aspects of their military to enhance 
cost-effectiveness, African states are forced to outsource entire functions of their statehood9 
to fill the void left by either the entire collapse or ineffectiveness of the previous national 
force.10  
The problem of mercenarism on the African continent is further exasperated by other 
dynamics which accompanied the end of the Cold War. Post Cold War the African continent 
faced a massive oversupply of arms as a result of Cold War powers overstocking states and 
rebel forces with arms to help ensure victory.11 This has continued today with the incumbent 
leaders providing more than sufficient arms to ensure that any local insurgence can be dealt 
with.12 At the end of the Cold War or when an incumbent is overthrown, these arms find their 
way to the black market and are often sold at below production cost.13 This means that 
mercenaries can be easily and cheaply supplied with arms and as a result this increases the 
                                                 
4 J N Maogoto, ‘Private military companies and international law: Building new ladders of legal accountability 
and responsibilty’ (2010) 11 Conflict Resolution 99, 103. 
5 J.J Messner, ‘Working towards effective legislative and regulatory solutions for the private security industry in 
Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 145, 150 & 153. 
6 B Perrin, ‘Modern warfare: Armed groups, private militaries, humanitarian organizations, and the law’ (2012) 
University of British Columbia Press 2. 
7 Note 4 above, 103. 
8 J Cilliers, ‘Private security in war-torn African states’ J Cilliers & P Mason (ed) Peace, profit or plunder?: The 
privatisation of security in war-torn African societies (1999) 1, 5. 
9 Note 8 above, 5. 
10 Note 8 above, 5. 
11 P Lock, ‘Africa, military downsizing and the growth in the security industry’ J Cilliers & P Mason (ed) 
Peace, profit or plunder?: The privatisation of security in war-torn African societies (1999) 11, 22. 




ease with which mercenaries can operate and this contributes to the negative effect 
mercenaries have on Africa. With the withdrawal of economic superpowers at the end of the 
Cold War, African states were no longer able to maintain their militaries, nor were they able 
to ensure an organised demobilisation of these armed forces.14 The result of this is that these 
military forces often fragmented into autonomous groups who not only took their equipment 
with them, but also their training and experience.15 This lack of economic opportunity led to 
many military personal (including child soldiers)16 seeking an income from alternative 
sources. More often than not this income is gained by confiscating public and civilian 
property. This not only has the potential to provoke an aggressive response from the public, 
but also has the effect of undermining the state as the sole provider of security and its 
monopoly over the use of force.17 This affects not just military personal but also members of 
the police force and further undermines the state and its monopoly over the use of force.18 
This loss of control creates an ideal environment for rebel groups to form and contract 
mercenaries to assist them with internal conflicts. This environment characterised by an 
oversupply of arms and unemployed yet experience soldiers, and the undermining of the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force provided a fertile environment for the mercenary 
industry to boom on the African continent.  
 
This peculiar susceptibility mercenarism  is also coupled with the nature of conflicts within 
Africa, which tend to be based on deeply entrenched ethnic tensions, motivated by the 
suppression of minorities, and aimed at the perpetuation of dictatorial regimes, to name but a 
few.19 Together with a lack of strong statehood, these trends of perpetual conflicts create the 
ideal environment for mercenaries to operate. In some instances mercenaries were 
specifically employed to create internal conflicts aimed at overthrowing the incumbent, 
undermining the constitutional order of the state, and interfering with the ability of these 
people to exercise their right to self-determination.20 On this basis alone mercenaries present 
                                                 
14 Note 11 above, 23. 
15 Note 11 above, 22. 
16 Note 11 above, 23. 
17 Note 11 above, 22. 
18 Note 11 above, 23. 
19 M Malan, ‘The crisis in external response’ J Cilliers & P Mason (ed) Peace, profit or plunder?: The 
privatisation of security in war-torn African societies (1999) 37, 39. 
20 Y Sandoz, ‘Private security and international law’ in J Cilliers & P Mason (ed) Peace, profit or plunder?: The 
privatisation of security in war-torn African societies (1999) 201, 210. 
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a significant threat to young states21 and their ability to make their own political and social 
decisions.22 
 
The United Nations is primarily concerned with maintaining international peace and 
security.23 The fact that mercenaries are individuals which are not acting under the authority 
of a state means that their involvement in conflict is not only a threat to international peace 
and security but also to International Humanitarian Law as they are not accountable for their 
actions and do not have to abide by international rules of conflict. The threat posed by 
mercenaries to international peace and security, as well as their tendency to violate human 
rights24, commit war crimes and impact on the sovereignty and political independence of 
states25 is sufficient to place a duty on the United Nations to regulate mercenarism.26  
 
Within the African context the maintenance of regional security is also the responsibility of 
the African Union.27 Recognising the problems and challenges listed above it can be argued 
that the biggest responsibility of African states and the African Union is the protection of its 
citizens.28 The African Union is also duty bound by the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights to promote and protect the citizens of Africa and their human rights.29 It has 
already been noted at length that mercenarism impacts negatively upon human rights and that 
this is especially true within the continent of Africa. In addition to what has already been 
mentioned the threat of mercenarism is especially worrisome within Africa where the 
bargaining strength of African states is much weaker than the more powerful Western private 
firms, who are therefore able to conduct business on their terms and employ whatever people 
they wish, even if those people are mercenaries. This means that an extra duty rests on the 
African Union in order to assist in this regard.30 Given the particular magnitude of the 
                                                 
21 Note 4 above, 103. 
22 M-F Major, ‘Mercenaries and international Law’ (1992) 22 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 103, 177.  
23 S Gumedze, ‘The African Union and the responsibility to protect’ (2010) 10 African Human Rights Journal 
146. 
24 Including the right to life, physical integrity and the enjoyment and security of property (M-F Major, 
‘Mercenaries and international Law’ 103). 
25 Note 22 above, 103. 
26 E L Gaston, ‘Mercenarism 2.0? The rise of the modern private security industry and its implications for the 
international humanitarian law enforcement’ 221, 234. 
27 Note 23 above, 146. 
28 Note 23 above, 137. 
29 Note 23 above, 147. 
30 J Isima, ‘Regulating the private security sector: An imperative for security sector governance in Africa’ 
(2007) 5 Journal of Security Sector Management 2. 
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problem on the African continent the African Union is also duty bound to step in to stamp out 
the scourge of mercenarism. 
 
This chapter will now discuss the attempts made by these two bodies to regulate 
mercenarism. 
 
1.2. Current International and Regional Attempts at the Regulation of Mercenarism 
There are currently three main conventions dealing with mercenarism at an international and 
regional level. These are the  1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
(article 47), the United Nations International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of mercenaries of 1989 and the OAU/AU Convention on the 
Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa of 1977. These three pieces of international and 
regional law will be discussed in turn before ultimately concluding what the current position 
of mercenarism at an international level is.  
 
1.2.1. Additional Protocol I of Article 47 1977 
The initial definition of a belligerent can be traced back to the International Declaration 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, which was adopted in 1874.31 Belligerents were 
defined in Article 9: 
‘The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps 
fulfilling the following conditions: 
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. That they carry arms openly; and 
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the 
denomination ' army '.’32 
 
Whilst certain changes were made to this definition over time, so as to keep up with changes 
in warfare, the definition remained largely the same and was used as the basis for The Hague 
                                                 
31 R Morgan; ‘Professional military firms under International law’ (2009) 9 Chi J. Int’l L. 217. 




Regulations (1907) and the Third Geneva Convention (1949). This definition made no 
mention of the notion of a mercenary in its definition of what constituted a belligerent.33 
 
When mercenaries emerged in the theatre of armed conflicts the definition pertaining of who 
constituted a belligerent was not able to cater for this new non-state actor.34 At the time the 
former Soviet Union had proposed and did use a definition of a mercenary which very 
broadly defined them according to their desire for private gain.35 During the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts from 1947 to 1977, 36there were attempts to arrive at a 
definition of a mercenary. Whilst the old Russian definition was criticised for being 
extremely unclear and vague, the definition which came out of the Conference and was 
codified in Additional Protocol I suffered from the opposite flaw – it was said to be too 
exacting.37 Nevertheless, Additional Protocol I was the first real attempt to define this non-
state actor which did not fit into the then current understanding of what a belligerent was. 
 
Additional Protocol I states: 
(1) A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war, 
(2) A mercenary is any person who: 
a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict 
b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities 
c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is 
promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party 
d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the 
conflict 
e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict  
f) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its 
armed forces 
 
                                                 
33 Note 31 above, 217. 
34 Note 31 above, 217. 
35 Note 31 above, 220. 
36 Note 22 above, 108. 
37 Note 31 above,  220. 
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The biggest criticism levelled at this definition is that it is far too narrow, to the point of 
being unworkable38 and potentially creates as more problems than it solves.39 In addition to 
the various sections making the definition narrow, the fact that the definition comprises of six 
cumulative elements make proving all six elements extremely difficult, if not impossible.40 
The reason for the extremely narrow definition was due to an inability to reach an agreement 
between African states, who wanted a broad definition of a mercenary, and Western states, 
who sought a narrow definition (as they were the largest supplier of mercenaries).41  
 
A second general criticism levelled at the definition is that is does not outlaw the activity of 
mercenarism, but rather denies a mercenary the status of prisoner-of-war should they be 
captured.42 This does not create a crime, but rather creates a disincentive for people 
considering mercenarism as an employment opportunity. The net effect of this definitional 
dilemma is that if a mercenary is not caught during a conflict they cannot be convicted for 
their mercenary behaviour.43 The negative consequence only arises in the instances where 
mercenaries fall into enemy hands during a conflict. 
 
Each aspect of the definition is also the subject of much critique: 
 
Article 47(2)(b) requires that a person must take direct part in the hostilities. The effect is that 
a person only becomes a mercenary according to the definition if they actually participate in 
the hostilities. This exempts those who provide military and tactical advice who are therefore 
under this definition merely considered civilians.44 
 
Article 47 (2)(c) speaks to money being the basic motivation in a person’s decision to enlist. 
The requirement that there must be material compensation which is substantially in excess of 
that paid to combatants of similar rank.45 The problem that arises in trying to determine what 
motivation drove a person to enlist is problematic and potentially unworkable46, especially 
                                                 
38 Note 26 above, 232. 
39 Note 22 above, 110.  
40 Note 26 above, 233. 
41 Note 22 above, 109. 
42 Note 26 above, 232. 
43 Note 20 above, 208. 
44 Note 22 above, 110-111. 
45 Note 22 above, 111. 
46 Note 22 above, 113. 
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considering that even if all other five requirements in the definition were met a person would 
merely have to claim some motivation other than a monetary motivation in order to avoid 
falling within the scope of the definition.47 There also poses a problem for ideological and 
religious mercenaries who are motivated by reasons other than material compensation.48 
 
Article 47 (2)(d) does not allow individuals who are nationals of either party involved in a 
conflict to be considered mercenaries. The problem with this is that it has the potential of 
arbitrarily exempting citizens from the belligerent parties from falling within the definition of 
a mercenary.49 In the African context where borders are extremely porous and many people 
have multiple citizenships this problem is particularly acute.50  
 
Article 47(2)(e) is also problematic in that it does not stipulate how long a person is required 
to be with the armed forces in order to not be considered a mercenary. Without a period of 
time being mentioned there is nothing to stop the armed forces of a country from 
incorporating mercenaries into their forces purely for the duration of the conflict and thereby 
thwarting the definition.51 
 
In short article 47 of the Additional Protocol I does not act as a useful definition for 
identifying and regulating the activities of mercenaries, as it is too narrow, practically 
unworkable and permits many individuals whose actions we would ordinarily consider to 
amount to mercenarism from escaping from the ambit of the definition. 
 
1.2.2. The OAU/AU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 1977 
The OAU/AU Anti-mercenary Convention (hereafter the OAU Convention) was recognised 
as a significant step in 1977 as it was the first convention dedicated entirely to attempting to 
deal with the problem of mercenarism. As such it was the first international instrument which 
was applicable to all territories of States’ party to the OAU Convention, which placed 
obligations on these States party to the OAU Convention to adopt domestic law regarding 
                                                 
47 Note 26 above, 233. 
48 Samuel Gama Mercenarism and the curbing of mercenary activity in Africa, 1990 to 2006: Selected case 
studies (unpublished Masters of Security Studies, University of Pretoria, 2008) 25.  
49 Note 22 above, 112. 
50 M Foaleng, ‘African mercenarism’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 45, 48.  
51 Note 22 above, 113. 
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mercenarism.52 The OAU Convention is also unique in that it is the first and only legal 
instrument in Africa which deals exclusively with the enormous threat posed by 
mercenaries53, which is surprising given the fact that the problem of mercenaries is especially 
worrisome within the African context. The OAU Convention declared that the actions of 
mercenaries constituted general crimes against the peace and security of Africa. At the time it 
was the first and only international convention to codify mercenarism as a crime.54  
 
The OAU Convention mimicked the definition provided by Additional Protocol I article 47, 
with the only change: subsection (c) was amended to read55: A mercenary 
 
(c) must be motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and in fact 
is promised by or on behalf of a party to the conflict material compensation. 
 
Unfortunately the same problem which plagued the definition found in article 47 of the 
Additional Protocol I also plagued the OAU Convention, in that all six elements need to be 
proved in order for a person to be considered a mercenary and this, as has been noted, proves 
to be unworkable.56 Despite the strong stance which the OAU Convention appears to adopt it 
does not actually ban the hire or employment of mercenaries in all instances.57 The OAU 
Convention was drafted so as to allow African Governments to hire non-nationals as long as 
they were used to protect themselves from rebel groups within their borders.58 So for example 
countries such as Angola and Zaire were allowed to hire mercenaries to deal with their rebel 
groups, but the South African government was prevented from hiring mercenaries to deal 
with the Liberation movement of the ANC.59 Additionally there was no real enforcement 
mechanism, instead it was left to states party to the convention to promulgate their own 
domestic legislation and to ensure regional compliance. This despite there being no 
guidelines as to how to achieve this regional compliance.60 To a large degree these 
                                                 
52 Note 22 above, 128. 
53 S Gumedze, ‘Towards the revision of the 1977 OAU/AU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in 
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54 P W Singer, ‘War, profits, and the vacuum of law: Privatized military firms and international law’ (2004) 42 
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55 Note 48 above, 18. 
56 Note 53 above, 24. 
57 Note 54 above, 529. 
58 Note 54 above, 529. 
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obligations were largely ignored by the parties to the OAU Convention.61 The regional rather 
than international nature of the Convention meant that Western states, who supplied a lot of 
mercenaries, were not affected by the terms of the OAU Convention, this greatly undermined 
its efficacy as an instrument aimed at reining in the threat posed by mercenaries on the 
African continent.62 
 
Sadly the definitional difficulties which undermined the efficacy of article 47 of Additional 
Protocol I had a similar effect on the definitional criteria set out in the OAU Convention. 
Article 1 (a) of the definition deals with persons fighting in armed conflicts, yet the OAU 
Convention does not define what an armed conflict is. The OAU Convention also fails to 
define whether or not conflict refers to international or non-international conflict.63 By 
adopting the definition used in Additional Protocol I and not expanding it to specifically 
include non-international conflicts the OAU Convention appears to only be concerned with 
international conflicts. This is a problem considering that most of the conflicts within Africa 
which involve potential mercenary activities are non-international in nature.64  
 
Article 1 (b) speaks to taking a direct part as well as hostilities, without providing a definition 
of what activities amount to direct participation in hostilities. Whilst International 
Humanitarian Law, such as the ICRC’s Guide on Direct Participation in Hostilities does 
provide a somewhat contested interpretive guide on the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities, the international understanding of what comprises war is often different from the 
reality experienced within the African context. Whilst at an international level war is 
generally between two separate states, within Africa war is more often internal between rebel 
groups or in the form of a civil war. Again the lack of an effective and contextually relevant 
definition makes the task of correctly identifying mercenaries nearly impossible.65 
 
Article 1 (c) once again raises the previous difficulties alluded to in regards to proving that a 
mercenaries desire is based purely on material gain. Additionally there is also the question of 
when should the desire arise. Does the desire for material gain need to be there when they are 
recruited or can it come about whilst the person is involved in the conflict? The other 
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64 Note 53 above, 24. 
65 Note 53 above, 25-26. 
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problem which further complicates matters is that the person making the offer needs to be a 
party to the conflict. This is easily circumvented by having an entity which is not a party to 
the conflict recruit mercenaries indirectly.66 This again demonstrates the impracticalities of 
the definition and the ease with which mercenaries can circumvent its requirements. 
 
Article 1 (d) which; deals with the nationality of a mercenary, also has numerous problems. 
States are in charge of affording citizenship and consequently they can decide whether or not 
to consider those employed as mercenaries or citizen of their state. If they simply afford them 
citizenship they are no longer considered mercenaries in terms of the OAU Convention. 
Similarly it is also easy for a mercenary to take up residence within territory, acquire 
citizenship and thereby circumvent the mercenary definition.67  
 
Article 1 (e) which requires that a mercenary is not a member of the armed forces party to the 
conflict does not define exactly what constitutes an armed force or what membership entails. 
It is therefore highly possible to consider membership to rebel forces as being sufficient to 
prevent a person being considered as a mercenary, especially when membership does not 
specifically require that person to form part of the traditional armed forces.68  
 
Finally Article 1 (f) appears to allow a mercenary to operate as a mercenary (while avoiding 
the repercussions attached to the definition) so long as they are sent on an official mission by 
another state. While this does prevent non-state actors employing the services of mercenaries, 
this requirement does create the double standard of allowing African governments to continue 
to hire mercenaries so long as they are used within the confines of an official mission. This 
opens up the entire OAU Convention to abuse, since even after the first five elements are 
met, an individual might still circumvent the definition so long as this last element is 
sidestepped.69 
 
In short, the AOU Convention suffers from many of the same problems as Additional 
Protocol I and is also ultimately an unworkable definition with too many possibilities for 
individuals to circumvent the definitional requirements and thwart the efficacy of the AOU 
Convention . 
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1.2.3. The United Nations Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and   
Training of Mercenaries 1989 
In 1989 the United Nations drafted The United Nations Convention Against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (hereafter the UN Convention) in response to a 
recognition that the definition provided within Additional Protocol I article 47 was 
inadequate, restrictive and potentially unworkable. The UN Convention is a pivotal 
development in dealing with the issue of mercenarism in two important respects; currently it 
is the only international convention which deals with mercenarism70, and more than just 
revoke a mercenary’s right to claim prisoner-of-war status (as was the case under Additional 
Protocol I) the UN Convention now makes mercenarism a crime in and of itself.71  
Article I of the Convention defines the term mercenary: 
 
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is 
promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the 
conflict; 
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its 
armed forces. 
 
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of 
violence aimed at: 
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or 
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is 
prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation; 
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed; 
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(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken. 
 
Article 2 of the UN Convention expands upon the definition of a mercenary by stating that: 
‘Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries, as defined in Article 1 of the present 
Convention, commits an offence for the purposes of the Convention.’ 
 
Whilst the first part of Article 1 mimics from the definition used in Additional Protocol I 
Article 47, the second part expands on it and in doing so better protects states against the 
effects of mercenary activities.72 The retention of the Additional Protocol I article 47 
definition means that the criticisms discussed earlier with regard to the definition also remain 
in so far as Article 1(1) is concerned. What is especially worrying is that the concerns about 
motive and the requirement that mercenaries be foreigners has not been addressed by the UN 
Convention.73 Additional concerns arise when one notes that that Article 9 of the UN 
Convention (which deals with jurisdiction) is not as far reaching as the jurisdiction provided 
to crimes such as piracy or genocide. In short in order for mercenarism to be dealt with 
effectively a wider concept of jurisdiction is required.74 A further concern is that, unlike the 
initial drafts of the UN Convention which dealt with the treatment of both the aggrieved and 
offending States, the final UN Convention does not contain these articles. The effect is that 
there is less incentive for countries to properly deal with mercenarism as there are no 
potential negative consequences for them.75 Lastly the UN Convention does not establish any 
form of monitoring76 and therefore there is no way that any of the obligations imposed by the 
convention can be monitored and enforced.77 In addition to this the UN Convention was slow 
to achieve the requisite number of signatories needed to enter into force in 200178 and to date 
it still has a relatively low level of state ratification. This has the effect of weakening the legal 
impact of the Convention and any good which may exist within it.79 
In short the UN Convention also suffers from the same set-backs and problems which faced 
both article 47 of Additional Protocol I and the OAU Convention. 
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1.3. Conclusions Regarding the Existing Regime Aimed at the Regulation of Mercenarism 
Despite African States supporting a strong stance banning mercenarism this does not have the 
international support it needs in order to be effective. In addition the requirements and 
standards of the current conventions are difficult to meet and there are no enforcement 
mechanisms to speak of.80 The conclusion is that an intended ban on mercenarism at either an 
international or regional level is inadequate and ineffective in the current international and 
regional arenas of conflict.81 
 
 
2. PRIVATE MILITARY SECURITY COMPANIES 
The current attempts to regulate private military security companies at an international level 
will now be analysed and discussed. This will be done by firstly analysing the rise and 
evolution of private military security companies, then trying to establish what attempts are 
made to regulate private military security companies at international level. The duty placed 
on domestic actors to regulate private military security companies will then be looked at 
before discussing the need to balance the regulation and criminalisation of private military 
security companies. 
 
2.1. The Rise and Evolution of Private Military Security Companies 
During the same time that mercenaries were establishing themselves as a threat to States and 
human rights in the 1980’s, private military security companies were beginning to organise 
themselves into corporate companies and beginning to focus on providing logistical support 
for various governments. Even in these early years however the United States and United 
Kingdom were not opposed to utilising these companies for military missions.82  
 
Three factors allowed for the rise of private military security companies during the 1990’s 
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union: an increase in the number of civil conflict zones, 
the large scale reduction and privatisation of military forces and a large surplus of arms.83 
Private military security companies were able to draw together these unemployed individuals 
equipped with advanced levels of military expertise and begin creating corporate 
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companies.84 Private military security companies have found a market in providing military 
forces for weak third world countries who lack the infrastructure and ability to create their 
own military forces, and in first world countries who are seeking to privatise certain sectors 
and tasks which previously were within the exclusive realm of the military.85 The growth in 
private military companies has been staggering.86 In the first Gulf War there was one 
contractor per 50 to 100 soldiers. At the start of 2011 the United States Department of 
Defence reported that the ratio in Afghanistan was 84 contractors per 100 soldiers and in Iraq 
the ratio was 129 contractors per 100 soldiers.87 
 
There has also been an evolution in the short history of private military security companies 
from companies who operated as covert mercenaries88 to companies who wish to create a 
corporate and legitimate image for themselves.89  So for example private military security 
companies were often initially employed by exploration companies order to directly influence 
the change of political power in weak Western and Central Africa countries so that the 
corporate powers could gain access to the important mineral and energy resources of these 
weak African States.90 These exploration companies would then sell these resources off to 
corporate entities, which having stayed out of the conflict, would be able to maintain a good 
public image. The private military security company would then be able to gain on going 
employment from the corporate employer by providing them with security.91  
 
One of the most notorious private military security companies which was active in the 
African continent at the time was Executive Outcomes.  Executive Outcomes started as a 
front company for the South African National Defence Force, but later become part of a 
consortium of many affiliated companies from across the globe. This consortium was made 
up of between thirty to fifty various security and mineral companies.92 Executive Outcomes 
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deployed fighting battalions as well as heavy armour in various conflict regions93 including 
Sierra Leone in 1993 where Executive Outcomes supported the Sierra Leone government in 
their fight against the Revolutionary United Front.94 Executive Outcomes and its affiliated 
companies ran operations in Ethiopia, Angola, Zambia, Ghana, Algeria, Ivory Coast, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Croatia, Indonesia, and many other countries.95 
 
In more recent years private military security companies have developed business models and 
internal checks and balances96 in an attempt to legitimise and corporatize their image. Their 
new corporate identity has allowed them to gain implicit and explicit legitimacy97 in order to 
construct a respectable and professional image for themselves.98 They have attempted to 
move away from and disassociate themselves from previous private military security 
companies, with their mercenary affiliations, and have honed their image to attract customers 
and also appease their critics.99 Private military security companies generally promote 
themselves as assistants to the military, acting in support of and not in the place of soldiers100. 
In her article McCoy argues that there are three ways in which organisations promote 
themselves as professional institutes;  
 
(1) by providing a stage or setting that makes professional claims credible;  
(2) by supplying a rationale that makes professional practice acceptable; and  
(3) by extending guarantees that professional promises will be institutionalised and upheld.101 
 
The first two aspects are catered for by the private military security companies who form 
professional groups and companies102, highlighting the good work that they do and the 
important role they play in acting defensively103 to ensuring human rights and providing 
stability within regions.104 The third way; the creation of guarantees, has been achieved to 
some degree by companies establishing internal checks and balances and criteria aimed at 
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holding themselves accountable105 for their actions. These internal processes however lack 
the objectivity and authority of regulations passed by states and has therefore not been a 
particular success.106 This presents a perfect opportunity for states as well as regional bodies 
to step in and provide the necessary authority to create regulations and standards by which 
these companies can hold themselves to account.107 Even without reference to the article by 
McCoy there have been arguments put forward about the need to create a set of standards for 
private military security companies.108 It is this evolution from covert to corporate which has 
allowed to private military security companies to regain legitimacy and has at the same time 
started a trend of self-regulation. 
 
2.2. International attempts at  Regulating the Private Military Security Industry 
Both the OAU Convention and the UN Convention were drafted before the emergence of 
private military security companies and therefore neither of them specifically caters for 
private military security companies.109 Similarly the myriad of conventions which constitute 
International Humanitarian Law also do not cater specifically for private military security 
contractors. Nevertheless in situations of armed conflict International Humanitarian Law is 
the existing legal regime which determined the status individuals working for private military 
security companies.110 The four most likely classifications for private military security 
companies are: armed civilians (Articles 50 and 51 of Protocol I), mercenaries (Article 47 of 
Protocol I), accompanying supply contractors (Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention), 
or members of the armed forces or militias (Article 4A(1) and (2) of the Third Geneva 
Convention and Article 43 of Protocol I).111 Each of these will now be discussed in turn. 
 
2.2.1. Private military security companies as armed civilians? 
Article 50 of Protocol I defines a civilian as being any person who does not belong to one of 
the other categories of persons referred to in Article 4A(1) (Armed Forces), 4A(2) (Militias 
and members of other volunteer corps), 4A(3) (the armed forces of a party not recognised by 
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the detaining power) and 4A(6) (Levies en masse and inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, 
who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist without having to 
time to form into regular armed units). The most likely category that may apply to PMSC is 
that of levee en masse.112 That said article 51(3) states, ‘[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’ It 
would therefore appear that civilians taking up arms after occupation would no longer enjoy 
protection under the Convention and therefore would not be entitled to prisoner-of-war status, 
whilst those that took them up before would. Given this fact it is unlikely that the personnel 
of private military security companies would fulfil this ‘pre-occupation’ requirement as there 
is nothing spontaneous about their decision to take up arms. Under this section then personnel 
of private military security companies would not be considered part of the International 
Humanitarian Law understanding of the levee en masse.113 
 
2.2.2. Private military security companies as mercenaries? 
Just as the definitions of what constitutes a mercenary are unworkable when applied to those 
who could potentially be classifies as mercenaries, the definition is similarly far too narrow to 
deal with the personnel of private military security companies. One of the major problems is 
the requirement that mercenaries must not be a national of one of the parties involved in the 
conflict. This would exclude a whole host of private military security companies and their 
personnel as, especially since the United States and United Kingdom, states hire private 
military security companies from within their own state, thereby exempting them from the 
definitional requirements of mercenarism.114  Another obstacle to assigning mercenary status 
to private military security companies is that most private military security companies are 
logistical or support orientated and do not engage in direct participation. These companies 
therefore have nothing to do with direct conflict and in fact only a minority have any 
involvement in direct conflict.115 A third problem is the requirement of substantial more pay 
than those in the armed forces, whilst this may be possible with third world countries, in first 
world countries, where soldiers earn decent salaries this is much more difficult to establish.116 
It is therefore highly unlikely, especially considering that private military security companies 
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were not considered during the drafting of the existing treaty definitions for mercenarism117, 
that members of private military security companies would be considered mercenaries under 
international law.118 All current attempts at regulating private military security companies are 
stuck in the mind-set of mercenaries and therefore, due to the differences between these two 
groups and the lack of modern attempts specifically catered for private military security 
companies personnel of private military security companies could not be considered 
mercenaries under International Humanitarian Law. 119 
 
2.2.3. Private military security companies as persons accompanying the armed forces? 
This classification is based on the agency relationship that often exists between people in 
conflict zones and states, such as war correspondents or unarmed advisors. If this person is 
not involved in direct combat situations then they will be considered civilians.120 These 
people have the possibility of having prisoner-of-war status so long as they are duly 
authorised by the state.121 This takes the form of an identification card, although it has been 
noted that this is not an essential requirement.122 Whilst at first this appears to suit personnel 
of private military security companies the problem arises that the personnel of private 
military security companies often carry arms and therefore their direct participation in 
conflict means that they are not able to enjoy such protection.123 The means that personnel of 
private military security companies cannot be considered as persons accompanying the armed 
forces.  
 
2.2.4. Private military security companies as combatants under authority of a party to the 
conflict? 
There are several categories under this classification (including armed forces and militia)124 
but suffice to say that the common requirement across all these subcategories is that the 
individuals must be subordinate to a superior who is responsible for ensuring that the rules of 
war are obeyed. So as long as this structure exists then personnel of private military security 
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companies are protected, the problem that arises is that this is seldom the case in practice and 
very few states are willing to take on this responsibility for private military security 
companies125 or bring them under their command structure.126 
 
2.2.5. Private military security companies as ordinary civilians? 
There exists a fundamental distinction within International Humanitarian Law between 
combatants and civilians. This is firstly to protect civilians and secondly to enforce the 
understanding that only combatants have the right to engage in direct conflict.127 From the 
analysis above it is clear that personnel of private military security companies do not fit 
comfortably into any classification which leaves them by default within the category of 
civilians. There is a general international trend to consider members of private military 
security companies are being classified as civilians.128 The body tasked with drafting a 
Convention on Private Military Security Companies has also tended towards regarding their 
personnel as civilians.129 This is on the understanding that the majority of private military 
security companies do not engage in direct conflict and are almost never incorporated into the 
armed forces130, a notion which is further advanced by the decision to ban private military 
security companies from taking part in direct conflict under the draft convention.131  
 
Whilst there appear to be arguments that most private military security contractors could be 
classified as civilians, there is not one classification which fits these contractors perfectly. It 
is also clear that private military security companies could not be considered to fall with the 
ambit of the definition of a mercenary as found in various international conventions and 
treaties.132 There is however a recent document which speaks to the issue of private military 
security companies called the Montreux Document which purports to provide some answers 
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2.2.6. The Montreux Document 
The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for 
States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed 
Conflict (the Montreux Document) provides the clearest statement to date of the relationship 
between private military security company and states, detailing not only legal norms, but also 
business, regulatory and administrative practices.133 It is an initiative of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in conjunction with various governments. The Document draws 
on international and regional conventions, treaties and customs as well as domestic 
regulations and legislation.134 The Montreux Document is significant for four reasons. 
 
Firstly the Montreux Document represents an acknowledgment by a variety of states that 
International Humanitarian Law and human rights are applicable to the laws governing 
conflict zones. This is especially important for example in the case of the United States, 
whose recent actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused some uncertainty in this regard; 
especially their actions to invade without United Nations authority and their lack of regard for 
the jurisdiction of either international or local courts.135  
 
Secondly the first part of the Montreux Document reinforces current international law and 
custom surrounding the relationship between private military security companies and the 
state. The Montreux Document is an acknowledgement by states that private military security 
companies do not operate in a legal vacuum and that states are responsible for their actions.136 
 
Thirdly the Montreux document identifies the common ground between states with regards to 
states obligations of the regulation of the extraterritorial conduct of businesses.137 The 
Montreux Document (in Part Two) sets up standards of regulation and good practice which 
can be implemented and expanded on at a domestic level by states.138 
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Finally the Montreux Document reveals the tension which exists between state driven 
regulation and industry driven regulation of private military security companies.139  
 
In the first part of the document we find a collection of current international laws and norms 
regarding private military security companies and is relatively narrow in scope. The second 
part has a much broader scope and deals with issues of good practice and ideas of regulation 
and monitoring of private military security companies. Whilst Part One is considered law and 
therefore must be enforced and followed, Part Two is more a suggested code of practice and 
provides suggestions as to how states can ensure good practice and accountability, it is 
however ultimately up to the state to decide how to implement this at a domestic level.140 
 
The Montreux document also clarifies the position of personnel of private military security 
companies under International Humanitarian Law.141 The default position will be that they 
are presumed to be civilians and that only if they are formally incorporated into the armed 
forces as well as meet the other requirements under Article 4A(2) or if they act as a rebel 
soldier in a non-international conflict will they be considered combatants. This will however 
always have to be determined on a case by case analysis, although the vast majority of private 
military security company personnel are most likely to be considered civilians.142  
 
There are however several concerns regarding the Montreux Document. Some of the main 
concerns are that it does not always provide a lot of clarity143, some of the obligations are 
broad ones which could allow for too much room for states and private military security 
companies alike to manoeuvre. This occurs by the Montreux Document not definitively 
defining what obligations they have and what they are accountable for. There is also a lot 
more work which needs to be done on the exact nature of the obligations and duties between 
states and private military security companies.144 Another concern is that without sufficient 
monitoring and follow up mechanisms145 the Montreux Document might just be used by 
states to appear as if they are correctly regulating their relationships with private military 
security companies, whilst they are actually continuing as before, without any true 
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implementation or enforcement.146 There was also concern over the unfair bargaining power 
held by the western states over other nations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan during the 
discussions which ultimately created the Montreux Document.147 The results of this can be 
seen in the heavier burden which is placed on Territorial States rather than Home and 
Contracting States.148 This is seen throughout the document.149 Lastly the Montreux 
Document also gives private military security companies legitimacy, this despite the fact that 
currently they unregulated and unmonitored. Without any interim procedures in place this is 
considered a premature move.150  
 
In conclusion the Montreux Document represents the first document purely focused on 
private military security companies and despite its faults and the concerns which have been 
raised, it does at least clarify the position of private military security companies and their 
personnel within international humanitarian law. 
 
2.2.7. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
The same concerns regarding a lack of international law regulating the activities of the 
private military security industry which resulted in the drafting of the Montreux Document 
were also the impetus behind the drafting of the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers.151 The Montreux Document, as already discussed, focusses on 
reinforcing and reaffirming international obligations as well as creating a set of good practice 
standards designed for the private military security industry. The Montreux Document is also 
designed to be binding on states and ultimately be used as a framework for domestic 
regulation.152 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers on 
the other hand is a multi-stakeholder initiative designed to establish principles for the private 
military security industry which can ultimately be translated into industry standards against 
which private military security companies can be held accountable.153 For example the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers establishes principles 
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regarding how private military security companies conduct themselves and speaks to the use 
of force, the detention of individuals as well as prohibition of torture and sexual exploitation 
to mention but a few. The code also seeks to establish standards for the private military 
security industry in terms of good business practices.154 Finally the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers mandates the establishment of voluntary 
independent and external mechanisms to ensure effective governance and oversight of the 
principles established by the code.155 Unlike the Montreux Document, the code is a document 
between private military security companies and not states.156  
 
The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers was launched in 
2009 following on from the Montreux Document, and was promoted by the Swiss as well as 
the United Kingdom and the Unites States.157 The code which was finished in 2010 pulled 
together various actors including governments, private military security companies as well as 
members of civil society.158 The main concerns which the code set to address where the lack 
of accountability and apparent impunity in terms of domestic and international law being 
experienced by the private military security industry at large.159 This code has sought to solve 
this by establishing principles for the private military security industry as well as an oversight 
mechanism.160 
 
Whilst many questions still remain about how the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers will operate, and how effective it will be in practice, the code is 
regarded as a step in the right direction.161 Furthermore the code is seen as innovative in that 
it is not a traditional state-to-state agreement, but rather represents a public-private 
partnership which better accommodates this unique and growing industry.162 To date the code 
has been signed by well over 500 private military security companies, and this in and of itself 
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seems to indicate a positive reaction to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers.163 
 
2.3. The Duty on Domestic Actors to Regulate Private Military Security Companies 
The rights and duties which exist between states and personnel of their military forces are 
clear and established. However the rights and duties which exist between and state and 
personnel of private military security companies are not as well defined and established. One 
of the key concerns is that whilst the essential element of command and control is clear with 
a state’s military force, it is not clear with private military security companies where their 
personnel answer to the company rather than to the state. This has the potential to create 
confusion and uncertainty in conflict zones.164 States appear to have a duty to regulate and 
control private military security companies as it is a long established tradition that states have 
the monopoly of military forces and violence, if there is no regulation then this monopoly is 
lost.165 The responsibility of states in terms of private military security companies currently 
will be examined before analysing why it is in the best interest of a state to regulate this 
industry.  
 
Currently there is no international convention or treaty dealing specifically with the 
relationship between private military security companies and states. There are however 
several doctrines, including the Geneva Convention, dealing with the relationship between a 
state and a non-state body who is carrying out state functions. Worth noting are the Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR) which have been used 
by the International Court of Justice and whilst not technically forming a binding treaty carry 
substantial weight and form a key part of customary international law on this subject of state 
responsibility.166 These doctrines are based on the understanding within international law that 
breaches of international law committed by non-state actors, acting as organs of the state will 
amount to state responsibility. This understanding also extends to privately performed acts.167 
At the cornerstone of international law however is the understanding that the duty to protect 
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and preserve human rights rests with states and that this is an obligation which states cannot 
sidestep.168 There are several relationships which give rise to state responsibility. 
 
When the conduct is committed by recognised organs or agents of a state then it is clear that 
responsibility attaches itself to the state. This is in terms of Article 4 of ASR which allows for 
responsibility to be attached even in the case of apparent official capacity to act as an organ 
or agent of the state, but not in the case where the act was a purely individual and private 
act.169 This would only apply to a private military security company if they were fully 
incorporated into the armed forces of a state and this is unlikely considering the nature of 
private military security companies.170 
 
The actions of non-state actors who have been authorised to act on behalf of a state can also 
give rise to state responsibility; this is dealt with in terms of Article 5 of ASR.171 These de 
facto agents are private persons or companies which have a connection with the state which 
allows for liability to be imputed to the state. This liability is imputed despite the fact that the 
action being taken is being taken by a private person or company. This doctrine recognises 
that a state can breach its international law obligations through a range of actors and not just 
actors which are obviously organs of the state.172 If such a connection existed between a 
private military security company and a state it would be clear that the state would be 
responsible for the actions of that private military security company and its personnel. The 
problem which arises is what action constitutes a state action or function. It has been argued 
that if there is an international obligation on a state to perform a certain action or function, 
that that state cannot get itself out of that obligation by hiring a private company and that 
such a function is a function of that state.173 This problem is also dealt with by the concept of 
delegation can be found in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility. Here a state is found to have delegated its responsibilities to a private person 
or company if the nature of the task being carried out by that private entity can be considered 
a public and therefore government task. It is clear that most of the tasks carried out by private 
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military security companies are in fact public and therefore governmental in nature.174 In 
support of this are the 2001 International Law Commission commentaries which noted that 
private persons or companies which engage in military activities or services that are 
sponsored by a government can only be considered as agents of that government.175  
 
The above responsibility is extended, in Article 6 of ASR, to a second state which is utilising 
the first state’s organs. So that a state hiring a private military security company from one 
state to perform a function of their state would be liable for the actions of the private military 
security company and not that companies state of origin.176 This means that the actions of 
private military security companies can be attached to their state of origin or the state 
utilising their services so long as they have the state’s authority to conduct their actions and 
they are carrying out a function or duty of the state. 
 
It should also be noted that in terms of Article 7 of ASR that responsibility can still be 
attached to a state even if a private military security company exceeded their authority and 
acted beyond the ambit of their duty, so long as they are acting whilst ‘cloaked with 
governmental authority’.177 
 
Article 8 of ASR also holds state responsible where non-state actors are acting under state 
instructions or control. This Article appears to make provision for private military security 
companies by including actors which are not formally incorporated into the armed forces of a 
state.178 The key question here is what is considered control and more importantly sufficient 
control for the purposes of imputing responsibility onto a state. This question has been 
discussed and answer by two cases. The United States case of Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. Judgment 
of November 26  required that there be effective control whilst in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic 
(Appeal Judgement),  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 
July 1999 also place a responsibility on the Tadic government for the actions of private 
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companies so long there was overall control between the state and the private company or 
person.179 These decisions indicate, besides what constitutes control, that it is in the best 
interests of states to regulate and clarify the rights and duties of these private companies 
especially if they could potentially be held responsible for their actions.180 
 
Responsibility can also be attributed to a state even when the individual or company does not 
act with the orders of a state or under its control. Article 9 of ASR holds states accountable 
for the actions of an individual where they perform what could be considered a public 
function in the absence of an official authority.181 The actions of an unauthorised individual 
can also be attributed to a state if, in terms of Article 11 of ASR, the state ‘identifies with the 
conduct in question and makes it its own’.182 In both instances it is clear that the conduct of 
private military security companies, although most commonly authorised, can still be 
attributed to a state in terms of these two articles.  
 
The arguments above also find support from various international bodies and treaties. The 
Humans Rights Commission has held that on a number of occasions that a state is still 
responsible despite some of its functions being delegated to other private persons and 
companies.183 This statement is given support by the Committee against Torture and Article 
16 of the Convention against Torture which holds a state responsible for the actions of all of 
its organs including those which are private so long as they are acting in an official 
capacity.184 The understanding that a private company or person which is acting on behalf of 
a State will accrue liability for the State and therefore falls under the responsibility of the 
State is again endorsed by the draft articles on state responsibility drawn up by the United 
Nations International Law Commission.185 The draft articles go on to state that this is 
especially the case where the private person’s or companies headquarters are in the territory 
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of the state hiring them, as the state then has the ability to regulate and play a decisive role in 
for example the issuing of a licence to regulate.186  
 
In light of the responsibility that states do have for the actions of private persons and 
companies acting in their capacity, as private military security companies clearly do, there is 
a clear responsibility on governments to ensure that these relationships are properly 
regulated. The Private Military Security Company Draft Convention does in fact go the extra 
step of making this regulation a duty on states. This especially to ensure that private military 
security companies respect human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Currently the 
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group has been tasked by the Human Rights 
Council, in terms of Resolution 15/26, to look into the possibility of expanding upon this 
Draft Convention.187  
 
In addition to the duty created by international conventions and treaties there are also several 
policy considerations that highlight why states would want to and need to create regulation 
for private military security companies at a domestic level. Private military security 
companies have the ability to play a pivotal role in maintaining peace and protecting human 
rights, especially within Africa.188 The role of private military security companies often 
means providing security for people as well as property, and in essence upholding and 
ensuring basic human rights. They have also been involved in operations such as peace 
keeping and mine clearing and destruction.189 In light of this it is in the best interests of states 
to provide a system of regulation at a domestic level that allows for private military security 
companies to exist and continue their work, so as to prevent any negative impact on peace 
and stability within the African region.190 The loss of a peace keeping force would ultimately 
impact negatively upon all states within that region.191 In addition to this and owing to the 
fact that states have over the past several centuries had the monopoly on power within their 
country and regions, states would want to regulate any other actors which could also 
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potentially hold some power over their own territory and/or region.192 The private military 
security industry also has the potential to affect the balance of power and stability within a 
region and therefore states would want to be able to control the effects of this.193 Private 
security companies could potentially affect the reputation of a state, as has been noted with 
Executive Outcomes and the negative perception it created for South Africa194, and this 
would motivate states to regulate the activities of these companies.195  It can be seen therefore 
that the control that states gain over the impact that private military security companies can 
have on a region by the regulation of their activities is of great benefit to them.  
 
To conclude whilst there is only a definite duty placed on states to regulate private military 
security companies in the Private Military Security Company Draft Convention, it is also 
clear that they are potentially responsible for the actions of private military security 
companies. This in addition to the policy concerns raised above make for an extremely 
compelling case as to why states should regulate private military security companies and their 
activities at a domestic level.  
 
2.4. The Need to Find a Balance Between the Regulation and Criminalisation of Private 
Military Security Companies 
The Montreux Document, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers and the Private Military Security Company Draft Convention, are a clear indication 
that at an international level there is a move to regulate private military security companies. 
The same move has been made by countries at a domestic level such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom.196 On the other end of the spectrum there are also calls to ban the 
industry entirely; such a stance can be seen in the South African domestic framework.197 The 
next few chapters will analyse domestic attempts at the regulation of private military security 
companies in determining, from a domestic perspective what route presents itself as the best 
way forward. Whether regulation or criminalisation of private military security companies is 
what domestic legislation should be aiming for.  
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THE UNITED STATES 
 
This dissertation will now turn to various domestic systems of law to determine how 
mercenaries and private military security companies are regulated. In doing so these next few 
chapters hope to provide insight into any trends within domestic legal systems and how 
effective domestic law has been in dealing with mercenaries and private military security 
companies. This chapter in particular will focus on the United States by first discussing the 
history of mercenaries and private military security companies within the United States and 
what role they play in the modern United States. The chapter will then discuss each piece of 
law in turn and how each deals with mercenaries and private military security companies.  
 
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE 
MILITARY SECURITY COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States army has been using the services of mercenaries since the American 
Revolution. In 1775 when George Washington was facing severe shortages of men due to a 
lack of enrolments as well as the enlistments of a large number of his men ending1, he turned 
to hiring Hessian2 mercenaries, both foreign and local, in order to subsidise his troops 
numbers. The shortage of soldiers was a constant problem during the American War of 
Independence, and so the practice of hiring mercenaries became an accepted practice of 
Congress.3 The practice of hiring mercenaries was one also used by the English during the 
revolution. Striking an even more common resemblance with modern private military 
security company hiring was that Congress hired specific European military officers in order 
to fill gaps in the army which required expert knowledge.4 This foreshadows the present day 
use of modern private military security companies for their specific expertise and knowledge.  
 
In more modern times private military security companies have begun to flourish again 
thanks to the surplus of trained military individuals created by the ending of the Cold War 
and the desire of states to reduce the cost of their militaries and improve the efficiency of 
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their military programs.5 Private military security companies have been contracted by the US 
on the battlefield in Bosnia and during Operation Desert Storm. During these and similar 
operations however the role played by private military security companies was marginal, with 
at most nine thousand private military security company personnel being deployed.6   
 
1.1. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program  
 This rather modest deployment of private military security contractors changed with the 
creation of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in 1985. LOGCAP is an 
on-going program which is designed to allow the United States to hire civilian contractors, as 
they are referred to, to perform specific military services during times of war/armed conflict. 
This is done so as to alleviate pressure on the United States military and allow the military to 
redeploy their forces more effectively.7 LOGCAP was originally designed to allow for the 
fast and effective deployment of specialised individuals within the United States armed 
forces, as soon as they were required. This was done by having civilian contractors undergo 
training with either the military or private military security companies, who then keep a 
database of these specialised individuals who can be called upon and deployed. For the 
United States this meant that it did not have to train reserve personnel during peacetime, 
which is a costly exercise, yet is still had the advantage of having a supply of specialised 
individuals who could be called upon at any time.8 Prior to the establishment of LOGCAP, 
the ratio of United States troops to private military security personnel was 1:50 (during the 
Gulf War), since LOGCAP and during the Iraq conflict it has risen to 1:10.9 The reason for 
the increase of this ratio is two-fold. Firstly, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001, the United States reassessed its international security threats and sought to increase its 
international presence. Secondly, and counter to this trend, there has been a move to lower 
the number of United States troops involved in these conflict areas for a variety of reasons 
including public pressure.10 It can also be argued that without the use of private military 
security companies that the United States would not be able to maintain its military presence 
outside of the United States and this would severely impact upon its ability to implement its 
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current foreign policy.11 The use of private military security companies also allows the 
United States it to redeploy its resources into armaments as well as allowing it to stream its 
logistics department and supply lines.12 Consequently, the United States has become one of 
the largest users of private military security companies in the world, spending over US$300 
billion between 1994 and 2002 and entering into over three thousand contracts with private 
military security companies during that time. Moreover these private military security 
companies provide not only most the logistical needs of the United States armed forces, but 
they also train nearly all of their reserve officers.13  
 
Since LOGCAP was originally introduced the number of tasks which could outsources under 
the LOGCAP program has increased to allow for more private military security company 
involvement. The result of this change has meant that the current system of United States 
legislation and regulation dealing with the outsourcing of military tasks to private military 
security companies is at times ambiguous and even contradictory. These controversies will be 
discussed further in the following paragraphs. 
 
1.2. Congressional vs Executive Control Over Private Military Security Companies 
Currently all power over the military rests with Congress. This was established after the 
American Revolution in order to appease fears that existed at the time that a large army 
controlled by the Executive posed a potential danger to the freedoms and liberties of the 
American people.14 The only power granted to the Executive, is that the appointment of 
various positions within the armed forces must have the Executive’s approval. The only limit 
placed on Congress is that money cannot be appropriated for the raising of an army for a 
period greater than two years. This lack of restrictions means that Congress is able to raise 
and maintain an army during peace time.15 Evidence of this can be found in the promulgation 
of legislation such as LOGCAP, which allows, for example, for the training of an army 
during peacetimes. Congress also has the power to create rules and regulations for the armed 
forces of the United States, and dictate how the armed forces operate and who is employed 
                                                 
11 Note 1 above, 334. 
12 D Brooks, ‘Messiahs or mercenaries? The future of international private military services’ (2007) 7 
International Peacekeeping 129, 137. 
13 P W Singer, ‘War, profits, and the vacuum of law: Privatized military firms and international law’ (2004) 42 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 521, 522. 
14 Note 1 above, 331. 
15 Note 1 above, 331. 
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within its chain of command. Whilst Congress has the power to extend its authority over 
private military security companies, it has as of yet chosen not to exercise this power.16  
 
Whilst Congress deals specifically with the raising of the armed forces, it is mainly the 
Executive branch which establishes and maintains contractual relationships with private 
military security companies. The office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense is 
responsible for all contractual oversight within the Department of Defense. Where contracts 
are formed with the Departments of Commerce, Interior or the State Department then these 
contracts are overseen independently by officials within those government departments.17 In 
terms of regulation of the internal workings of private military security companies the United 
States is lacking any form of regulation, although there have been failed attempts by 
Congress in 2005 to impose training requirements and background checks.18 
 
A report by the Armed Services Committee (Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private 
Security Contractors in Afghanistan) revealed that private military security companies 
operate without sufficient government oversight. The report also highlights that a lack of 
accountability from the private military security companies means potential danger for 
civilians, members of the armed forces as well as a potential to undermine the mission itself. 
There is also a lack of adequate training which also adds to the risk factor.19 Despite the lack 
of congressional oversight, the United States Army Regulations stipulate that contractors are 
allowed to perform potentially any function other than an inherently government function 
which are defined as, ‘necessary for the sustainment of combat operations, that are performed 
under combat conditions or in otherwise uncontrolled situations, and that require direct control by 
the military command structure and military training for their proper execution’.20 Moreover, 
failure to abide by this may mean that PMSC lose the ability to claim their non-combatant 
status as the regulations lists them as civilians accompanying the force.21  
                                                 
16 Note 1 above, 332. 
17 Note 1 above, 334. 
18 F Schreier & M Caparini, ‘Privatising security: Law, practice and governance of private military and security 
companies’ (2005) Occasional Paper 6 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 1, 106. 
19 J L Gomez del Prado, ‘A United Nations instrument to regulate and monitor private military and security 
contractors” (2011)  1 Notre Dame Journal of International, Comparative, and Human Rights Law 1, 27. 
20 US Department of the Army, AR 715-9: Contractors Accompanying the Force, 21 Aldri van Jaarsveld Private 
military companies as “new peacemakers” in Africa: Is regulation sufficient? (unpublished Masters of Arts 
(International Studies, University of Stellenbosch, 2007) 28. 
21 Note 20 above, 28. 
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Having analysed the history and development of the relationship between the United States 
and mercenaries and more recently private military security companies this dissertation will 
now focus on analysing each piece of legislation dealing with mercenaries and private 
military security companies independently. Legislation dealing with mercenaries will be 
analysed first before legislation dealing with private military security companies. 
 
2. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
2.1. Legislation Relating to Mercenaries 
Attempts aimed more specifically at outlawing mercenaries include the United States Federal 
Statute which; ‘prohibits United States citizens from enlisting or from recruiting others from 
within the United States to serve a foreign government or party to a conflict with a foreign 
government with which the United States is at peace.’22 There is very little legislation with 
regards to mercenaries in particular, save for the Foreign Relations Act and the Neutrality 
Act. 
 
2.1.1. The Foreign Relations Act 
The Foreign Relations Act of 1988 places a prohibition on any citizen of the United States 
who accepts on offer to serve ‘a foreign prince, State, colony, district, or people, in war, 
against any prince, State, colony, district, or people, with whom the United States is at 
peace’. Sections 959 and 960 preclude a United States citizen from traveling and serving as a 
mercenary for a foreign state whilst the United States is at peace with that state. However, as 
the case of the United States v Elliott23 illustrates, the difficulty arises in determining whether 
or not a state of peace exists. In this case citizens who blew up a Zambian bridge were found 
to have contravened the Foreign Relations Act as the United States was at peace with Zambia 
at the time. In United States v Terrell24 however the supplying of weapons to the Nicaraguan 
Contras was not considered a contravention of the Foreign Relations Act as there was no state 
of peace with Nicaragua.25   
 
 
                                                 
22 Note 18 above, 106. 
23 266 F Supp 318 (DNY 1967) 
24 731 F Supp 473 (SD Fla 1989). 
25 C Walker & D Whyte, ‘Contracting out war?: Private military companies, law and regulation in the United 
Kingdom’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative law Quarterly 651, 668. 
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2.1.2. The Neutrality Act 
The 1794 Neutrality Act prevents an individual from preparing to leave for a foreign conflict, 
whilst the new 1937 Neutrality Act prohibits the recruitment of mercenaries within the 
United States26. The Neutrality Act has a limited scope as it does not define what a mercenary 
is, or what constitutes mercenary activity.27 It also doesn’t outlaw being a mercenary per se, 
but merely outlaws the recruitment of mercenaries, consequently the United States is able to 
get around this Act by hiring individuals as government agents and thereby avoiding the 
Act28, or making use of the fact that the Act does not outlaw the sale of military services, 
which is how most private military security companies market themselves.29 
 
2.2. Legislation Relating to Private Military Security Companies 
The Legislation relating to private military security companies is far more expansive and the 
three key pieces of legislation are: the Arms Export Control Act, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. These will be analysed in 
combination with the following pieces of legislation and committee reports: the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Department of State’s Office of Defense Trade Control, the Special 
Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act, the Stop Outsourcing Security Act and any 
applicable civil law. 
 
2.2.1. The Arms Export Control Act 
The Arms Export Control Act 1976 (AECA) is one of the primary means by which the 
United States regulates private military security companies. The AECA allows the President 
of the United States to control not only the import and export of defence articles and services, 
but also to create foreign policy guidance for personnel involved in the import and export of 
defence articles and services.30 This control was implemented after the realisation by the 
State Department that a number of private military security companies were providing 
military training to people from countries with whom the United States did not have good 
relations.31 This control over defence articles and services is exercised by the International 
                                                 
26 Note 20 above, 27. 
27 B Barrie, ‘Private military firms and mercenaries: Potential for liability under international law’ (2005) 12 
TFLR – International Law 324, 344. 
28 Note 20 above, 27. 
29 Note 13 above, 537. 
30 S Franklin, ‘South African and international attempts to regulate mercenaries and private military companies’ 
(2008) 17 TRANSNATIONAL Law & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 1, 253. 
31 Note 18 above, 105. 
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Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which implements the authority which AECA grants to 
the President. The authority of the President was delegated in 1997 by Executive Order 
11958 to the Secretary of State. The United States State Department administers that 
authority mainly through the Office of Defense Trade Controls at the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs. It is the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs which ultimately is responsible 
for the licensing of private military security companies.32 A private military security 
companies cannot operate until such time as it has been duly licenced.33 
 
The defence articles and services which may be exported are listed in part 121 of ITAR in the 
United States Munitions List (USML). Articles in the list include everything from firearms 
and tanks to nuclear radiation detection and measurement devices. Section 120.9 (a) of ITAR 
states that a defence service means: 
‘The furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or 
abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, 
maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense 
articles.’ 
 
Section 120.9 (a) also covers the ‘furnishing of technical data’ and ‘military training of 
foreign units and forces, regular and irregular’, whether provided in the US or abroad.34 The 
ITAR in general also covers various definitions, policies as well as violation and penalty 
issues.35 The services provided and offered by private military security companies need to be 
covered under USML and ITAR in order for a license to be granted.36 
 
The ITAR and USML are constantly being updated and amended so as to reflect the changing 
nature and objectives of United States foreign policy. So for example, in 2002 the United 
States government prevented all applications for licences or requests to export defence 
articles or services to Zimbabwe. A similar status was placed over the Federal Republic of 
                                                 
32 C Ortiz, ‘Regulating private military companies: States and the expanding business of commercial security 
provision’ in L Assassi, D Wigan, K van der Pijl (eds) Global Regulation. Mangaing Crises After the Imperial 
Turn (2004) 205, 212. 
33 Note 30 above, 253. 
34 Note 32 above, 212. 
35 Note 32 above, 212. 
36 Note 32 above, 214. 
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Yugoslavia in the 1990s but has since reversed.37 On the other end of the scale there are no 
constraints of any form placed on providing defence services or articles to NATO members.38 
 
If the cost of the defence article or service exceeds US$50 million then special procedures 
need to be followed. In brief the President is required to ask for a licence from the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate by providing the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
with a written certificate. Congress has the capacity to deny such a licence unless the 
President states in the certificate that ‘an emergency exists which requires that consent to the 
proposed transfer become effective immediately in the national security interests of the 
United States.’39 
 
Whilst there are some who argue that AECA is an effective mechanism of providing control 
over private military security companies and the services and goods which they provide via 
the licensing process.40 There are others who argue that the process of acquiring a license 
varies so considerable from one case to another that few are clear as to how the process 
works. Additionally it is noted that provided the contract amount is below the US$50 million 
mark, Congress does not need to be informed, nor does Congress have any right to request 
any information about that contract.41 Many contracts either fall under this amount or are 
broken up into smaller contracts so as to fall below this threshold. Once a license is issued 
there is little to no follow up on the private military security company, and whilst this should 
be the responsibility of foreign United States embassy officials, no officials has been 
delegated such oversight power to date. Many officials also view their primary job as being 
the protection of Americans rather than the investigation of Americans.42 The purpose of the 
AECA also appears to uphold foreign policy rather than international law.43 This can be seen 
by the diverse treatment given to various countries and that no distinction is drawn between 
governments and irregular forces. This diverse treatment illustrates that decision taken under 
the AECA do not cater to international law policies, but rather which country or force needs 
support in terms of the foreign policy considerations of the United States.44 
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2.2.2. The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) of 1950 established a court martial which was 
created during a time when military law was applied to civilians and the UCMJ was in part 
designed to allow for the prosecution of civilians under martial law.45 The decision in the 
case of United States v Averette46 however ended the ability of UCMJ to prosecute civilians. 
Averette provided a narrow interpretation of Article 2(a)(10), which stated that military 
jurisdiction over civilians existed only during times of war, by holding that times of war 
referred only to wars formally declared by Congress. Averette therefore almost ended the 
ability of UCMJ to be applicable as the last time that the United States Congress formally 
declared war was World War II.47  
In 2006 the Graham Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal 
Year 2007, which is primarily concerned with the budget for the Pentagon, amended the 
section in UCMJ which referenced in a time of war and replaced it with ‘in time of declared 
war or a contingency operation [over] persons serving with or accompanying an armed force 
in the field.’48 This amendment not only reflects a more accurate understanding of the private 
military security industry but also the nature and scope of their involvement in modern 
battlefields but also allowed for UCMJ to once again apply to civilians.49 The immediate 
effect of the amendment was to potentially make all civilians accompanying the military 
subject to military law.50 
 
The current concern around UCMJ is whether or not the amendment will stand up to a 
constitutional challenge on the grounds of over-inclusive grounds, due process and 
vagueness.51 This concern is given support by a 1957 case, Reid v Covert which upheld the 
unaltered section of UCMJ and its reference to ‘in times of war’ as the ‘maximum historically 
recognized extent of military jurisdiction over civilians.’52 Future courts will have to 
                                                 
45 A Ebrahim, ‘Going to war with the army you can afford: The United States, international law, and the private 
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47 Note 45 above, 196. 
48 Ibid. 
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determine whether or not the amendment exceeds this historical maximum. Future courts 
may also be posed with the question of whether or not the personnel of a private military 
security company is in fact a member of the armed forces and no longer a civilian based on 
the nature of their relationship with the armed forces and the nature of their duties and 
activities. If this is the case then the UCMJ in its entirety would be applicable.53 Reid also 
held that Congress, despite its power to regulate the land and naval forces, does not have the 
power to prosecute civilians without providing them with the standards guaranteed by the Bill 
of Rights.54 The court also mentioned in dicta that courts-martial are not the best place for the 
prosecution of civilians it did not expressly forbid the prosecution of civilians by the military. 
In fact lower courts have upheld the ability of the military to prosecute civilians.55  
 
If the courts accept that the constitution allows for the prosecution of civilians by the military, 
a civilian will still have to satisfy the statutory requirements of the UCMJ. These require that 
the civilian ‘serving with or accompanying an armed force’ that is operating ‘in the field.’56 
The phrase ‘serving with or accompanying an armed force’ means that the civilian’s presence 
must be dependent upon the armed forces and that there must be a connection and link 
between the two.57 In other words the presence of the two together cannot merely be 
incidental. The phrase ‘in the field’ is concerned more with ensuring that the duties being 
performed by the civilian at the time of the offence are connected to the battlefield. In short 
the civilian does not have to be on the frontlines to be having an active impact on the battle.58  
 
The Gates Memorandum was released in 2007 to clarify the confusion which existed as to 
what effect the amendment had on private military security personnel. It required that any 
offences by such personnel should be reported and referred to the Department of Justice. This 
deferral of authority from the military to the Department of Justice does not mean that the 
military relinquish jurisdiction and in fact the military is expected to continue to ‘address’ 
crimes while the investigation is being conducted by the Department of Justice.59 
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A concern with the UCMJ is what are the potential punishment which can be given to a 
civilian as most military punishment such as a loss of rank or dishonourable discharge are 
either not able to be carried out on the personnel of private military security companies or 
have no effect on these personnel. In addition is the concern that there is currently no way to 
compel private military security companies to retain their personnel so as to allow for the 
completion of courts-martial. A private military security company could just dismiss the 
accused individual and the military will no longer have jurisdiction over them.60 Lastly is the 
problem that the UCMJ only applies to personnel working for the Department of Defense and 
is not applicable to personnel in the employ of other government agencies, many of whom are 
also heavily involved in conflict areas.61  
 
2.2.3. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was created to fill in some of the gaps 
that were originally left by UCMJ before it was expanded as has been noted above.62 The 
MEJA does not extend territorial jurisdiction, but rather creates a status based source of 
jurisdiction. This it does by creating criminal jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses.63 
The MEJA applies to either members of the armed forces or to personnel of private military 
security companies who are accompanying the armed forces. In order for jurisdiction to arise 
the offence has to result in a sentence of a year or more in prison.64  
 
There are several concerns with the MEJA. The MEJA is only applicable to personnel of 
private military security companies who are working for the Department of Defense and 
therefore personnel working for other state departments, such as the State Department do not 
fall under the MEJA.65 It is also not applicable to personnel who are paid by a third party but 
are working for the United States66 or it appears personnel who are engaged in their own 
operations overseas.67 The MEJA requirement that the personnel in question must be 
‘supporting the mission of the Department of Defense’ has meant that the act does not cover 
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the conduct of personnel when they are acting independently or away from the armed forces. 
Lastly there is also the concern that the MEJA has been used too selectively which the 
Department of Justice has blamed on a lack of legal precedent68 as well as the concern that 
the MEJA does not extend to offences punishable by less than one year.69 
 
In order to deal with some of these problems Congress has amended the MEJA in two ways; 
firstly it has expanded the definition of employee to not only include personnel contracted by 
the Department of Defense but also ‘any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, 
to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of 
Defense overseas’. Secondly Congress has expanded the requirement about ‘supporting the 
mission of the Department of Defense’ to include any work being done in close proximity to 
an area where the armed forces are conducting their operations. There are still questions 
however about some ambiguous language in the act itself70 and there will always remain the 
difficulty of being authority to gather evidence in foreign jurisdictions.71  
 
In terms of the regulations issued by the Department of Defense for implementing the MEJA 
(Department of Defense Instruction 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed 
By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, 
and Former Service Members, March 3, 2005) the Department of Defense Inspector General 
has to inform the Attorney General when there is a suspicion that a federal crime has been 
committed.72 The Inspector General is also responsible for implementing investigations and 
investigative policies so as to give effect to the MEJA. In 2008 there had been twelve people 
charged under the MEJA and more investigations that may result in charges. There have also 
been several personnel who have pleaded guilty to their respective charges.73 These charges 
represent significant developments in the regulation of private military security companies, 
especially considering the international anger at some of the human rights abuses at times 
associated with private military security companies and their personnel.74 
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2.2.4. The Committee on Armed Services 
The Committee on Armed Services (the Committee) is the House panel which has been given 
legislative authority over defense matters. Essentially it is the Committee which must 
authorize all funds for the military and how where those funds and spent. The Committee 
creates several bills which affect military research, development and procurement. The 
number of private military security companies which are employed is therefore affected by 
the decisions of this committee in so far as budget allocation is concerned.75 
 
2.2.5. The Department of State’s Office of Defense Trade Control 
The Department of State’s Office of Defense Trade Control (ODTC) is mandated under 
ITAR to issue and authorise licences for private military security companies who are 
providing knowledge, services or goods. Applications are made by private military security 
companies to the ODTC which are then subject to review by the various offices of the 
ODTC. A concern that arises is that the licensing mechanism is confusing and often 
inadequate as well as the ability for oversight by bodies such as the ODTC and Congress is 
limited. The problem around the US$50 million threshold for contracts to be reviewed by 
Congress has already been discussed. There are however moves in Congress to change this 
threshold and provide greater oversight of the granting of contracts to private military 
security companies.76 
 
2.2.6. The Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act 
The Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act (SMTJ) is designed to extend United 
States jurisdiction and protect American citizens and property beyond the traditional borders 
of the United States. There are currently nine areas of special jurisdiction with the ninth being 
added in 2001 by the Patriot Act, these are: vessels on the high seas, vessels on international 
waterways, lands acquired by the United States, certain islands valued for their guano (bird 
excrement used for fertilizer), aircrafts, spacecrafts, lands outside the jurisdiction of any 
nation, and certain vessels bound for the United States and offenses committed by or against 
a United States national in any place or residence within a foreign state used by missions or 
entities of the United States government.77  Some of the criminal statutes which apply under 
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the SMTJ include: maiming, assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse, assault or contact, murder and 
manslaughter. The responsibility for prosecuting the crimes under the SMTJ rests with the 
Department of Justice.78 
 
The 2001 amendment means that in theory that jurisdiction could be extended to include 
personnel of private military security companies although to date there have been very few 
convictions using the SMTJ. The first of these was in 2004 when David Passaro was 
convicted under Section 9(A) of the SMTJ statute. Whilst the United States has traditionally 
been hesitant to apply domestic law outside of traditional United States territorial jurisdiction, 
Section 9(A) and the Passaro case shows potential for the United States to start doing so and 
holding more personnel of private military security companies liable in terms of domestic 
law.79 This was again seen in 2007 when a CIA contractor was convicted of assault whilst 
serving in Afghanistan.80 
 
2.2.7. The Stop Outsourcing Security Act 
In 2010 Representative Jan Schakowsky and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced the Stop 
Outsourcing Security Act (SOSA) with the goal of prohibiting the use of private military 
security companies in war zones.81 The main motivation behind SOSA is the potential for 
private military security companies to endanger the lives of United States military personnel 
as well as undermine military missions and relations with foreign governments needs to be 
removed. There is also the concern that the high salaries offered to the personnel of private 
military security companies not only places a burden on the American taxpayer but that this 
saps the moral from United States troops who are fighting for their country whilst also 
battling to feed and cater for their families.82 Finally private military security companies are 
being increasingly relied upon to conduct essential services and missions, they do not form 
part of the traditional chain of command and several high ranking United States officials are 
concerned that private military security company personnel are hampering the chances of 
success in Iraq.83 
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The SOSA would require that all military functions and training return to the United States 
military and that should the President wish to create exceptions to this, that such a decision 
and contract would have to be passed by Congress. The proposed act would also require any 
contract exceeding US$5 million to be overseen by Congress and private military security 
companies which are granted contracts would have to be far more transparent about their 
operations than currently which would include making public any disciplinary actions against 
any of their personnel.84  
 
Currently the status of the SOSA is that it is sitting with Congress and being considered by 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs as well as the Committee on Armed Services and 
Intelligence.85 
 
2.2.8. Civil Law 
The analysis provided under civil law will focus firstly on the law of contract and then tort 
law and how these can be used in the light of private military security companies. Contract 
and tort law have the ability to affect the decisions of private military security companies 
because they are companies and are therefore concerned by anything which could potentially 
affect their profit margins.86 
 
In terms of the law of contract the False Claims Act 1863 (FCA) allows private individuals to 
sue private military security companies on behalf of government and to then share in a 
portion of the damages won. Not only does the FCA therefore act as another mechanism to 
regulate private military security companies but it also lessens the burden on the United 
States government to investigate claims against the personnel of private military security 
companies.87 
 
Private military security companies may see their conduct regulated and punished under 
domestic tort law and more specifically the Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 (ATCA) which it has 
been argued allows for a foreigner to sue an American private military security company by 
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providing jurisdiction over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’88  
 
3. LEGAL CONTROVERSIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN WITH THE USE OF 
PRIVATE MILITARY SECURITY COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The incorporation by the United States Army of the personnel and services of private military 
security companies has created several logistical and legal issues which the current legislation 
of the United States does not cater for. The following are some of the challenges still facing 
the integration of the private military security industry and the military.  
 
Primarily there has been a failure to provide adequately for the legal incorporation of private 
military security companies and their personnel into the armed forces, especially during 
deployment.89 In 1997, an effort to sort out some of the confusion, the Department of the 
Army released a memorandum wherein it established that it was the contracting officer (i.e.: 
an officer within the private military security company) who was in charge of ‘monitoring 
contractor performance’, and who must then report back to the armed forces. From this 
statement it appears as though the private military security company personnel are removed 
from the military chain of command, as they now reported to their PMSC officer rather than 
the military.90 Oddly it remains is the responsibility of the armed forces to maintain the 
physical and spiritual quality of life of the private military security company personnel.91 The 
inclusion of private military security companies into the armed forces means that the 
potential for confusion between the private military security company and the military arises. 
An example of this is that often the times set by dining hall services (a service normally 
provided by a private military security company) often conflict with military duties. The 
relationship and duties of the two groups is often difficult to determine as they are motivated 
by different objectives, so whilst private military security companies are focused on securing 
a profit and running on cost effective strategy, the armed forces are focused on national 
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strategic goals. This combination of complex regulations, confusing chain of command and 
divergent goals creates confusion within the armed forces.92 
 
The licensing process also contains problem areas. For example by only placing limits on 
weapon transfers where the financial benefit for the private military security company 
exceeds fifty million US Dollars there exist a large number of contracts which are not 
susceptible to limits as the financial benefit from those contracts does not exceed fifty million 
US Dollars. Even for contracts whose financial benefit for the private military security 
company exceeds fifty million US Dollars it is only the United States embassy in the 
contracting country which provides the only oversight of these contracts. Currently however 
no oversight duty has been delegated to any officer of such an embassy. The net result being 
that very few contracts are able to have limits placed on them and those that do are not being 
monitored, as the only body which can oversee these contracts as to date not been directed to 
oversee any contracts.93  
 
Additional problems which exist with United States domestic legislation is that not only can 
the definitions provided within legislation be circumvented but also private military security 
companies can easily avoid prosecution by moving their operations. The lack of extra-
territorial jurisdiction is another problem which plagues most pieces of domestic legislation. 
Legislation also predominantly only caters for contracts with the Department of Defence and 
not other government bodies who also make use of the services of private military security 
companies. Lastly a lack of officials and oversight bodies constantly checking up on private 
military security companies means that there is little chance of enforcing domestic 
legislation.94 
 
The United States has stuck to its use of private military security companies despite 
accusations of human rights abuses, and several failed attempts by Congress95 to reserve 
military functions for the exclusive domain of the public sector. So for example when the US 
Congress tried to end the practice of employing private military security copmanies to 
interrogate detainees, the United States President argued that in some cases these personnel 
                                                 
92 Note 71 above, 50. 
93 Note 27 above, 344. 
94 Note 27 above, 345. 
95 Note 19 above, 13. 
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possessed ‘the best combination of skills to obtain critical intelligence’.96 Never the less some 
in Congress remain concerned by the apparent loss of control they have over those employed 
to fight in United States wars.97 
 
Despite the existence of the aforementioned legislation, this does not always ensure the 
prosecution of all personnel of private military security companies as some of these personnel 
do not fall within the definitions within these pieces of regulation. This means that despite a 
responsibility under international law to prosecute the United States is unable to prosecute.98 
There are several examples of how this occurs; the ability to prosecute does exist under other 
pieces of legislation such as the War Crimes Act and applies to acts of torture regardless of 
the nationality of the perpetrator and includes members of the armed forces of the United 
States, but this does not appear to include the personnel of private military security 
companies.99 Murder can also be prosecuted where both the victim and the perpetrator are 
United States nationals, but the approval of the Attorney General is required. This approval 
can only be granted where the murderer has not already been prosecuted for the crime, and 
where the suspect is no longer in the country where the murder took place, and in addition 
where that country is no longer able to secure the arrest of the suspect.100 Other legislation 
also allows for the prosecution of the personnel of private military security companies 
however this power seldom extends to foreign nationals101, even if in the employ of the 
United States and this power does not extend to a foreign private military security 
company.102 
 
A further consideration in the ability of the United States to be held liable for the actions of 
personnel of private military security companies is the question of the degree of control 
which a state exercises over that private military security company and their personnel. In 
Nicaragua v United States the degree of control required according to the International Court 
of Justice was a very stringent. This meant that whilst the United States may well have been 
liable for certain individual actions,  in order for it to be liable for the actions of the Contras 
as a whole then it was needed to be proven that the United States had effective control of the 
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military operations during the period when the alleged violations occurred.103 The 
requirement was however altered by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case of Prosecutor v Tadic who found the decision 
in Nicaragua v United States to be confusing and also inconsistent with international law 
around state responsibility. International law makes states responsible for the actions of 
individuals who aren’t state organs so long as they are acting on behalf of the state. The 
Appeals Court stated that the international law requirement is that states must exercise 
control over that individual in order to be liable for the actions performed by that individual 
but that the degree of control may vary according to the factual circumstances of each unique 
case.104 The decision of the Appeals court therefore was that state responsibility arises out of 
two potential circumstances; either a state official commits an unlawful act, or private 
individuals who are acting as de facto states organs perform an unlawful act. In order to be 
considered a de facto state organ the individual needs to be paid or financed by the state and 
that there conduct must be supervised and authorised by the state.105 The impact on the 
United States in particular may mean that by placing private military security companies 
under the jurisdiction of the UCMJ that based on either the Nicaragua or Tadic decisions the 
personnel of private military security companies are meeting the requirements of effective 
control and de facto state organs and that the United States is responsible for their actions.106  
 
When the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with the Rome Statute in 2002 
and the possibility of the American military personnel being brought to justice based on the 
state responsibility findings in Tadic the United States responded by entering into Article 98 
Agreements with over ninety countries. These agreements prevented either party from turning 







                                                 
103 Note 50 above, 233. 
104 Note 50 above, 233. 
105 Note 50 above, 233. 
106 Note 50 above, 234. 




There is a general consensus throughout the various acts and committee reports discussed 
above that the United States has sought to outlaw mercenaries and prevent their citizens from 
at the very least recruiting mercenaries108, and secondly that there is a need to regulate private 
military security companies and hold them accountable for their actions.109 Moreover the 
creation of a licensing system under the AECA indicates the United States desire to utilise 
private military security companies, and even the SOSA creates room for exceptions to allow 
for the use of private military security companies.110 When problems with various acts have 
been mentioned above it has mainly been to raise concern over the lack of oversight of 
private military security companies111 or that further offences need to be included.112 The 
simple conclusion therefore is that what the United States should be looking to do is further 
regulate and monitor the private military security industry.  
 
United States laws and in particular the AECA show a trend towards the creation of a 
regulatory system of laws rather than the explicit banning of both mercenaries and private 
military security companies such as is seen in the South African legal system.113 There are 
also those who argue that despite some of the problems faced by the United States in 
regulating private military security companies that its attempts at licensing defence articles 
and services could well serve as examples for other countries and the difficulties that is has 
faced with oversight could serve as good lessons for other countries.114 
 
With the jurisdiction of UCMJ being increased and the possibility arising that the United 
States may well be held responsible for the actions of the personnel of private military 
security companies there is a need for the United States not only to clarify the role played 
private military security companies but also to consider incorporating private military 
security companies into the armed forces so as to exert great control over them.115 This would 
be done in order to protect both civilian and military commanders from being held criminally 
liable for the commission of offences by private military security company personnel.116  
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It is important to remember that the current structure of the armed forces of the United States 
is such that private military security companies form an integral and permanent part of it. 
Therefore whatever future steps are taken they need to be developed with this fact in mind.117 
Bearing in mind the integral role played by private military security companies within the 
armed forces the findings of the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘Inquiry 
into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan,’ which was 
approved in 2010 should be worrying to Congress. The report highlights that not only are 
there gaps in terms of responsibility and accountability with regard to private military 
security companies but that these gaps pose a risk to civilians, military and private military 
security company personnel and military missions. The inquiry found that the United States 
government is failing to sufficiently oversee private military security companies and their 
actions. That the Department of Defense is failing to enforce policies designed to hold private 
military security companies accountable and prevent deficiencies from arising and finally 
United States military personnel are being put in harm’s way because the Department of 
Defense is not properly training the personnel of private military security companies.118 The 
potential result of this lack of government oversight is that with an increased legal duty the 
United States will be finding itself responsible for more and more criminal offences.119 In 
order to deal with this possibility the United States has entered into Article 98 Agreements 
with currently over ninety countries. The Article 98 Agreements guarantee that neither party 
to the agreement will surrender a national of the other party to the ICC without the consent of 
that party. It would appear that these agreements cover the personnel of private military 
security companies. These agreements however are merely short term solutions as they don’t 
actually deal with legal culpability and there is always the possibility of countries to refuse to 
accept these agreements or fail to uphold them and whilst this might not always currently be 
in a countries interest there is no guarantee that in the future countries will still depend on 
support from the United States. Mexico is a good example of a country which has refused to 
enter into such an agreement with the United States. Lastly the agreements don’t cover 
personnel of private military security companies when employed by a nation other than the 
United States.120 The United States has also entered into over 120 contracts with various 
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private military security companies whereby the United States is required to cover any 
liability incurred by the private military security company. Whilst this may protect the private 
military security company, not only do the American taxpayers have to foot the bill121 but 
bilateral agreements such as the two mentioned above are not an appropriate response to the 
growth of the private military security industry. A better and longer term solution may well 
be the establishment of an international norm of incorporation which would resolve questions 
of legal responsibility and allow the United States to fulfil its foreign policy objectives.122 
 
There are several incentives for the United States to establish and buy into an international 
regulatory system. The starting point is to understand that currently the United States is the 
leading supplier and user of private military security companies and their personnel. This 
means that they are leading the industry and have an enormous ability to influence the 
industry. It is therefore in the best interest of the United States to utilise its current industry 
dominance to dictate how international law should regulate the private military security 
industry.123 The United States however cannot expect this industry dominance to last forever 
and so it needs to act before other countries such as China or Russia start to gain too much 
influence in the industry. In the future with other countries increasing their use of private 
military security companies the United States would also want to be able to hold countries 
accountable for the actions of private military security company personnel in their employ 
and this is not going to be possible without an international system which forces states to be 
held responsible for the actions of such personnel.124 The benefit to a future with a larger 
private military security industry is that true competition not only drives down costs, which is 
a major public criticism of private military security companies, but also improves service 
delivery, which also happens to be  concern raised about current private military security 
companies.125 It is also unrealistic to expect other countries to sit idly by whilst being 
adversely affected by private military security companies and not have the power to do 
anything about it. It therefore makes sense for the United States to create an international 
system if it is going to continue to utilise private military security companies, which has 
already been noted as an almost certainty.126  Lastly the incorporation of private military 
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security companies into the armed forces would increase control and accountability and in the 
process decrease the likelihood of offences against international laws.127 
 
In final conclusion noting that what has been discussed above clearly indicates the entrenched 
nature of private military security companies within the United States armed forces, and the 
development of a legal system which is clearly a regulatory mechanism which is evolving 
through various amendments to create better regulation, accountability and criminal 
jurisdiction. The incentives just discussed make a strong argument for the United States to 
buy into an international regulatory system where currently they would have the power and 
dominance to influence it so as to benefit their reliance and use of private military security 
companies.
                                                 






1. INTRODUCTION  
The United Kingdom has had a long association with mercenaries and private military 
security companies which includes the government of the United Kingdom itself hiring 
mercenaries such as the hiring of Hessian soldiers during the American War of 
Independence.1 In 1815 the United Kingdom licensed private companies such as the East 
India Company, which was used by the British government to colonise India, and had an 
army of 150 000 soldiers.2 The result of this long history and association with mercenaries 
and private military security companies is that the United Kingdom also has a long history in 
legislating and regulating the activities of mercenaries and private military security 
companies.3 
 
With the rise of the modern private military security company the use of mercenaries is no 
longer necessary for the United Kingdom who continues their use of private military security 
companies to this day.4 Despite, for example, having ended its combat operations in Iraq the 
United Kingdom still has several private military security companies on the ground in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. There are also British incorporated private military security companies who 
are serving contracts with the United States Department of Defense.5 Almost 80 per cent of 
British Army training program is conducted by private military security companies6 and some 
reports reveal that the number of privately employed personnel working for the British Army 
may exceed the number of publically employed personnel.7 Unlike the United States, the 
United Kingdom does not have a licensing system for its private military security companies. 
Instead it relies on a system of self-regulation based on an industry-wide voluntary code of 
                                                 
1 D Shearer, ‘Outsourcing war’ (1998) 112 Foreign Policy 68, 69&70. 
2 Note 1 above, 69&70. 
3 Note 1 above, 69&70. 
4 A Irvin, ‘Rethinking the role and regulation of private military companies: What the United States and United 
Kingdom can learn from shared experience in the war on terror’ (2011) 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 446, 446. 
5 Ibid. 
6 D Whyte, ‘Lethal regulation: State-corporate crime and the United Kingdom government’s new mercenaries’ 
(2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 575, 576. 
7 C Walker & D Whyte, ‘Contracting out war?: Private military companies, law and regulation in the United 
Kingdom’ (2005) 54 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 651, 652. 
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conduct.8 The result is that currently private military security companies within the United 
Kingdom have very little legislative oversight.9 The British government is therefore under a 
great deal of pressure to create regulations for the private military security industry. To date 
the preferred method for regulating the industry, according to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, involves three components: Firstly, the development of a code of 
conduct for private military security companies, secondly to try restrict any contracting with 
private military security companies to those companies which follow this code of conduct, 
and lastly, to develop global standards for the private military security industry by working 
with other international actors.10  
 
Unlike the United States, the British Government has not yet elected to  prosecute any 
personnel of a British private military security company, but the reality is that there is a very 
real risk that very soon the need may arise for scrutiny of the British government and there 
stance on PMSC.11 The conviction and sentencing of Danny Fitzsimons by an Iraqi court in 
2011 for shooting two fellow contractors and an Iraqi guard is a clear statement from the 
British government that they consider the personnel of private military security companies 
the sole concern of the private military security companies, and not the British Government.12 
To date the only tangible step taken by the British government towards greater regulation of 
the private military security industry is the 2002 Green Paper13, which will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
Having analysed the history and present day reality of the relationship between the United 
Kingdom and mercenaries and private military security companies and highlighting some of 
the general problems which exist at a domestic level, this dissertation will now focus on 
analysing each piece of legislation independently. 
 
                                                 
8 Note 4 above, 447. 
9 The Export Control Act does provide some restrictions on the trafficking and brokering of military equipment, 
as does the Landmines Act which would apply to any private military security company dealing in landmines or 
landmine based services. These two acts, which will be discussed in more detail later on, however are not 
specifically designed and created to deal with private military security companies (A Irvin, ‘Rethinking the role 
and regulation of private military companies: What the United States and United Kingdom can learn from 
shared experience in the war on terror’ 454). 
10 Note 4 above, 446&453. 
11 Note 4 above, 455. 
12 Note 4 above, 455. 
13 Note 4 above, 453. 
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In analysing the United Kingdom’s domestic legislation this dissertation hopes to provide 
insight into possible emerging trends within domestic legal systems, and analyse how 
effective domestic law has been in dealing with the different concerns posed by mercenaries 
and private military security companies. This chapter in particular will discuss each piece of 
domestic UK law in turn, and explore how each in turn deals with mercenaries and private 
military security companies.  
 
2. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
The first piece of British legislation dealing with mercenaries and private military security 
companies was the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1736. This act prevented individuals enlisting 
or seeking to enlist others, ‘in the service of any foreign prince, State, or potentate without 
the prior express leave or licence of the Crown’.14 Such an activity was considered to be 
prejudicial to the safety and welfare of the monarch, as well as the country as a whole.15 
Twenty years later, the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1756, increased the list of actors with 
whom a British citizen was not allowed to enlist, to include the French King. In a similar 
fashion the Militia Act of 1768 dictated that those who sought enlistment in the ‘Scotch 
Brigade in the service of the States General of the United Provinces’ were first required to 
take an oath of allegiance to the British Monarch. If a British citizen were to enlist in the 
services of another prince or state, without first obtaining the required permission, their 
actions might be punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. During the reign of King George 
II this misdemeanour was re-classified as a felony, which could be punishable by death.16  
 
In 1819, pursuant to the 1814 Treaty of Paris with Spain, in which the British government17 
agreed to take all measures necessary to prevent British subjects from supporting insurgents 
in the Spanish Colonies in South America with their fight for independence18, the British 
government enacted the Foreign Enlistment Act. The purpose of this act was to provide the 
British government with the requisite power to enforce the consequent proclamation of 
neutrality which was issued in 1817. The Foreign Enlistment Act repealed the earlier pieces 
                                                 
14 A Layeb, ‘United Kingdom legislative control of mercenary activity, its effectiveness’ (1988) 45 Mil. L. & L. 
War Rev. 47, 50. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Note 14 above, 50.. 
17 Bowing to political and economic pressure. 
18 Note 14 above, 49. 
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of legislation, and was more stringent, precise and elaborate.19 This new act was applicable to 
acknowledged and unacknowledged powers20, as well as to any power which rose to power 
regardless of whether or not that power had assumed power via legitimate means.21 The 1819 
Act also extended the prohibited grounds from enlistment to include the equipping or fitting 
out of vessels for warlike purposes22, and it was these very provisions which resulted in Great 
Britain being held liable during the American Civil War for allowing ships to be equipped. 
 
The 1819 Act also re-classified any failure to comply with its provisions once again as a 
misdemeanour rather than a felony.23 In 1867 a Royal Commission was appointed to 
investigate the shortcomings of the 1819 Foreign Enlistment Act. The Royal Commission 
recommended that the act be extended and amended so as to grant further and sufficient 
powers to the Crown, which eventually resulted in the promulgation of the Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1870.24 The 1870 Act is still in effect today and shall be fully analysed and 
discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Currently there are four pieces of legislation which pertain to the activities of private military 
security companies and mercenaries: the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, the Export Control 
Act of 2002, The Landmines Act of 1998 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 
2001. There is also one Green Paper, drafted in 2002, but which has not yet been 
promulgated. These will be explored further in detail here. 
 
2.1. The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 
The existing Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 differs in two important respects from its 1819 
precursor. The first is that the 1870 Act expanded the definition of a British subject from 
natural-born British subjects, to all British subjects regardless of how they acquired their 
citizenship.25 The second difference was that the prohibition against service in a foreign state 
which is friendly with Britain was given a broader application in the new act. The effect of 
                                                 
19 Note 14 above, 49&50. 
20 This meant that the Act was applicable regardless of whether or not the British government had acknowledged 
the authority of the state or rebel force in question.   
21Note 14 above, 49&50. 
22 Note 14 above, 49&50. 
23 Note 14 above, 49&50. 
24 Note 14 above, 51. 
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these two amendments made the 1870 Act the piece of British legislation which prohibited its 
citizens from becoming mercenaries for foreign countries.26  
 
The essence of the 1870 Act is captured in the following section:  
‘If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without her 
Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or 
naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty... [h]e shall 
be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment or, either of 
such punishments’.27 
 
The 1870 Act, unlike the legislation emanating from the United States, applies to acts 
committed both within and outside the borders of the United Kingdom.28 The one thing that 
the 1870 Act does have in common with other countries domestic legislation is that it does 
not offer a definition of a mercenary, but rather seeks to criminalise mercenary type 
activities.29  
 
2.1.1. Sections 4-7, 11-12 and 30 of the 1870 Act 
Section 4 of the 1870 Act prevents British citizens from enlisting their services with a foreign 
state’s military or navy, without a licence issued by the Crown, while section 5 prevents a 
British citizen from boarding a ship with the intention of committing the offence mentioned 
in section 4 or inducing another person to board a ship for the purposes listed in section 4.30 
The fact that section 5 of the Act makes no references to the boarding of an aircraft perhaps 
speaks to the vintage of the Act, rather than the notion that aircraft are not also means used to 
enlist the services of mercenaries.31 Without mentioning the word mercenary the net effect of 
sections 4 and 5 is to outlaw the potential activities associated with mercenarism. The 1870 
Act makes one allowance for mercenary type activities, but only on condition that the 
‘perpetrator’ of these activities does so with a licence issued by the Crown.32  
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Section 6 of the 1870 Act also makes it an offence to induce any person to quit the British 
dominions, or embark on any ship within the British dominions, under the misrepresentation 
of what he is to be engaged in, when his actual intention is to join the services of a foreign 
state’s military or naval forces.33 Section 7 makes the master of a ship guilty of an offence if 
he agrees to take on board a person who is guilty of an offence in terms of sections 4, 5 or 
6.34 Section 7 also prevents the fitting or preparation of a ship within British waters, for the 
purpose of taking part in a military or naval operation, against a foreign state which is at 
peace with Britain.35 Any person involved in the fitting and preparation of the ship will also 
find themselves liable under section 7 of the Act.36 Section 12 provides that any person who 
aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of any one of the offences listed in the 1870 
Act shall be tried and punished as a principal offender.37 In interpreting section 12, the British 
Courts have adopted a wide interpretation, in the interest of maintaining good relations with 
foreign states.38  
 
One of the questions arising from the 1870 Act is whether or not its reference to a foreign 
state means that it is not applicable to those who enlist in cases of civil wars or wars of self-
determination. In order to answer this question most academics turn to the interpretation 
clause found in section 30 of the Act, which defines foreign state as: ‘includ[ing] any foreign 
prince, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or any person or persons 
exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, 
colony, province, or part of any province or people.’39 From this they conclude that a very 
wide definition is given to the term ‘foreign state’, and as such it is clear that those who enlist 
in support of parties to a civil war are also included in this definition. The result of this 
interpretation is that a licence issued by the Crown is needed whether attempting to join the 
forces of the rebels or the forces of the government.40 In such instances a peculiar difficulty 
arises in that the 1870 Act requires the British government to recognise the civil war before it 
can issue a license required under the provision of the act. On the other hand there are those 
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who argue that despite this potential hurdle the 1870 Act does still apply to rebel forces. They 
argue that such rebels are automatically recognised by the British government, since the 
purpose behind the 1870 Act is to maintain Britain’s neutrality, by preventing its citizens 
from entering or assisting any war effort of any state, or as the case may be, rebel force. To 
allow for an interpretation of the 1870 Act which undermines the very purpose of its 
existence is counterintuitive.41 There are those however who argue that section 30 requires a 
force, state or rebel, to have actual control or governance over territory.42 Since this is 
unlikely to be the case for most rebel groups, especially guerrilla forces, some have 
questioned whether or not the 1870 Act does in fact cover rebel forces.43 The potential 
uncertainty created by the 1870 Act was best shown when, in 1937, the British Government 
expressly prohibited any British citizen from assisting either side of the Spanish Civil War.44 
Despite the British government never officially recognising the war, the British government 
made it clear that to assist without the requisite licence was an offence under sections 4 and 5, 
this despite recognition being required under the 1870 Act. The need for the British 
government to issue such a clear statement is evidence of the flaws, with regards to the status 
of rebels and British citizens who assist rebel forces, or at the very least the fear of there 
being flaws within the 1870 Act.45 It is also worth noting that section 11 of the 1870 Act 
potentially covers unrecognised wars by referring to ‘hostile acts’. Despite the declaration by 
the British government, and the provisions contained in sections 4, 5, 11 and 30, there were 
many British citizens who fought on both sides of the Spanish Civil War and indeed many 
other wars over the years. It is notable that very few have found themselves convicted under 
the 1870 Act or any legislation existing prior to it.46  
 
2.1.2. Case law pursuant to the 1870 Act 
The reaction to the 1870 Act was not altogether supportive. Shipbuilders saw the 1870 Act as 
an infringement on their ability to trade and expand British trade and commerce.47 This view 
was also shared by the courts, which were also of the view that the 1870 Act placed too many 
restrictions on the British citizen.48 The first case decided was R v James Carlin where the 
                                                 
41 Note 14 above, 56. 
42 Note 28 above, 81. 
43 Note 28 above, 81. 
44 Note 14 above, 59&60. 
45 Note 14 above, 59&60. 
46 Note 14 above, 60. 
47 Note 14 above, 56&57. 
48 Note 14 above, 56&57. 
67 
 
ship Salvador was seized by the governor of the Bahaman Islands for assisting rebels in the 
Island of Cuba, in violation of section 7 of the act. The Vice-Admiralty Court decided that the 
ship should be returned as no violation of section 7 had occurred. The court argued that the 
ship was not engaged against any foreign state, as the rebels did not assume to act with any of 
the powers of government, or control any of the territory of the Island of Cuba.49 This 
decision was reversed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal. The 
committee found that they were satisfied that the rebels had in fact formed themselves into a 
group which formed a part of the people and territory of the Island of Cuba, and that the ship 
had been engaged in assisting them.50  
 
Another authoritative cases dealing with the 1870 Act was the case of R v Sandoval.51 In this 
case goods and munitions were purchased in Britain with the intention of being shipped to 
Venezuela to assist in fighting there. The court held that the act of fitting out an expedition 
included its preparation, and that an offence was committed in terms of the 1870 Act the 
moment an overt act of preparation had occurred. This was to ensure that any attempt to 
breach the 1870 Act could be dealt with and prevented as soon as possible.52  
 
In the case of R v Jameson and Others53 a British subject attempted to assist a military force 
in their efforts to engage the Transvaal government, who opposed Cecil John Rhodes’ plan to 
incorporate the whole of Southern Africa under British rule. The court held that any person, 
who assists in the preparation of an unlawful expedition, even if such assistance is provided 
outside one of the territories of Great Britain, shall be guilty of an offence.54  
 
The 1870 Act has been heavily criticised for hindering British citizens in conducting their 
work and inhibiting the development and expansion of the British trade and commercial 
empire.55 In addition to this the 1870 Act has hardly ever been used to prosecute individuals, 
and has resulted in even fewer convictions despite British civilians being involved in several 
conflicts since its adoption.56 One of the biggest criticisms levelled at the Act is that the idea 
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of neutrality, upon which the 1870 Act is based, is no longer an acceptable foreign policy in 
the modern world and that the purpose behind the legislation is outdated.57 The shortcomings 
of the 1870 Act were analysed by the Diplock Report.  
 
2.1.3 The Diplock Report 
The Diplock Committee was established as a response to the trial of several British 
mercenaries in Angola between 1975 and 1976, and which resulted in the public execution of 
those British mercenaries.58 The Diplock report represented the findings of the committee and 
was released in 1976.59 The committee was asked to analyse the 1870 Act, and to determine 
whether sufficient controls existed in respect of the enlistment and recruitment of British 
citizens as mercenaries, and then to make recommendations for either fresh legislation or for 
the amendment of the 1870 Act.60  
 
The Diplock Report found the 1870 Act inappropriate and in dire need of updating. The 1870 
Act was found to be an unjustified infringement on the rights and freedoms of British 
citizens, in that it prevented them from working overseas in the security industry – assuming 
that they were mercenaries.61 The Diplock Report stated that those prohibited mercenary type 
activities should be defined not on the basis of motivation for private gain, but rather that the 
more pertinent enquiry should  look at the purpose for which the individual’s had been hired. 
The Diplock Report went further to say that any definition of mercenarism which was 
dependant on determining an individual’s motivation would be impractical and unworkable.62 
A more accurate means of determining whether such activities were acceptable would be by 
looking at the purpose for which these individuals were hired and what the potential 
consequences of their actions might be.63  
 
The Diplock Report also concluded that the wording and requirements of the 1870 Act were 
outdated and unusable. Some of the problems highlighted in the Report included the fact that 
the 1870 Act only referred to those individuals who departed by ship, without making any 
mention of more modern forms of transportation. The 1870 Act is also not applicable to 
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Commonwealth countries, especially those which still keep the British Monarch as their 
monarch, since the 1870 Act speaks of ‘foreign states’ consequently excluding any activities 
carried out on the territory of Commonwealth countries. Finally the 1870 Act was originally 
designed to support the policy of neutrality, which in 1870 might have had political purchase, 
but which today has undergone significant modern developments, none of which the 1870 
Act has been kept abreast of.64  
 
The final recommendations of the Diplock Report was that British citizens seeking work 
outside the territory of Britain, in undertaking mercenary type activities, should be allowed to 
pursue these activities so long as the countries they wish to work for are not on a restrictive 
list, which was to be drawn up by the British government.65 The hiring and training of 
mercenaries within Britain should however remain prohibited.66 The main problem with the 
recommendations made by the Diplock Report is that they concern themselves too heavily 
with internal regulation, and do not consider international obligations and consequences 
which flow from British policies.67 The findings of the Diplock Report in 1976 have since 
become outdated and are no longer in tune with the modern international and domestic 
movement towards regulation rather than outright prohibition of ‘mercenary type’ activities, 
and fails to deal with the rise of private military security companies68 and the nuance 
responses that this new actor demands of states in their regulation of mercenary type 
activities. 
 
2.2. The 2002 Green Paper, ‘Private Military Companies; Options for Regulation’ 
The 2002 Green Paper on ‘Private Military Companies; Options for Regulation’ (Green 
Paper) was the product of a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee which reported 
on the role of the private military security company Sandline International and the role they 
played in Sierra Leone in 1997. Sandline International had apparently received approval from 
the Foreign Office in 1997 to ship weapons to Sierra Leone, in breach of a United Nations 
embargo,  in what would become known as the ‘Arms to Africa’ affair. The effect of the 
‘Arms to Africa’ affair was to impact negatively upon the United Kingdom’s much praised 
and ethical stance on how it had so far conducted itself international and the degree of control 
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it had been able to hold over its citizens at an international level. The Green Paper was first 
presented on 13 February 2002 and sought to create legislation, after a long process of 
engagement with the international community, around the subject of private military security 
companies and mercenaries.69  
 
The position of the United Kingdom as set out in the Green Paper is that there is little or no 
prospect of successfully outlawing private military security companies and that the better 
approach therefore is to bring private military security companies into the fold by some form 
of regulatory government framework.70 The logic behind this is that a government would 
rather be aware of what is happening in the private military security industry, and therefore 
be able to control and regulate it, rather than be unaware and unable to control the industry.71 
The Green Paper also argues that not only is the growth of the private military security 
industry inevitable, but that there are also several benefits which arise from the use of private 
military security companies, and that regulating them is the best way to reap the benefit 
which flow from their use.72 The benefits noted by the Green Paper include the use of private 
military security companies by weak states, to create a state owned monopoly of violence, 
which in turn might stabilising the region. Other benefits include the economic benefits to 
using private military security companies rather than an entirely state funded military.73 
Private military security companies could also be put to greater use in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, as well as an increase in the ability to fund permanently deployed forces in 
destabilised regions.74 The United Kingdom government also acknowledges in the Green 
Paper that the best way to force disreputable private security companies to change their 
behaviour is to award lucrative government contracts to reputable private military security 
companies.75 The export of military services and arms also comprises a large portion of 
United Kingdom exports and as such by regulating rather than prohibiting these companies, 
and therefore these exports, the United Kingdom is able to maintain the income generated 
from these exports. The use of private military security companies also means that there is 
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less political pressure on the government of the United Kingdom as there would be if they 
were to utilise their armed forces.76  
 
The Green Paper lists six options for the United Kingdom government to consider going 
forward with its legislation regarding the private military security industry. They are: 
 a ban on military activity abroad 
 a ban on recruitment for military activity abroad 
 a licensing regime for military services 
 registration and notification 
 a general licence for private military security companies 
 self-regulation through a voluntary code of conduct77 
These six options can be grouped into three basis policy based groups: 
 a ban on participation in armed conflict abroad (options 1 and 2) 
 a licensing and authorisation system (options 3, 4 and 5) 
 the promotion of codes of conduct for private military security companies (option 6)78 
These three groups will now each be discussed in turn to determine which option is arguably 
the most defensible and therefore the most likely way forward for UK legislation aimed at 
regulating private military security companies. 
 
2.2.1. A ban on participation in armed conflict abroad 
The ban mentioned in the Green Paper could either be a complete ban or the partial ban of 
certain activities which the government decides should be prohibited, such as direct 
involvement in conflict.79 The problems which prevented the ban on participation in armed 
conflict abroad, as found in the 1870 Act, from being successful are likely to prevent any 
future ban from being effective for the same reasons. The failure of the 1870 Act in this 
regard, and the fact that British citizens continued to fight in wars despite the 1870 Act paint 
a very clear picture that such a policy is doomed to fail. One of the key problems associated 
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with enforcing a ban is the collection of evidence in order to enforce that ban. The problems 
with collecting evidence include the fact that these offences often happen in foreign 
countries, in regions which are difficult to reach. Moreover the current definitions of 
mercenarism offered by the UN and OAU also provide difficulty in collecting evidence to 
prove for example that profit was in fact the sole motivating factor.80 There is also the 
technical difficulty of legislating the banning itself. This would require the banned conduct to 
be defined, and current attempts at providing such a definition have proven to be completely 
unable to provide a sufficient, workable and effective definition.81 Assuming that an effective 
definition could be created this would potentially limit the ability of humanitarian private 
military security companies, such as mine clearers, from performing their often essential 
work.82  
 
There is also a clear lack of political will to ban the actions of private military security 
companies. This is evidenced by the fact that there are very few convictions for mercenarism 
per se, despite international conventions having been in force for several years.83 On the other 
hand there is an abundance of private military security companies and countries which 
engage and support their activities.84 The general intentional intention regarding the private 
military security industry therefore appears to be one which is moving away from the banning 
of private military security companies and towards their regulation.85 The use of private 
military security companies from the United Kingdom in the reconstruction efforts in Iraq are 
a good indication that the United Kingdom’s government have little intention of banning the 
industry outright.86  
 
This option was also dismissed by the Green Paper and the Foreign Affairs Committee for the 
additional reasons that private military security companies provide an essential service to 
weak but legitimate governments, and that to ban them would inhibit the United Kingdom’s 
ability to assist these governments.87 The effect of the ban on the ability of United Kingdom 
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defense exporter’s ability to conduct legitimate business was also cited as a reason not to 
follow this option.88 The additional fear with banning private military security companies is 
that these companies will simply leave the United Kingdom and set up business elsewhere, 
not only depriving the United Kingdom of potential trade, but also operating outside the 
government’s control, whilst having the potential to conduct themselves in such a way so as 
to tarnish the United Kingdom’s international image.89 
 
2.2.2. A licensing and authorisation system 
The first option under this group is for a licensing regime, which is what the United States 
currently uses; whereby private military security companies have to apply for a licence each 
time they wish to provide military services or export military goods. Whilst this system does 
have the benefit of increased government control over the actions of private military security 
companies, the downside is that this type of regime creates a lot of administrative work for 
both the government, as well as the private military security company. There is also the 
potential of delays in the awarding of these licences as a consequence of the administrative 
burden which accompanies this type of licensing regime.90 This has the potential to impact 
negatively upon the profits of a private military security company. It is also cited as one of 
the reasons why United States private military security companies are less inclined to take on 
overseas contracts, than private military security companies emanating from the United 
Kingdom. The reason for this is that in an industry which requires a quick response and 
ability to adapt rapidly to change, private military security companies which do not have to 
jump through several administrative hoops are more likely to succeed and be awarded the 
contract, than those who have to secure a government license prior to deployment. In the 
United States this system works because the federal government is the largest customer for 
private military security companies, and so they are willing to deal with all the administrative 
burdens if it means large and lucrative contracts. The government of the United Kingdom 
does not offer as lucrative contracts as the government of the United States and therefore 
private military security companies are more likely to suffer from a delay in the granting of 
licenses for their foreign work.91 The licensing option also crucially allows for a contract by 
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contract analysis, allowing the government to control the impact that private military security 
companies have especially within various contexts and ever changing situations.92  
 
The second option presented under this group is one which requires notification. The effect of 
this is that private military security companies would have an automatic licence to operate but 
would have to provide the government with notice of their potential actions, affording the 
government the ability to prohibit that action. This does solve the problem created by the 
administrative burden which accompanies the licensing mechanism, however it too creates its 
own problems as well. These problems include the potential for private military security 
companies to be evasive in providing their notification and therefore either not providing it at 
all or delaying when they provide it, as well as not providing full and complete notification, 
and lastly that it is difficult to monitor changes to the action requested in the notification, 
especially when the ever changing nature of conflict is taken into account. This system also 
lessens the hold that government is able to exercise over private military security companies, 
especially in comparison to the licensing approach, which could impact the United 
Kingdom’s ability to manage effectively its impact on the international stage.93 
 
The third option under this group is a the granting of a general licence that would for example 
allow a private military security company to operate in a set of listed countries, and perform a 
selection of listed activities. This would allow for the government to set out clear standards of 
practice while still exercising a degree of control over private military security companies 
without hindering these companies with too many administrative burdens.94 This option 
might not provide as much control over private military security companies as the 
government might like, but could potentially be paired with another regulatory mechanism in 
order to overcome this problem.95 The granting of a general licence implies that the 
government supports that particular private military security company. This could prove 
problematic when the company is not well known, or if the company breaches international 
laws or commits human rights violations.96 
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The overarching concern for all three of these options however is the question of monitoring, 
which is also a problem with the United States licensing system. Effective monitoring is 
costly and cumbersome, but essential to ensure that private military security companies obey 
international regulations and laws, and abide by any requirements placed on them by the 
government of the United Kingdom or various codes of conduct.97 
 
2.2.3. The promotion of codes of conduct for private military security companies 
This option aims to help develop the respectability of the United Kingdom’s private military 
security industry whilst at the same time ensuring that private military security companies 
operate in accordance with international laws, including the respect for human rights, a 
state’s sovereignty as well as ensuring their conduct is transparent. This is done by creating a 
voluntary code of conduct and forming a trade association. The trade association would also 
have some of the difficulties faced by the government, such as an inability to evaluate the 
activities of private military security companies whilst abroad. The general consensus is also 
that from a regulatory perspective that a voluntary code of conduct cannot be effective by 
itself and would have to be used in conjunction with one of the licensing mechanisms 
discussed above. Those in favour of a code of conduct cite the fact that many private military 
security companies currently have their own independently developed codes of conduct 
which they hold themselves accountable to.98 This option does not allow for companies and 
individuals to be held accountable for any offences which they commit. This creates not only 
a negative perception for the United Kingdom, but also undermines the principles of justice 
and international law.99 The lack of power associated with this option also means that 
government has no say in how private military security companies engage with other 
countries at an international level, and not having control over this process could potentially 
be detrimental for the United Kingdom.100 
 
To date however no real action has been taken by the government of the United Kingdom 
towards adopting any of the options identified by the Green Paper. The current attempts at a 
form of regulation are fragmented and come from several other laws, most of which were not 
designed specifically for the private military security industry.101 This delay has been 
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attributed to the negative public perception around private military security companies, 
especially after incidents such as the ‘Arms to Africa’ affair. The government of the United 
Kingdom may also be taking their time so as to ensure that the best policy and method of 
regulation is created, so as to prevent any detrimental effects on international security or any 
more events like the ‘Arms to Africa’ affair which would inhibit the good work being done 
by private military security companies at present.102 The decision is also an important one 
and therefore one requiring a great deal of thought, as it is likely to affect how other 
European countries regulate their private military security industries.103 A further explanation 
for the delay in implementing the recommendations of the Green Paper has been opposition 
from within British parliament and most particularly the Labour Party which disagrees with 
the Green Paper’s recommendation handing over power to private military security 
companies.104 The Labour Party feels that such military power must remain entrusted with 
government.105 The laws which currently assist in the regulation of private military security 
companies include the Export Control Act and the Terrorism Act which will be discussed 
next.  
 
2.3. The Export Control Act 
The Export Control Act of 2002 (ECA) was promulgated in order to update United Kingdom 
legislation, and bring it in line with current European Union and international standards. ECA 
therefore replaces the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act of 1939.106 Sections 
2 (technology transfers) and 3 (technical assistance) can be applied to private military 
security companies, and even have the potential to be applied on an extra-territorial basis if a 
citizen of the United Kingdom is involved. These two sections can be used to prevent private 
military security companies from trading in military equipment and on the basis of concern 
about an 'adverse effect on peace, security or stability in any region of the world or within 
any country'.107 The conduct of private military security companies is potentially further 
regulated by the Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 and the Trade in Controlled Goods 
(Embargoed Destinations) Order 2004. These two orders have the effect of preventing 
persons from trading in restricted or controlled goods to any country or embargoed country. 
The ECA however does not specifically cater to regulate the private military security 
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industry, and is more focused on regulating and preventing the trade and creation of weapons 
of mass destruction. The ECA does not concern itself with the trade of normal weapons and 
where it prohibits technical assistance it is not referring to military consulting and training.108 
 
2.4. The Landmines Act 
In terms of Section 2(1) of the Landmines Act 1998; no person shall: 
(a) use an anti-personnel mine;  
(b) develop or produce an anti-personnel mine;  
(c) participate in the acquisition of a prohibited object;  
(d) have a prohibited object in his possession; or  
(e) participate in the transfer of a prohibited object.  
 
It is also an offence to assist, encourage or induce any other person to engage in any conduct 
mentioned in subsection (1). Section 3 makes it clear that the bans also apply outside the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom as well as within. Despite the provision in the Landmines 
Act when there were allegations made against Dyncorp Aerospace Ltd that they were in the 
process of storing landmines in preparation for the Iraqi War. There was no legal action or 
follow up to the allegations.109  
 
2.5. The Terrorism Act 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 is designed to prevent the training and 
recruitment of personnel for the purposes of committing acts of terrorism. The definitions in 
Section 54 also prevent the training of personnel in the production of radioactive or chemical 
weapons. The Terrorism Act applies to British citizens and residents, and applies both within 
the territories of the United Kingdom and outside them. The Act which was originally created 
in response to the Irish revolts was more recently being used to protect the United Kingdom’s 
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The current UK approach to legislating the private military security industry is entirely 
outdated and does not cater for the industry in its current form. The few pieces of legislation 
which do apply to private military security companies, only applies to them indirectly and 
only regulates certain sectors of industry. The government of the United Kingdom has also 
failed to implement any of the recommendations of the Green Paper and has therefore left the 
industry to be regulated largely by itself, as well as international law or the laws of the 
countries in which its private military security companies operate.111 The continued use and 
acceptance of the practices of British private military security companies indicates 
government’s acknowledgment of the uses of this industry, but without more comprehensive 
legislation and regulation the United Kingdom’s government does not fully exercise the 
potential control it could exert over the industry via regulations.112 The reality is that British 
private military security companies are currently active in conflict areas around the world and 
that the United Kingdom needs to develop some form of regulation for them.113 The difficulty 
is going to be how much control the government exerts over these companies without 
preventing them from being profitable but also allowing the government control to be 
effective.114
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South Africa has a long history with of its citizens being contracted as mercenaries and 
personnel of private military security companies which goes back as far as the 1960’s.1 More 
recently however the context which establishes South Africa’s current stance on mercenaries 
and private military security companies begins at the end of apartheid. During apartheid the 
South African government had trained a large standing army which was drastically down 
sized when apartheid ended, and the new democratic government was elected into power.2 
This created a ready supply of trained military men who suddenly found themselves without a 
job. These were the people who then entered the booming ‘guns for hire’ market in Africa, 
either by acting alone or by joining private military security companies such as Executive 
Outcomes.3 Executive Outcomes capitalised on this surge in supply by privatising entire 
battalions of the former South African Army.4 The new South African government’s initial 
response to private military security companies such as Executive Outcomes was to tolerate 
them as they arguably played an important role in assisting with the peaceful transition of 
South Africa from apartheid to democracy, by removing from the country those most likely 
to attempt to disrupt this transitional process.5  
 
Executive Outcomes was one of the largest private military security companies in South 
Africa and contracted with several countries, primarily within Africa. It secured contracts 
ranging from twenty million to one hundred million US Dollars per year.6 Executive 
Outcomes had its biggest impact on the African continent, where it assisted in the creation 
and training of a number of professional armed government forces7, played an important role 
in ending conflicts in Angola (1994) and Sierra Leone (1996), and stabilised these countries 
so as to allow for the best circumstances for the new governments of Angola and Sierra 
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Leone to succeed.8 Executive Outcomes also provided non-combatant services which 
included mine clearing, as well as medical and welfare services, and the rebuilding and 
creation of infrastructure. These services also had a positive impact on the stability within 
several African countries.9 These positive effects, in addition to removing potential trouble 
makers from South Africa, have often been cited as justification for why the South African 
government permitted the existence of Executive Outcomes. It should also be noted that 
Executive Outcomes never undertook a contract which was contrary to the foreign policy of 
the South African government10 and in fact Executive Outcomes contracts were often punted 
by the South African government in the rest of Africa.11 Despite the stabilising effect which 
Executive Outcomes brought to the region, there were already questions being asked about its 
influence12, and its access to natural resources in Angola and diamond fields in Sierra Leone, 
as part payment for their activities.  Executive Outcomes had strong connections to the 
Branch-Heritage Banking Group and as a result the subsidiaries of the Branch-Heritage 
Group received concessions to those resources from Executive Outcomes.13 The payment by 
means of granting concession to state resources was not only creating bad publicity for South 
Africa internationally, but these activities were also beginning to attract the attention of the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur.14  
 
The growing international criticism levelled at the activities of many South African private 
military security companies, including Executive Outcomes, is often cited as one of the 
reasons for the creation of South Africa’s first piece of anti-mercenary legislation, the 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (FMA) of 1998.15 Pursuant to the entry into 
force of the FMA Executive Outcomes terminated all its services with effect from January 
1999, citing in part the negative public criticism and the constrictive provisions contained 
within the FMA.16 Most of Executive Outcomes’ personnel still operate in Africa within 
other private military security companies, although these personnel are no longer based 
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within South Africa.17 At an international level,  the fall of Saddam Hussein and the advent of 
the Afghan conflict, saw coalition forces spread thin on the ground, and an increasing 
demand for private military security companies and their personnel, to not only train police 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan but also to protect key infrastructure and people.18 These 
conflicts have also proved a fertile ground for South African nationals seeking employment 
in the private security sector. 
 
In 2005 eight men (all South African nationals) were arrested and charged under the FMA for 
their alleged involvement in an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea.19 The coup supposedly 
involved kidnapping President Teodoro Objang Nguema Mbasogo, in order to overthrow his 
government and replace him with exiled opposition politician Severo Moto.20 The alleged 
coup was foiled however when these eight men, and their South African pilot, were arrested 
in Zimbabwe on route to Equatorial Guinea. The pilot along with four other South Africans 
was sentenced to 34 years and was imprisoned in Equatorial Guinea. Meanwhile, in South 
Africa, the son of the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Mark Thatcher was 
charged under the FMA and plead guilty to his alleged involvement in negligently financing a 
plane which was used in the plot.21 He received a four year suspended sentence, and a 
R265 000.00 fine.22 Domestic charges were also brought against the other eight men under 
the FMA in South Africa, in the end these charges were eventually dismissed as the evidence 
before the court suggested that the South African government had sanctioned their actions. 
The court upheld the arguments of the lawyers of the eight men that at the very least the 
South African government had been aware of the plot and that by not acting they had tacitly 
sanctioned their actions.23 This allegation of involvement on the part of the South African 
government was never proved and has always been officially denied by government 
sources.24 It was in light of this case that the South African government drafted the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act of 2006 (PMA)25 to improve the possibility of successfully prosecuting 
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those South Africans undertaking mercenary activities. Despite being several years old, the 
PMA has still not received the necessary presidential proclamation in order to turn it into 
law.26  
 
Today South Africa is not only the only African country to have anti-mercenary legislation27, 
but the FMA and the PMA are considered to be the harshest pieces of legislation relating to 
mercenaries and private military security companies in the world.28 Whilst the stance of 
South Africa’s government appears at the moment to be to remain steadfast in its principle of 
not utilising private military security companies as well as outlawing the export of private 
military security skills. The reality is that there are South African citizens who are engaged in 
Iraq and Afghanistan working for private military security companies.29 Despite these pieces 
of legislation it is currently estimated that up to 20 000 South Africans are working for 
private military security companies throughout the world.30 Moreover, the generous salaries 
which these international private military security companies offer has resulted in, for 
example, a large portion of Durban’s police force resigning in order to take advantage of 
these offers of higher salaries.31  
 
Despite what appears to be a flagrant disregard for the FMA, South Africa’s legislation has 
yet to be put to a real litmus test, and so there are doubts as to South Africa’s ability to 
effectively control its citizens undertaking private security jobs elsewhere. It has been 
suggested that perhaps less stringent controls and restrictions might actually afford South 
Africa better control over private military security companies, and its citizens who are 
employed by them.32  
 
This chapter will now discuss the FMA and PMA in turn, and address some of the concerns 
surrounding both acts. This chapter will also discuss the effects the two acts have on South 
Africa’s ability to regulate effectively the private military security industry, before looking at 
what the future may hold for South Africa, by briefly analysing the Defence Review 2012.  
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2. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1. The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 
Prior to the promulgation of the FMA in 1998, members and auxiliary members of the South 
African Defence Force were prohibited from serving as mercenaries in terms of Section 121A 
of the Defence Act33 which stated:  
 
(1) Any person who- 
(a) is a member of the South African Defence Force or the Reserve or an auxiliary or 
voluntary nursing service established in terms of this Act and who binds himself to service or 
renders service as a mercenary; or 
(b) makes any utterance or performs any act or does anything with intent to advise, 
encourage, assist, incite, instigate, suggest to or otherwise persuade any member referred to 
in paragraph (a) to bind himself to serve or to render service as a mercenary, shall be guilty of 
an offence34. 
 
 One of the primary objectives of the FMA was to extend this prohibition to all South African 
civilians, private military security companies as well as foreign civilians operating within the 
boundaries of South Africa.35 The FMA is also a constitutionally mandated piece of 
legislation, as Section 198(b) of the South African Constitution states that: ‘The resolve to 
live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed 
conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or 
national legislation’.36 The FMA was drafted and adopted as a response to the controversy 
surrounding the involvement of Executive Outcomes and other South African private military 
security companies, such as Logo Logistics, in countries such as Sierra Leone, Equatorial 
Guinea and Zimbabwe.37 The FMA is widely viewed as the most hard-lined approach to anti-
mercenary legislation in the world.38 This hard-line response is especially interesting 
considering that South Africa has not signed either of the United Nations nor OAU/AU 
                                                 
33 Y Sandoz, ‘Private security and international law’ J Cilliers & P Mason (ed) Peace, profit or plunder?: The 
privatisation of security in war-torn African societies (1999) 201, 215. 
34 Defence Act 44 of 1957 Section 121A(1) 
35 Note 1 above, 249. 
36 C Ortiz, ‘Regulating private military companies: States and the expanding business of commercial security 
provision’ in L Assassi, D Wigan, K van der Pijl (eds) Global Regulation. Mangaing Crises After the Imperial 
Turn (2004) 205, 214. 
37 Note 26 above, 95. 
38 Note 26 above, 95. 
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Mercenary Conventions.39 Moreover it is widely agreed that the provisions within the FMA 
go further than what is required in terms of these two international conventions.40  
 
Broadly speaking the FMA has two functions; the first is ban mercenary activity, which is 
defined in the act as ‘direct participation as a combatant in armed conflict for private gain’.41 
The second function of the act is to regulate military assistance provided outside of South 
Africa, either by private citizens or members of the South African armed forces.42  
 
The FMA’s definition of what constitutes ‘mercenary activity’ is in line with what the various 
international conventions consider to be mercenarism.43 The FMA incorporates within its 
definition of ‘military assistance’ any form of assistance and therefore includes, not only the 
provision of personnel and equipment, but also training, advice and financing operations.44 
‘Military assistance’ however does not extend to those providing humanitarian or otherwise 
civilian services, which are aimed at assisting people within conflict areas.45 Where the FMA 
does extend its ambit further than the requirements of the international anti-mercenary 
conventions is in prohibiting the provision of military assistance and requiring those wishing 
to provide such assistance to gain authorisation from the National Conventional Arms 
Control Committee (NCACC).46  
 
The FMA requires potential private military security companies to first gain authorisation 
from the NCACC, a body established in terms of the FMA, to offer ‘military assistance’, and 
once granted each subsequent agreement must be agreed to by the NCACC.47 The NCACC 
has the ability to either grant or reject an application to provide military assistance, or it can 
as it sees fit add conditions to the granting of permission to provide military assistance. This 
permission from the NCACC needs to be received before a contract to provide military 
assistance can be entered into.48 According to the FMA the NCACC should not grant 
authorisation for a contract where that contract would result in a ‘breach of the principles of 
                                                 
39 Note 26 above, 95. 
40 Note 26 above, 95. 
41 FMA Section 1.  
42 C Holmqvist, ‘Private security companies: The case for regulation’ (2005) Policy Paper 9 Stockholm 
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43 Ibid. 
44 Note 42 above, 52; FMA Section 1.  
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international law, international human rights law, or endanger peace, destabilise or escalate 
conflicts within a region, support terrorism or prejudice South Africa’s interests’.49 Under the 
FMA, the provision of military assistance, without the permission of the NCACC, or failing 
to comply with the conditions imposed on such permission is an offence which carries a 
potential prison sentence of 10 years or a fine of not more than 1 million rand.50 The FMA 
only applies however to parties of an armed conflict; the act is therefore triggered by the 
declaration of an armed conflict.51  
 
2.1.1. Criticisms of the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 
There are several criticisms of the FMA which broadly speaking fit into three categories. 
They are; the constitutionality of the FMA, the impact which the FMA has on policy 
considerations and lastly the lack of successful prosecutions under the FMA. Each of these 
categories will be analysed in turn. 
 
2.1.1.1. Issues of constitutionality and administrative legality 
Since the enactment of the FMA there have been challenges expressed regarding the 
constitutionality of its provisions, in light of the right to freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession expressed in section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
The right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession, as set out in the case of S v 
Lawrence52, entitles everyone to ‘free participation in economic activity and in pursuing a 
livelihood’.53 Under the interim constitution section 26(2) the right did have some limitations, 
primarily that one’s economic activity must be lawful, and the person must be suitably 
qualified if required by that profession.54 It is worth noting that this subsection no longer 
exists in the final constitution, and that these restrictions to the right no longer apply. That 
does not however mean that the right is without any limitations in the final constitution. 
Rather under the final constitution this right may be limited in terms of section 36 of the 1996 
Constitution. This application and understanding of the right to economic activity was also 
                                                 
49 Note 1 above, 250. 
50 F Schreier & M Caparini, ‘Privatising security: Law, practice and governance of private military and security 
companies’ 107. 
51 Ibid. 
52S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC). At the time of the judgment the right was then 
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53 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) 1193 para 32. 
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endorsed by the court in S v Jordan55 in a case which dealt with the right as expressed in the 
final constitution. 
 
Besides the concerns that the FMA might compromise the constitutional right to freedom of 
trade, there have also been questions raised as to whether the provisions of the FMA will pass 
muster in terms of administrative law. Here critics of the FMA point out that the discretionary 
powers granted to the NCACC were flawed in that there was little clarity as to the factors 
which are to be applied56 when they exercised their discretion. Admittedly, as highlighted in 
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs57, discretion is important and ‘plays a crucial role in any 
legal system’58, and may be broad as well as varied, nevertheless there ultimately still has to 
be accountability and transparency. Consequently, whilst a committee or person may have a 
wide variety of factors to consider in making a decision, and they may legitimately give 
greater weight to some factors over others, they nevertheless are not completely unfettered in 
determining which factors may play a role in their decision.59 Whilst the legislature may not 
be able to foresee every factor that may be relevant to the decision, and hence is allowed to 
provide broad and varied factors. The Legislature must still limit the factors which can be 
considered so as to provide some degree of certainty for those subjected to the exercise of this 
discretionary power. This limitation is what ensures clarity and enables a person or company 
to attempt to align themselves with the requirements set out by the legislature. 
 
Having established what is meant by the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession, 
as well as the requirements in terms of administrative law, the FMA will be analysed to 
determine whether or not it conforms to both these legal constraints. 
 
According to section 3, the FMA prohibits the rendering of foreign military assistance, which 
has been broadly defined in section 1 to include the activities of private military security 
companies which have already been discussed. The FMA currently places an enormous 
amount of power in the hands on the NCACC to allow or prevent private military security 
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companies from operating. In terms of section 4 and 5 the NCACC has the power not only to 
authorise or deny a company or person’s application to render foreign military assistance but 
also, in terms of subsection 3 of both section 4 and 5 to ‘at any time withdraw or amend an 
authorisation so granted’. Furthermore in terms of section 7 the criteria60 which the 
committee has to apply in determining whether or not to authorise a company’s application is 
so broad that subsection (1)(g) allows for ‘any other reason to be considered’.  
 
In terms of administrative law the extremely broad and vague list of factors in section 7 of the 
FMA means that the NCACC has the ability to consider any and all factors which it deems 
necessary to consider. This lack of certainty makes it extremely difficult for applicants to 
accurately predict the outcome of such an application. This is because they are unsure about 
how to align themselves with the standards of the NCACC, as they do not know the full list 
of factors which the NCACC will be using. The NCACC could potentially therefore, due to 
this large scope, deny an otherwise legitimate application on the basis of private political 
agendas61, or on the basis that all applications must be denied in order to prevent completely 
any future links between South Africa and the private military security industry; in effect 
creating a blanket ban under the guise of regulation. Whatever the motives behind the denial 
the judicial process that potential applicants have to take after their application is denied is a 
long one. First they have to request reasons in terms of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice (PAJA).62 Then they can made application to the courts for the decision of the 
NCACC to be overturned.63 This is however a long and drawn out procedure that wastes time 
                                                 
60 Section 7 of the FMA is as follows: 
Criteria for granting or refusal of authorisations and approvals 
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and requires money on the part of the applicant to institute court proceedings. Given the 
nature of modern warfare and the speed with which conflicts flare up, such a long and 
uncertain process will place South African private military security companies and 
individuals seeking employment by international private military security companies in a 
heavily compromised position64, especially in comparison to companies and individuals from 
other states within Africa; where there is little real domestic level regulation65, or other 
international countries such as the United States where the private military security industry 
is flourishing.66  
 
From the outset the FMA undermines the right to freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession. It does so by defining foreign military assistance so broadly as to include the 
legitimate aims of private military security companies and in so doing places the burden on 
these companies to justify their actions, rather than force the NCACC to provide reasons as to 
why a company may no longer operate. This position is in contrast with the decision in S v 
Lawrence, which held that the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession ensures 
free participation that can only then be limited when it can be justified by a legitimate 
government objective.67 What the FMA does in its definition section is in effect create a 
blanket ban for the entire private military security industry. Assuming that this was not an 
unconstitutional limitation of the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession, the 
FMA then proceeds to provide broad and unlimited powers to the NCACC in terms of the 
factors that need to be considered in exercising this very broad discretionary power. Not only 
is this unacceptable in terms of administrative law principles which demand transparency in 
the exercise of discretionary powers, but it is also unacceptable in light of section 22 of the 
Constitution. In short the FMA as it stands at present negatively affects the right of these 
personnel and companies to be able to engage freely in their choice of profession because not 
only are applicants unable to gauge their likelihood of success when they approach the 
NCACC, but the courts are unable to review any erroneous decision of the NCACC within 
the tight time frames which characterise the deployment demands of those working in the 
private military security industry.  Sadly the contracts and employment are awarded to those 
individuals and companies who do not have to content with the vagaries of the NCACC.  
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Even if one is initially successful in securing the NCACC’s authorisation, there is always the 
potential that the NCACC will invoke section 4(3) and 5(3) of the FMA and simply withdraw 
its authorisation. Consequently for South African companies and citizens, there is always the 
possibility that in the middle of delivering in terms of a private military security contract, the 
NCACC can deem their actions unlawful and demand that they return to South Africa to re-
apply for authorisation or face criminal proceedings.68 This unregulated power will ultimately 
have the effect of making companies weary of awarding private security contracts to South 
African companies, and similarly circumspect of employing South African’s to carry out such 
work abroad.  
2.1.1.2. Prosecutorial failure 
The unconstitutionality of the FMA is arguably most evident in its many attempted and 
mostly failed prosecutions. The first prosecution under the FMA was that of Richard Rouget, 
who plead guilty to recruiting persons for military assistance as well as providing logistical 
support and equipment in the Ivory Coast in 2003.69 His original fine of R100 000 was 
reduced to R75 000 on appeal.70 Carl Alberts was arrested in 2004 for alleged mercenary 
activity in the Ivory Coast. Despite initially being sentenced to two years in jail or a R20 000 
fine, he eventually only paid R10 000 after entering into a plea agreement with the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA).71 As already discussed, the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea 
also failed to prove the prosecutorial value of the FMA. In these cases four of the alleged 
coup plotters prosecuted in South Africa either plead guilty or entered into plea agreements, 
whilst eight others eventually went to trial and were ultimately acquitted as there was 
insufficient proof that they were guilty of the charges laid against them.72 The net effect is 
that under the FMA the NPA has had to rely on plea bargains and confessions, and has yet to 
successfully take a case to trial and secure a conviction.73 Those that do plead guilty or enter 
into plea agreements serve very little jail time.74 Not surprisingly, given the limitations 
already exhibited by the FMA in securing a successful prosecution, the NPA has generally 
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been reluctant to lay charges for anything but conduct which is more closely associated with 
uncontroversial mercenary activity, rather than military assistance or conduct associated with 
private military security companies. It would appear that under the FMA the NPA are 
toothless when it comes to private military security companies.75 In potential response to this 
the South African government sought to amend section 6 of the South African Citizenship 
Act in order to deny citizenship to those South African’s engaging in private security work 
without NCACC authorisation.76 This amendment has permitted the South African 
government to revoke the citizenship of a South African citizenship who is working for a 
foreign military for ‘engaging in a war under the flag of a country that the Government of 
South Africa does not support’.77 This amendment has the potential to impact massively upon 
South African’s working within the private military security industry and represented an even 
harder stance against the industry as a whole by the South African government.78 This 
amendment which was assented to on 3 December 2013 and which commenced on 1 January 
201379 has added subsection 3 to section 6 of the act which grants this power to the South 
African government. At the time of writing this however no record could be found of this 
section being used to revoke a South African’s citizenship and it appears that in a similar 





2.1.1.3. Policy considerations 
The FMA has also faced several criticisms from a perspective of domestic and foreign policy. 
The first criticism is that the FMA has not been supported by other countries, who for the 
most part accept and utilise private military security industry.81 This has had a negative 
impact on the FMA’s ability to successfully prosecute individuals. It has been discussed in 
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earlier chapters how the legislation of the United States and the United Kingdom seeks to 
regulate rather than prosecute companies and personnel within the private military security 
industry. The United Kingdom’s Green Paper is based on the government of the United 
Kingdom acknowledging the positive and global role which private military security 
companies can play at an international level.82 The United States not only regulates the 
provision of military assistance, through the Arms Export Control Act, but further it has 
extended federal jurisdiction over offences committed by personnel of private military 
security companies through the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, as well as more 
recently the Uniform Code of Military Justice.83 The effect of the US system is that private 
military security companies are able to monitor and regulate the activities of private military 
security companies, whilst also being able to hold individual personnel responsible for their 
actions.84 It is clear that the intention of the United Kingdom and the United States is to 
attempt to incorporate private military security companies within their legal systems, as well 
as to regulate their activities.  
 
The UK and US approach is in stark contrast with the perceived intention of the South 
African government when it drafted the FMA. The effect of the FMA has been to encourage 
the South African private military security industry to set up shop in other countries. A 
perfect example of this is Executive Outcomes, which disbanded its operation following the 
promulgation of the FMA, and its members have since moved into other countries and been 
employed by different private military security companies.85   
 
The South African government does justifiably, it could be argued, have the additional 
concern of the implications flowing from the involvement of South African Citizens in 
African conflicts. This is true especially considering the nature of the political and economic 
relationship between South African and the rest of Africa.86 South Africa is impacted to a far 
greater degree by this than its western partners in the supply of private military security 
companies and their personnel.87 This dissertation would argue that perhaps herein lies the 
reason for the key difference between South African legislation concerning the private 
military security industry, and for example the approach adopted by the United States. Both 
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attempt to create some mechanism of regulation, however whilst the regulatory mechanism 
by the United States is designed to be a mechanism to monitor the activities of private 
military security companies, the regulatory mechanism of South Africa is designed to control 
the activities of the private military security industry from within South Africa. This is 
because the South African government wants to be able to manage the impact which its 
private military security companies and personnel have on the African continent.88 The effect 
of these opposing approaches to the private military security industry is that despite several 
thousand South African citizens working for private military security companies and plying 
their trade in Iraq and other conflict areas, South Africa has not been able to prosecute these 
individuals due to a lack of support from countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom.89  Furthermore the ability of companies, such as Executive Outcomes to simply 
transfer to another country, or for citizens of South African to change their citizenship, means 
that South Africa no longer has the ability to prosecute what are still in essence South African 
companies and citizens.90 So for example, very soon after the beginning of the Iraq War two 
South African private military security companies; Meteoric Tactical Solutions and Erinys, 
were providing protection services without NCACC authorisation, and in the case of Erinys, 
without even having applied to the NCACC for such approval. Despite this no action was 
brought against either company.91  
 
Another policy criticism levelled at the FMA is that its vague and broad description of 
‘military assistance’ is likely to bring within the ambit of the act those many humanitarian 
actions such as de-mining or providing security for vulnerable NGOs within conflict zones.92 
In the next breath the FMA does exclude ‘humanitarian or civilian activities aimed at 
relieving the plight of civilians in an area of armed conflict’93 from being prohibited under 
the act. However the net effect is that these humanitarian services, essential for creating 
stable countries post conflict94, may be used by private military security companies as a 
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loophole to claim that their activities in countries such as Iraq are legitimate95, in effect 
undermining the efficacy of the FMA’s intended purpose. 
 
Additionally the effect of the regulatory system, which requires the NCACC to approve every 
contract, amounts to the South African government officially sanctioning the actions of each 
and every private military security company.96 The effect of this sanctioning is that the South 
African government could now be held responsible for the actions of the private military 
security company.97 This means that the South African government, and not the private 
military security company, are held to account.98 This power which is granted to the NCACC, 
which is an organ of the executive branch of government, amounts to substantial power to 
determine and put into effect foreign policy and most worryingly without any parliamentary 
oversight and therefore in violation of the democratic principle of checks and balances99 
which harkens back to how apartheid legislation gave power to the executive in order to 
bypass parliamentary oversight.100 One of the key weaknesses of the FMA, which has already 
been mentioned, but deserves to be highlighted, is that due to it being a domestic law, with no 
real international backing it is simply undermined by private military security companies and 
personnel moving out of the country.101 Furthermore the FMA, in only being applicable to 
conflict zones, does not consider the situation in countries of general unrest but not conflict. 
These countries often utilise the services provided by private military security companies in 
order to prevent this unrest from erupting into full blown armed conflict. In the situation that 
a South African private military security company was approached to provide its services to 
such a country the FMA would not cover its actions.102  
 
Of concern is that by in effect forcing the private military security industry out of South 
Africa the South African government has lost the ability to control this industry and the 
actions of its citizens in warzones.103 South Africa has maintained exclusive control over 
military and political power by not only restrictively regulating the private military security 
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industry but also refusing to utilise the services of the private military security industry.104 
This has meant that only the South African government has been able to affect foreign policy 
decisions that private military security companies such as Executive Outcomes were 
previously able to do via the governments which they chose to work for.105 This has however 
arguably been at the expense of the power increase experienced by the United States and the 
United Kingdom, who have embraced the private military security industry. This loss of 
power is most evident in South Africa’s loss of control over its own citizens, which has 
already been highlighted and discussed. Despite its citizens disregarding the FMA, the South 
African government does not have the ability to bring its own citizens under its control and in 
line with the FMA. Even if it did have the ability to completely regain this control, the cost of 
utilising it and in effect halting the activities of South Africans in countries such as Iraq 
would have too high a price for South Africa in terms of international relations.106 The effect 
therefore of the FMA is that the South African government has ceded its control over South 
African private military security companies and personnel to countries such the United States 
and the United Kingdom.107 Considering the large pool of military skills which South Africa 
possess, which is clearly demonstrated by the demand for South African private military 
security personnel by non-South African private military security companies, a move to 
lessen restrictions on South African private military security companies might actually 
improve the control which the South African government has over the private military 
security industry as a whole.108 
 
2.2. The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act of 2006 
The failure of the FMA to allow for the effective prosecution of those who engage in 
mercenarism, or who flaunt the requirements of the FMA by not seeking authorisation from 
the NCACC, was highlighted most by the South Africans who were involved in the attempted 
coup in Equatorial Guinea in 2005. This incident made the failings and short comings of the 
FMA abundantly clear.109 The response from government was to draft the PMA, which whilst 
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being passed by the national assembly in 2006, has still not received the crucial presidential 
proclamation in order for it to come into effect.110 In terms of the PMA: 
No person may within the Republic or elsewhere -  
(a) Participate as a combatant for private gain in an armed conflict;  
(b) Directly or indirectly recruit, use, train, support or finance a combatant for private gain in 
an armed conflict;  
(c) Directly or indirectly participate in any manner in the initiation, causing or furthering of  
(i) An armed conflict;  
(ii) A coup d'etat, uprising or rebellion against any government; or  
(d) Directly or indirectly perform any act aimed at overthrowing a government or 
undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state.111 
 
The PMA does allow for military services to be provided but requires that personnel or 
private military security companies wishing to provide such services must first seek 
authorisation from the NCACC.112 Section 9 of the PMA sets out the grounds on which such 
an authorisation could be refused: 
(a) is in conflict with the Republic's obligations in terms of international law;  
(b) would result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
territory where the assistance or service is to be rendered or the exemption granted;  
(c) endangers the peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into the region or 
territory where the assistance or service, or humanitarian aid, is or is likely to be, provided or 
rendered;  
(d) would contribute to regional instability or negatively influence the balance of power in 
such region or territory;  
(e) in any manner supports or encourages any terrorist activity or terrorist and related 
activities, as defined in section 1 of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act No 33 of 2004);  
(f) contributes to the escalation of regional conflicts;  
(g) in any manner initiates, causes or furthers an armed conflict, or a coup d'etat, uprising or 
rebellion against a government; or  
                                                 
110 Note 26 above, 75. 
111 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 
of 2006 S2(1). 
112 Note 26 above, 99. 
96 
 
(h) prejudices the Republic's national or international interests.113 
 
The PMA defines ‘mercenaries’ as ‘citizens who provide assistance in the form of advice, 
logistical support, training, and security services or personnel recruitment’.114 This too is, like 
the FMA, a much broader definition than that provided in the United Nations Mercenary 
Convention, which defines a mercenary as being essentially motivated by private gain and is 
employed for that specific conflict. The PMA definition brands anyone involved in any 
conflict for private gain as being a mercenary115 and, like the FMA still outlaws mercenarism. 
 
Despite its attempt to overcome the limitations of the FMA, there remain several aspects of 
the PMA which harken back to the FMA, for example that those wishing to provide military 
services still need to gain permission from the NCACC. The PMA also prevents South 
African citizens from joining the armed forces of another country without obtaining the prior 
permission from the South African government.116 That said there are many aspects of the 
PMA which diverge from the status quo under the FMA. Primarily the PMA is intended to 
make it easier for the NPA to prosecute mercenaries successfully.117  This is achieved by 
increasing the jurisdiction scope of the act, in terms of the activities and areas of conflicts 
where the act is applicable.118 So for example the PMA states that: 
 ‘Any act constituting an offence under this Act and that is committed outside the Republic 
by- 
   (a)   a citizen of the Republic; 
   (b)   a person ordinarily resident in the Republic; 
   (c)   a company incorporated or registered as such under any law, in the Republic; or 
   (d)   any body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, in the Republic, 
must be regarded as having been committed in the Republic and the person who committed it 
may be tried in a court in the Republic which has jurisdiction in respect of that offence.’119 
The net effect of this section is that any criminal activity by a South African committed 
outside of South Africa could be prosecuted in a South African court. This section is in direct 
                                                 
113 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 
of 2006 S9(1). 
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response to the difficulties which the South African government faced in trying to prosecute 
the South Africans involved in the Equatorial Guinea in a South African court.120  
 
2.2.1. Criticisms of the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 
Similar to the FMA the criticisms levelled at the PMA fit broadly speaking fit into two 
categories: the constitutionality and administrative legality of the PMA, as well as policy 
considerations surrounding its implementation.  
 
2.2.1.1. Constitutional and administrative law challenges 
As with the FMA, the basis for the constitutional challenge lies in terms of section 22 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996: the right to freedom of trade, occupation 
and profession, while the administrative law challenge lies in the limited right of review of 
the exercise of discretionary powers at the hands of the NCACC. The PMA not only grants 
the NCACC broad discretionary powers, as was the case under the FMA, but there are also 
several definitional issues raised by the PMA which create even more problems for private 
military security companies. In the myriad of definitions set out in the PMA terms like 
‘security services’ ‘assistance’ or ‘service’ are all couched in general terms, and nowhere is 
there any certainly given as to  the specific activities which are prohibited, save to say that in 
most instances these terms will include all the functions and roles of private military security 
companies. The effect of not having specified what activities make up security services is that 
in terms of the PMA a person or company that provides a security service to an entity which 
is not engaged in a conflict zone will be just as guilty as a person or company that provides 
direct armed support to a combatant.121 By not differentiating between the legitimate work of 
private military security companies, and mercenaries, the PMA places an unfair burden on 
legitimate companies and individuals who now have to constantly distinguish their conduct 
from that of a mercenary. 
 
Similarly the definition of ‘armed conflict’ is problematic, as it makes provision for section 6 
to grant the NCACC the power to arbitrarily, due to the lack of any clear criteria as to what 
constitutes a conflict area, determine an area to be a conflict area. The effect of this is that by 
classifying, or reclassifying an area as a conflict zone, the NCACC could make the actions of 
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companies and individuals within that area illegal.122 This unregulated power once again 
creates uncertainty and means that South African private military security companies and 
personnel will not be able offer assurances of meeting their contractual duties for contracts 
which they manage to secure.   
 
 Further, section 7(c) grants the NCACC the power to ‘at any time withdraw or amend an 
authorisation so granted’. Whilst the factors stated in section 9, which are to be considered by 
the NCACC in determining an application in terms of section 7 are once again, as with the 
FMA, broad. The set of factors are not only wide ranging, but highly subjective, for example; 
subsection (h) states that authorisation can be withdrawn when an action ‘prejudices the 
Republic's national or international interests’. Not only is what constitutes a prejudice 
subjective, but also what a national and international interest includes is also not only 
subjective but wide ranging.  
 
The impact of the PMA in terms of administrative law is the same as the impact of the FMA 
in that it does not provide certainty, and creates a long drawn out court process in order to 
ensure fairness. This ultimately impacts on the right to freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession, by preventing people involved in the private military security industry within 
South Africa to compete for contracts123, owing to the amount of time wasted and the 
uncertainty that their application will be successful. The PMA once again places the burden 
on individuals and companies to enforce their rights, rather than placing the onus on the 
NCACC to legitimately limit this right. The PMA, in granting the NCACC the power to 
withdraw authorisation at any time, as with the FMA, directly inhibits the ability of those 
involved with the private military security industry to get and keep contracts. This ultimately 
means that they are not able to work.124  
 
Lastly, considering the stance of the South African government towards its previous links 
with the private military security industry, the wording in section 9(h) ‘prejudices the 
Republic's national or international interests’ could be interpreted to mean that no company 
or individual must have their application granted due to the possibility of more negative 
media for South Africa. This in effect creates provision for the possibility of a blanket ban on 
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the private military security industry. This clearly inhibits on the right, as outright bans are 
only allowed for unlawful professions in terms of S v Lawrence.125 In order to protect the 
right the PMA should not create such broad powers so as to allow for the potential blanket 
banning of a lawful profession. It is clear that the PMA does not meet the requirements of 
administrative law and can therefore be argued to be unconstitutional. 
 
2.2.1.2. Policy Challenges  
One of the more policy related criticisms of the bill is that, like the FMA, the bill has the 
potential to inhibit the good and legitimate work done not only by private military security 
companies but also by other NGO’s who provide humanitarian support in conflict zones.126 
Groups like the Red Cross and Amnesty International could be prevented from conducting 
their operations in conflict zones due to section 5 of the PMA, which prohibits South African 
based humanitarian organizations from providing assistance in countries where there is an 
armed conflict or in countries where the NCACC has determined that armed conflict is 
imminent.127 Even though the bill does allow for an exemption to be made for South African 
humanitarian organisations, which would allow them to operate in conflict zones, there are no 
criteria about what constitutes a humanitarian organisation. Not only does this create 
problems for these humanitarian organisations but, as has been seen under the FMA, this 
creates the opportunity for private military security companies operating in conflict zones to 
claim that they are providing humanitarian services, and further defeat the PMA’s ability to 
control the private military security industry.128  
 
The instability which is caused by the NCACC being able to at any time change the status of 
a conflict zone or deny a previously authorised individual or company further exasperates the 
situation discussed under the FMA, where South African companies and citizens are more 
likely to either set up shop outside of South Africa or change their citizenship in order to be 
able to operate in the private military security industry.129 This has the knock on effect of 
further worsening South Africa’s ability to control its citizens and gives more advantage to 
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.130  
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Those who defend the PMA argue that South Africa cannot allow for South African citizens 
and companies to act as mercenaries in Africa and the rest of the world, and in so doing 
undermine South Africa’s reputation as well as destabilise other countries and regions and 
that therefore the PMA is an essential bill.131 These supporters fail to see that the 
unconstitutional nature of the PMA has the effect of further reducing South Africa’s ability to 
regulate, and therefore exert some control over the private military security industry, and that 
this in fact cedes this power to other countries.132 The PMA does not appear to be able to deal 
with the current problems faced by the FMA and if anything appears to be able to potential 
make the situation worse.  
 
To date there appears to have been no further development in trying to promulgate the PMA 
into law and online legal sources indicate that the date of commencement of the PMA is still 
to be proclaimed.133 
 
2.3. The South African Defence Review 2012 
In April 2012 the Defence Review Committee, an ad hoc committee formed by the Minister 
for Defence and Military Veterans134 released the South African Defence Review with the 
purpose of inviting interested parties to discuss the first South African Defence Review since 
1998.135 The purpose of the South African Defence Review is to map a future for the South 
African defence forces.136 The South African Defence Review is not only designed to support 
goals and decisions made by the South African government, but is also seen as a much 
needed up date from the previous 1998 Defence Review. The 2012 review was intended to 
update the 1998 focus which had been on the integration of the former South African Army 
and the African National Congress’s Umkhonto we Sizwe, as well as moving forward from a 
history of an apartheid government which had sought to destabilise South Africa’s 
neighbouring countries.137 The South African Defence Review speaks to broad issues and 
responsibilities, such as better accountability within the South African National Defence 
                                                 
131 Note 1 above, 252. 
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133 Jutastat online law resource:  Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in 
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Force (SANDF), as well as the SANDF playing a bigger role within Africa, including 
peacekeeping on the continent, as well as ensuring better controlled South African borders.138  
 
The South African Defence Review also spoke on the issue of private military security 
companies and how best to deal with South Africa’s private military security industry going 
forward. The South African Defence Review argued that a new debate needs to arise 
regarding private military security companies, as South African citizens and companies 
continue to be contracted to provide military and security services.139 It noted that there is a 
need to regulate such companies as well as clearly establish the role of private military 
security companies in Africa.140 The South African Defence Review also discussed that the 
debate needs to include a discussion about the relationship between private military security 
companies and current and former members of the SANDF. The South African Defence 
Review also made the important comment that: ‘the global involvement of South African 
private security companies or South African citizens, particularly in defence transformation, 
peacekeeping and peace building in conflict and post-conflict areas will continue into the 
foreseeable future’.141 This appears to be a fresher view of the true nature of the private 
military security industry, especially within the South African and African context and one 
that concedes that the FMA and PMA may have been misguided in attempting to outlaw the 








The FMA arose out of a need to regulate and control the activities of the private military 
security industry within South Africa. South Africa has however chosen to go about this 
process with legislation that is widely regarded as being the harshest in the world and which 
well exceeds the international and regional obligations to outlaw mercenarism.142 The effect 
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of the FMA has been to force South African private military security companies out of South 
Africa and to encourage them to set up shop in other countries. This movement out of South 
Africa has meant that the South African government no longer has the ability to control these 
companies which form part of the private military security industry. Those companies that 
have remained in South Africa now operate in defiance of the FMA, or as covert operations, 
both of which are worse than the system before the FMA where government at least had 
some idea about the actions of companies such as Executive Outcomes.143 Furthermore the 
effect of the FMA as well as the PMA has been to negatively impact upon those private 
military security companies who offer legitimate and essential military services in order to 
assist in the stabilising of post conflict countries. As it stands the PMA is likely to further 
inhibit the ability of South African humanitarian companies from providing their services in 
conflict zones.144  
 
The FMA has not been able to prosecute offenders successfully, due in large part to its 
unconstitutionality and problems arising out of administrative law. The PMA seems to have 
inherited these problems with the net effect being that South Africans are having their rights 
trampled while government acts with unrestricted power and without parliamentary 
oversight.145  
 
South Africa’s approach to the private military security industry highlights the need for a 
balance between regulation, which allows private military security companies to exist and 
operate,  and some government oversight without banning the private military security 
industry or at the very least driving them out of your country or underground.146 The South 
African government needs to realise that mercenarism per se does not automatically exist 
within the private military security industry, and that there are potential benefits which can be 
gained from a viable private security industry.147 This is hopefully the direction of the 
renewed debate which the South African Defence Review 2012 was speaking to.  
 
Ultimately the argument is that as counter-intuitive as it may appear the solution for South 
Africa may lie in the loosening of its regulation over private military security companies, as 
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this will in fact increase the control which the South African government has over private 
military security companies and South African citizens operating for these companies.148 A 
dialogue with these companies and engaging with them rather than seeking to control them 
via problematic legislation, may not only allow for better control, but also allow the South 
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A WAY FORWARD 
 
Having spent the past five chapters discussing the current situation regarding the legal 
position and regulation of mercenaries as well as the private military security industry this 
dissertation will now seek to provide a way forward for future regulatory attempts. With the 
private military security industry being an ever growing and inevitable reality in future 
conflict zones and humanitarian efforts, the focus needs to be on how best domestic and 
international law can deal with this industry.1 Discussing how best to regulate the private 
military security industry will therefore be the focus of this chapter. The starting point will be 
a brief discussion about the lessons learnt from the previous chapters and the various 
international and domestic legislative attempts, and what should be avoided and potentially 
what works well and should therefore be built upon. The various negative and positive policy 
considerations that arise from the private military security industry will then be discussed. 
This discussion is designed so that when a possible legislative mechanism is proposed, that it 
prevents as much as possible the negative effects associated with mercenarism and the private 
military security industry, whilst at the same time allowing the positives currently gained 
from the private military security industry to be continued. Lastly this chapter will discuss the 
proposed way forward by looking at the three levels where this legislation should be put into 
effect, that is; at an international level, the domestic level and lastly within the private 
military security industry itself in terms of self-regulation.  
 
1. LESSONS LEARNT FROM PREVIOUS CHAPTERS 
The lessons learnt and discussed in previous chapters from attempts at regulating 
mercenarism and the private military security industry will be discussed briefly. This will 
include lessons learnt from international attempts, as well as the attempts of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. 
 
1.1. International legislation 
The current conventions at an international level are designed to deal solely with 
mercenarism rather than private military security companies. These are the  1977 Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 47), the United Nations International 
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Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of mercenaries of 1989 
and the OAU/AU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa of 1977. It was 
discussed that one of the biggest criticisms against article 47, the United Nations Convention 
and the OAU/AU Convention was that their definition of what constituted mercenarism was 
unworkable2, too narrow and potentially created more problems than it solved3. The main 
reason for this was not only that the six individual elements had flaws as already discussed, 
but the fact that all six had to be met in order to prove that a person was a mercenary meant 
that proving all six elements was extremely difficult and more likely, impossible.4 Additional 
problems included a lack of enforcement mechanism5, limited jurisdiction6 as well as a lack 
of guidelines as to how states should implement these conventions.7 The result is that current 
international attempts to ban mercenarism are inadequate as well as ineffective.8  
 
The private military security industry arose after the UN and OAU/AU Conventions were 
implemented, as such neither of these conventions cater for a growing and influential actor 
within conflict zones and on the international arena in general.9 Currently therefore the only 
existing legal mechanism which could apply to private military security companies and their 
personnel is International Humanitarian Law(IHL).10 In terms of IHL the four most likely 
classifications for private military security companies are: armed civilians (Articles 50 and 51 
of Protocol I), mercenaries (Article 47 of Protocol I), accompanying supply contractors 
(Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention), or members of the armed forces or militias 
                                                 
2 E L Gaston, ‘Mercenarism 2.0? The rise of the modern private security industry and its implications for the 
international humanitarian law enforcement’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 221, 232. For the 
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(Article 4A(1) and (2) of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 43 of Protocol I).11 
Whilst, as discussed there are strong arguments for private military security company 
personnel being classified as civilians, there is no one category into which these personnel fit 
neatly and more significantly they definitely do not fit into the mercenary category.12  
 
The first attempt to create international legislation specifically for the private military 
security industry is the Montreux Document. It provides the clearest statement to date of the 
relationship between private military security company and states, detailing not only legal 
norms, but also business, regulatory and administrative practices.13 The Montreux Document 
is important for several reasons; firstly it represents an acknowledgment by a variety of states 
that international humanitarian law and human rights are applicable to the laws governing 
conflict zones.14 Secondly the first part of the Montreux Document reinforces current 
international law and custom surrounding the relationship between private military security 
company and state. The Montreux Document is an acknowledgement by states that private 
military security companies do not operate in a legal vacuum and that states are responsible 
for their actions.15 Thirdly the Montreux document identifies the common ground between 
states with regards to states obligations of the regulation of the extraterritorial conduct of 
businesses.16  
 
The second international attempt at filling in the void within international law with regards to 
the private military security industry is the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
on the other hand is a multi-stakeholder initiative designed to establish principles for the 
private military security industry which can ultimately be translated into industry standards 
against which private military security companies can be held accountable.17 To date over 
500 private military security companies have signed the International Code of Conduct for 
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Private Security Service Providers18 and along with the Montreux Document these two 
documents represent a strong indication of the trend of acceptance of the private military 
security industry. This appears to be further justified by the contrasting lack of support for the 
previous international conventions.19  
 
It therefore makes sense that whatever legislative system is proposed that it needs to better 
cater for the private military security industry, whilst at the same time dealing with the 
previous failures at banning mercenarism.  
 
1.2. United States Legislation 
The United States’ Foreign Relations Act of 1988 and Neutrality Act of 1794 are both 
designed to deal with mercenarism. Neither act defines what actually constitutes mercenarism 
and it has been argued that their limited scope means that they are not as effective as they 
could be.20 Individuals are also able to sidestep both these acts via a myriad of legal 
loopholes, which further diminishes their efficacy to actually legislate against mercenarism.21  
 
United States’ legislation relating specifically to private military security companies is far 
more expansive, and the three key pieces of legislation are: the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA), the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). The AECA is designed to regulate the import and export of military 
articles and services by private military security companies.22  The control over defence 
articles and services is exercised by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
which implements the authority which AECA grants to the President. It is the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs which ultimately is responsible for the licensing of private military 
security companies.23 A private military security companies cannot operate until such time as 
                                                 
18 J Crook, ‘Contemporary practice of the United States relating to international law’ (2013) 107 American 
Society of International Law 213. 
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it has been duly licenced.24 The mechanism provided under the AECA is generally 
considered to be an effective one25, although there are concerns regarding the details of the 
process, and of most concern is the lack of a follow up mechanism to provide oversight of the 
contracts.26 The AECA also pays no attention to international law policies, but rather the 
decision of whether or not to grant a contract is based solely on the foreign policy 
considerations of the United States.27  
 
The UCMJ and MEJA are designed to extend United States jurisdiction to private military 
security companies and their personnel when these personnel commit offenses outside of the 
territory of the United States.28 MEJA was created so as to deal with some of the gaps left by 
the UCMJ29, such as the UCMJ only being applicable to those serving contracts with the 
Department of Defense.30 
 
One of the biggest criticisms faced by the United States with regards to its regulation of 
private military security companies was raised by the findings of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee report, ‘Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in 
Afghanistan’ which was approved in 2010. The report highlighted the worrying lack of 
oversight of private military security companies contracted by the United States government, 
as well as the lack of training of these private military security companies and the danger 
which this poses to American troops.31 Despite this criticism, and the obvious need for a 
better mechanism of oversight, the United States model of regulation is widely regarded as 
being a model for future regulatory attempts.32 The licensing system is a strong indication of 
the United States’ stance on the private military security industry and its desire to continue to 
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utilise it.33 The criticisms which have been discussed can be ameliorated by creating 
oversight mechanisms and including additional clauses and requirements. It is therefore also 
the argument of this dissertation that the United States’ model of regulation is one which can 
be used as a starting point for future legislative proposals, and can be adapted to take into 
consideration concerns already discussed as well as other concerns which may arise.  
 
1.3. United Kingdom Legislation 
The only piece of legislation specifically created to regulate the private military security 
industry within the United Kingdom is the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 (the 1870 Act). 
The 1870 Act sought to outlaw mercenarism, not by offering a definition of mercenarism but 
rather by criminalising mercenary type activities.34 The 1870 Act has been heavily criticised 
for hindering British citizens in conducting their work, and inhibiting the development and 
expansion of the British trade and commercial empire.35 In addition to this the 1870 Act has 
hardly ever been used to prosecute individuals, and has resulted in even fewer convictions, 
despite British civilians being involved in several conflicts since its adoption.36 One of the 
biggest criticisms levelled at the Act, is that the idea of neutrality, upon which the 1870 Act is 
based, is no longer an acceptable foreign policy in the modern world, and that the purpose 
behind the legislation, as well as the 1870 Act as a whole is outdated.37 The shortcomings of 
the 1870 Act were analysed by the Diplock Report.  
 
The Diplock Report found that the 1870 Act was extremely outdated, unusable and therefore 
in need of updating.38 The Diplock Report ultimately recommended that British citizens 
should be allowed to conduct mercenary type activities provided that the country they were 
contracted by was not on a restricted list, which was to be created by the British 
government.39 It did however recommend that the hiring and training of mercenaries within 
Britain should remain prohibited.40 The Diplock Report has however become outdated, and 
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does not take into consideration international legal obligations and laws, as well as the private 
military security industry and the nuanced response that this new actor demands of states in 
their regulation of mercenary type activities.41  
 
The most current attempt at legislating the private military security industry is the 2002 
Green Paper on ‘Private Military Companies; Options for Regulation’ (Green Paper). The 
Green Paper is designed to report on possible options for the United Kingdom in terms of 
how best to deal with the private military security industry.42 The Green Paper argues that 
there is little point in outlawing the industry not only because of its inevitable growth but also 
because of the potential benefits which can arise from the regulation and utilisation of the 
industry.43 The Green Paper also comments that the best way to force disreputable private 
security companies to change their behaviour is to award lucrative government contracts to 
reputable private military security companies.44 The Green Paper provided six options for the 
British government to consider when legislating the Private military security industry, these 
go from banning the industry, to a regulatory mechanism as well as relying on the self-
regulation of the industry.45 To date none of these recommendations have been taken further 
and the British private military security industry is governed indirectly by several acts 
including the Export Control Act of 200246, the Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 and the 
Trade in Controlled Goods (Embargoed Destinations) Order 2004.47 
 
The United Kingdom, like the United States, appears to be accepting of the private military 
security industry, as it has not sought to outlaw the industry and has allowed it to operate, 
albeit indirectly. It is argued that the recommendations and considerations put forward by the 
Green Paper are useful to consider when developing a proposal for future regulation of 
private military security companies.  
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1.4. South African Legislation 
The South African response to mercenarism and the private military security industry is 
considered the harshest approach in the world.48 Currently the Regulation of Foreign Military 
Assistance Act of 1998 (FMA) governs how the South African government interacts with 
mercenaries and private military security companies and their personnel. The FMA requires 
potential private military security companies to first gain authorisation from the National 
Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), a body established in terms of the FMA, 
to offer ‘military assistance’, and once granted each subsequent agreement must be agreed to 
by the NCACC.49 The FMA has been heavily criticised owing to concerns around its 
constitutionality which are founded on vague and excessive powers being granted to the 
NCACC, and result in citizens of South Africa not being able to gain legitimate 
employment.50 Other concerns are that the FMA has yet to produce a successful conviction51 
and that despite the harsh legislation there are thousands of South African citizens who are 
employed as personnel for private military security companies who are not being prosecuted 
or even threatened with prosecution.52  
 
The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act of 2006 (PMA) is a response to the failure of the FMA to produce 
convictions and prevent South African citizens and companies from operating as mercenaries 
and within the private military security industry.53 There remain several aspects of the PMA 
which harken back to the FMA, for example that those wishing to provide military services 
still need to gain permission from the NCACC. The PMA also prevents South African 
citizens from joining the armed forces of another country without obtaining the prior 
permission from the South African government.54 That said there are many aspects of the 
PMA which diverge from the status quo under the FMA. Primarily the PMA is intended to 
make it easier for the NPA to successfully prosecute mercenaries.55 This is achieved by 
increasing the jurisdiction scope of the act, in terms of the activities and areas of conflicts 
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where the act is applicable.56 The PMA ultimately however suffered from very similar 
criticism as the FMA, especially with regards to questions surrounding its constitutionality.57 
Potentially as a result of these concerns the PMA has not yet been passed into law by the 
president of South Africa.58  
 
More recently the South African Defence Review of 2012 appears to indicate a change in 
attitude towards the private military security industry by at the very least the Defence Review 
Committee who wrote the review. The South African Defence Review argued that there was 
a need to refresh the debate around private military security companies within South Africa, 
especially in terms of their regulation and what role they should play within the African 
continent.59 The South African Defence Review appears to be a fresher view of the true 
nature of the private military security industry, especially within the South African and 
African context and one that concedes that the FMA and PMA may have been misguided in 
attempting to outlaw the industry wholesale. 
 
The harsh nature of the South African legislation, as already argued and discussed in the 
South African chapter does not appear to have benefitted South Africa in any regard. It is 
argued that the lesson which needs to be learnt from South Africa is that there is a need to 
treat mercenaries and private military security companies separately. It is also important to 
note that even a harsh stance is not able to be enforced when that stance is not shared by other 
countries. The acceptance and utilisation of the private military security by the United States 
and the United Kingdom means not only that South Africa receives no support in attempts to 
prosecute and limit their citizen’s involvement in the industry60, but also that power over the 
industry and the ability to regulate it is lost to these countries.61 The ultimate lesson to be 
learnt from South Africa is that as counter-intuitive as it may appear the solution for the 
effective legislation of private military security companies may lie in the loosening of 
restrictive regulation over private military security companies, as this will in fact increase the 
control which governments have over private military security companies and citizens 
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operating for these companies.62 A dialogue with these companies and engaging with them 
rather than seeking to control them via problematic legislation, may not only allow for better 
control, but also allow governments to utilise these companies for legitimate operations.63  
 
2. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
This dissertation will now analyse the concerns and benefits surrounding the private military 
security industry. The lessons learnt from this section, like those form the previous section 
will be used to argue for a proposed way forward for the legislation of private military 
security companies.  
 
2.1. Concerns surrounding the private military security industry 
There are several concerns and negative consequences around the utilisation of the private 
military security companies. The purpose of this section is to identify those and then ensure 
that they are at the very least mitigated by the proposed way forward. 
 
2.1.1. Lack of prosecution of private security military companies and their personnel 
One of the concerns surrounding private military security companies is summed up by the 
events on July 18 2006 when a personnel of Triple Canopy, which is an American private 
military security company, whilst on duty during an escort mission opened fire on an 
unthreatening civilian truck. Neither the person who opened fire, nor any of the other 
personnel, stopped to check on the condition of the driver. On the return trip back to base the 
same individual opened fire on a civilian taxi which again had posed no threat to anyone or 
the mission, from reports later that week it appeared as if the taxi driver had been killed.64 
The individual was reported by his fellow employees and subsequently fired. Whilst Triple 
Canopy reported the incident to the United States Army no criminal charges were brought 
against the individual.65 This incident, which is not unique, highlights a lack of consequences 
for the criminal activities of personnel of private military security companies.66 Had the 
individual in question been a soldier in the United States Army he would have faced potential 
                                                 
62 D Brooks, ‘Messiahs or mercenaries? The future of international private military services’ (2000) 7 
International Peacekeeping 129, 136. 
63 K O’Brien, ‘PMCs, myths and mercenaries: The debate on private military companies’ (2000) 145 The RUSI 
Journal 59, 59 & 60. 
64 Note 10 above, 213&214. 
65 Note 10 above, 214. 
66 C Lumina, ‘Counting the cost: The impact of corporate warfare on the human rights of women and children in 
Africa’ (2008) 147 ISS Monograph Series 101, 101. 
114 
 
domestic as well as international prosecution, and had his superiors even tacitly been in 
agreement with his actions, they too would have faced prosecution under international law.67 
The problem is not necessarily that there is a lack of human rights law, all combatants fall 
under the Geneva Conventions and states are party to various human rights conventions, the 
problem is that governments do not provide sufficient oversight mechanisms to ensure that 
the responsibilities under these conventions are enforced.68  
 
2.1.2. Human rights violations 
The above story is not unique and death of 17 unarmed civilians, including women and 
children by the private military security company Blackwater on September 16 2007 
highlights another concern about private military security companies other than just a lack of 
accountability, that being of human rights abuses.69 Random and unprosecuted killings70 are 
not the only human rights abuses which private military security companies are accused of71; 
L-3 Services which provided translators for US military prisons in Iraq has been accused by 
72 Iraqi civilians of a range of criminal activity from torture and assault to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.72 There have also been media reports of private military security 
companies being involved in the arbitrary detention of Iraqi and Afghanistan citizens, 
supposedly in conjuncture with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).73  
 
2.1.3. Undermining state monopoly over the use of force 
It has already been noted in this dissertation that states are considered to have a monopoly on 
the use of force and that private military security companies are considered as undermining 
this monopoly.74 The reason that this shift causes concern is that the idea of states having a 
monopoly on force is the premise of the UN Charter. The thinking behind the UN Charter, in 
part, is that because states have this monopoly if the UN Charter is able to limit when states 
can utilise this force, that it can therefore limit wars and conflicts.75 Changing this dynamic 
means that the UN Charter is potentially not as effective as it was before and that were states 
                                                 
67 Note 10 above, 214. 
68 Note 1 above, 68, 77. 
69 Note 31 above, 17. 
70 Note 31 above, 18. 
71 Note 66 above, 101. 
72 Note 31 above, 18. 
73 Note 31 above, 19. 
74 E Krahmann, ‘Security governance and the private military industry in Europe and North America’ 259. 
75 Z Salzman, ‘Private military contractors and the taint of a mercenary reputation’ (2008) 40 International Law 
and Politics 854, 861. 
115 
 
could be held accountable to the UN when they violated the UN Charter, that the same does 
not apply to private military security companies.76 One of the reasons why there hasn’t been 
an international movement to ban private military security companies by states whose 
monopoly on power is being undermined, is that the major employers of private military 
security companies are states themselves.77 There are therefore those who argue that private 
military security companies are an extension of the states’ use of force rather than an 
undermining factor of the states’ monopoly over force.78 Whilst this may well be true for 
private military security companies hired by states, these companies are also hired by non-
government actors, such as humanitarian organisations and because they operate outside the 
control of the state that they do pose a threat to this monopoly of force.79 Of additional 
concern are those private military security companies hired by criminal organisations, such as 
those hired by the Mexican drug cartels, and their effect on undermining a states’ monopoly 
over force.80 This ability to work for criminal organisations however is currently possible 
because of the lack of regulation over the private military security industry.81 The difficulty 
which does arise however is how governments and regulation mechanisms decide between 
legitimate and illegitimate or criminal clients. This is a difficult decision especially when 
private military security companies are focused on making profit and therefore increasing 
their cliental base as much as possible.82 A states’ monopoly over the use of force is often 
most undermined in developing countries, where private military security companies can in 
fact hold a large influence over government decision and have been known to use this to gain 
access to natural resources.83  
 
2.1.4. Private military security companies leaving over-regulated countries 
The problem which existed in South Africa, with private military security companies and 
personnel simply dissolving and operating from a country which allows them to operate or 
changing their citizenship, is a problem which will always plague states that place too much 
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regulation and accountability on their private military security companies and personnel.84 
This problem can be added to when companies have the ability to dissolve entirely and not 
merely relocate but also form as a complete new and fresh company elsewhere without any 
record of their previous activities.85 This is a concern for states, because as has been noted in 
the South African chapter, this means that governments lose control over these companies 
and their own citizens which can also create a negative international perception about that 
country.86 
 
2.1.5. Undermining democratic values 
The hiring of private military security companies via contracts also has the ability to 
undermine the democratic values of checks and balances within government. This occurs 
because it is the executive branch of government which enters into contracts and often 
without the need for debate or revealing the details of the contracts entered into.87 This can 
allow for decisions regarding the use of a states’ monopoly on force to bypass parliamentary 
discussion. This monopoly on power can then shift from a monopoly controlled by a 
government to one controlled by the executive.88 This lack of parliamentary discussion and 
public knowledge means that there is very little to no accountability for the actions of the 
executive. The reason that there is less discussion is that whilst parliament or Congress (in the 
case of the United States) may approve the budget for the military they have no say in the 
awarding of these contracts.89 Accountability is crucial in that it is a key mechanism of the 
checks and balances which prevents people in power within a democracy from abusing that 
power.90 The decision to be involved in conflict is also less likely to receive public backlash 
when private military security companies are used rather than citizens via the military and 
this too could have the effect of the public being less concerned when the executive enters 
into conflict zones.91 The public are also less likely to be aware of the actions of government 
contractors, especially in contrast to the awareness of soldiers.92 
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2.1.6. Different motives 
An additional concern is that the incentives of governments and private military security 
companies differ. Governments are concerned with conflict resolution, whilst private military 
security companies are concerned with making money.93 This may lead to the situation where 
these companies, in the interest of ensuring continued profits, create continual need to their 
involvement.94 This does however clash with another basis of private business; reputation. If 
a business is not able to perform then this decreases their chances of being awarded future 
contracts and so the net effect of the profit motivation of private military security companies 
could well mean better conflict resolution.95 This loyalty to shareholders and profit making 
has also had other negative consequences. This loyalty and especially the influence which 
private military security companies can have in developing nations often allows for abuse to 
occur as was the case when Executive Outcomes used its influence in several African 
countries, including Angola, to gain access to resource rights for the Branch-Heritage 
Group.96 
 
2.1.7. Influence of risk analysts 
The growth of the private military security industry has also meant that private military 
security companies no longer merely provide military assistance, services and goods on the 
ground but are also concerned with risk analysis and provide advice regarding security 
concerns for governments and non-government organisation alike.97 The effect of this is that 
whilst what can be considered a risk is a subjective question, for a private military security 
company analyst the more opportunities for services to be provided (in other words the more 
security threats which exist) the more work and profit the company stands to make.98 This is 
further compounded by governments who constantly outsource their military and security 
needs to private military security companies. This has the result of governments becoming 
more reliant upon the analysis provided by these companies and undermines the development 
of government analysis.99 
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2.1.8. Shift in focus 
The proliferation of the private military security industry could also have the unwanted effect 
of incentivising government to invest in and people to join private military security 
companies rather than government armies and police forces. This is perfectly illustrated by 
the example used earlier in this dissertation with the vast number of police force members 
leaving the Durban police force in order to earn better salaries from private military security 
companies.100 This effect does not assist in the stabilisation of countries which need to be 
able to eventual protect themselves.101 
 
2.1.9. Overcharging of services 
Increasingly private military security companies have been accused of overcharging 
governments for their services, as was the case when the US Defense Contract Audit Agency 
established that the private military security company; Kellogg, Brown and Root, had 
overcharged the United States Army by as much as $108 million for fuel imports and $160 
million for the provision of meals.102 Whilst the competition created by the private sector 
means that there are instances when money can be saved within the constraints of military 
contracts there is often no room for competition to exist.103  
 
2.2. Benefits arising from the private military security industry 
This section will now analyse the benefits which the private military security industry can 
provide for governments, conflict zones and non-government organisations. The purpose of 
this is to try and mitigate the potential harms discussed above but also add to the justification 
of the proposed way forward, and highlight the aspects of the private military security 
industry which should be maintained when establishing the proposed way forward. 
 
2.2.1. Importance for deployed armies 
One of the main benefits derived from private military security companies is the important 
role which they play within modern armies. The armies from countries such as the United 
States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom rely heavily upon the private military 
security industry in order to not only operate but also deploy their armed forces.104 These 
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services range from providing training in the operation and maintenance of nuclear 
submarines by the British, to the Canadian government contracting out the transporting of 
their troops, to the United States who has awarded over 3000 contracts between 1994 and 
2002 to various private military security companies for various roles.105 The strength of 
private military security companies lies in part in their ability to rapidly provide ‘surge’ 
forces for state armies when faced with a large enemy without having to wait for all the 
bureaucratic red tape of deploying more soldiers.106 They also have the ability to deploy very 
specifically qualified and trained personnel due to the wide range of personnel and therefore 
services available to them and who are seeking employment after completion of their military 
career.107 
 
2.2.2. Importance for non-governmental organisations  
Private military security companies also have a role to play in their assistance of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as humanitarian organisations who have 
increasing begun to rely on the security services provided by private military security 
companies in order to effectively continue their operations in certain countries.108 The 
services provided to NGOs by private military security companies not just physical protection 
but also training in security matters such as emergency procedures and evacuation policies.109 
The positive effect which Executive Outcomes provided in Angola and Sierra Leone has 
already been discussed but not only benefitted those countries but also allowed NGOs to 
conduct their work, so much so that when Executive Outcomes withdrew the NGOs operating 
in those countries became restricted.110 The speed with which personnel of private military 
security companies can be deployed along with the vast variety of services which they can 
perform111 is an additional bonus to NGOs who operate in often rapidly changing 
circumstances.112 Based on this there are those who argue that the private military security 
industry could greatly benefit United Nations peacekeeping missions, especially due to 
massive cost savings if not for any of the other reasons discussed above.113 
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2.2.3. Breaking cycles of violence 
Private military security companies also have the potential to be utilised to break cycles of 
violence and assist governments in regaining control over unstable situations. A good 
example of this is the work done by Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone, where 
they were able to restore order within those countries as well as train up government forces so 
as to be able to maintain the peace once Executive Outcomes pulled out.114 Another example 
where Executive Outcome could have played an equally important role was during the 
genocide in Rwanda. This was a situation where the world was in agreement that intervention 
was needed but where no country was willing to provide troops.115 When the threat of 
genocide was nearing, Executive Outcomes drafted a plan to have troops in Rwanda within 
two weeks at a cost of $600 000 per day. The eventual plan followed by the United Nations 
and the utilisation of their troops not only arrived much later than the Executive Outcome 
troops would have arrived but also cost $3 million per day.116 The ability of private military 
security companies like Executive Outcome to stabilise regions and break cycles of violence 
is crucial, especially when in circumstances like Rwanda there are no willing troops despite 
there being an agreement that action is required, and where the subsequent time delays cost 
people their lives and destabilises countries and regions.117 Their potential benefit was even 
noted by Kofi Annan who stated that, ‘'in the face of mass murder' the use of private con-
tracts 'is an option that cannot be relinquished’.118 Kofi Annan’s decision to ultimately not 
utilise private military security companies in Rwanda is because he felt that the world was 
not ready for the privatisation of the peace process and comment which has to some indicated 
that better regulation and control might lay the path for more efforts like those of Executive 
Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone.119 The ability of private military security companies 
to train the armies of developing countries is especially important when considering that 
within Africa for example it is the armed forces of developing African countries which are 
known for committing human right violations. Private military security companies therefore 
not only provide a good substitute for these weak forces but also have the ability to train 
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these forces and prevent future abuses of power.120 More recently the efforts of private 
military security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the ability of these 
companies to contribute to the creation of peace and stability.121 The use of private military 
security companies can also prevent the outbreak of cycles of violence as was witnessed in 
the Balkans when the United States licensed a private military security company to train the 
Croatian army and so without deploying a single American troop or spending any money the 
United States had been able to push the Serbs to the negotiation table the result of which were 
the Dayton Accords.122 Similarly the United States have utilised these companies to provide a 
‘surge’ force to the Iraqi police force during times of unrest. This also has the benefit of 
allowing the United States Army to use its troops for other missions.123  
 
2.2.4. The corporate nature of private military security companies 
There has also been, from its beginning, a strong force within the private military security 
industry to gain and maintain respectability within the international community and to 
separate itself from the conduct and perception surrounding mercenarism.124 This 
respectability is gained from the understanding that private military security companies are 
corporations and therefore act as any other corporation would and that because they are 
incentivised to maintain this respectability in order to gain future contracts that they may 
even have less reason to commit crimes during conflict as they are not motivated by 
ideologies or nationalism in the way soldiers are.125 In fact it is argued that due to the 
competitive nature of the private military security industry that committing human right 
violations is the best way for private military security companies to ensure that they are no 
longer considered for future contracts.126 This is the same logic used to explain why the 
interests of the state and of the private military security company are the same and why it 
makes no sense for a company to undermine the interest of the state, as this too will 
undermine the potential for future contracts.127 There is in fact, or at least it has been argued, 
no reason for private military security companies to behave any worse than other actors 
within conflict zones.128 In fact private military security companies have been very involved 
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in attempts to regulate their industry, Sandline has proposed several mechanisms to ensure 
private military security companies are held to account in terms of human right conventions 
and Executive Outcomes submitted 36 proposals when the South African government was in 
the process of drafting the FMA.129 The corporate nature of private military security 
companies is a key and important factor which distinguishes them from mercenaries. Whilst 
mercenaries are not concerned with their reputation and therefore how they act, private 
military security companies are, as already mentioned, highly concerned with their reputation 
as they rely upon this for future job opportunities.130 This means that it is important that a 
distinction is always make between mercenaries and private military security companies and 
their personnel; their different motives mean that they act differently and are incentivised to 
act differently in the international arena.131  
 
2.2.5. Costs 
Whilst there are instances when the services provided by private military security companies 
are in fact cheaper than what it costs the military to run those services for themselves, ideally 
where there exists strong competition.132  A common criticism of the industry is that it is 
often more expensive. The reality however is that the prime motivation behind a 
government’s decision to employ a private military security company is not financial but 
rather employing a private military security company means that that government can achieve 
more in a conflict zone without having to increase the size of its force.133 It also means that 
specialised and experienced people can be brought into conflict zones immediately. 
Additionally it is at times unlikely that the services of private military security companies 
will be cheap, especially when demand is at its beak as there is often too much demand and 
the resultant sellers’ market means that prices will increase. There is also the high cost of 
insurance which needs to be included in the cost of these services and sometimes can be as 
high as 40cents in every dollar.134 The one instance where the costs to employ a private 
military security company always appear to be cheaper is when the employer is the United 
Nations. The example of the potential cost savings by Executive Outcomes in Rwanda has 
already been highlighted, but additionally in Sierra Leone Executive Outcomes was able to 
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operate $10 million per month cheaper than a United Nations peace keeping force would 
have.135  
 
2.2.6. Reasons not to ban the private military security industry 
The importance and increasing size of the private military security industry means that 
arguments for the banning of the industry would not only undermine all the benefits 
discussed above, but would also have the effect of decreasing accountability by pushing the 
industry underground.136 The benefits to governments who utilise the services of the private 
military security industry appear to at the moment outweigh any harm caused by the industry 
and therefore indicates that a complete ban is highly unlikely. This is not only evident by the 
continued use of the industry by governments but also by the saving offered to government as 
well as not having to keep specialised individuals on full time pay as they can acquire such 
services from a private military security company. In addition there are the benefits of not 
having to increase military presence in conflict zones which has been discussed above.137 It is 
also strange that most of the criticisms levelled against the private military security industry 
are not based on actual harms which currently exist, but rather on potential harms which may 
occur should the industry continue to operate.138 Therefore the complete banning of the 
private military security industry is not a viable option and will not be considered by this 
dissertation as an option for future regulatory attempts. 
 
Having analysed the criticisms and benefits of the private military security industry and 
noting the issues which need to be remembered when proposing a way forward this chapter 
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3. PROPOSED WAY FORWARD FOR THE PRIVATE MILITARY SECURITY 
INDUSTRY 
Having discussed the lessons learnt from previous and current attempts to legislate the private 
military security industry, as well as discussing which criticisms to attempt to address whilst 
maintaining the benefits which arise from the industry in its current form this dissertation will 
now discuss how best to legislate this industry going forward. This dissertation proposes that 
there are three levels at which this needs to occur and as such these three levels will each be 
looked at in turn. They are regulation at an international and domestic level as well as the 
level of self-regulation.139  
 
3.1. International regulation 
Due to the international and global nature of the private military security industry, and the 
inability of governments to regulate actions outside of their own sovereign state, there is 
clearly a need for international regulation of private military security companies in some way 
shape or form.140 The current system of a patchwork of national regulation is currently 
insufficient to deal with this global industry.141 It is insufficient on two levels; firstly it is 
unable to have jurisdiction over the international conduct of these companies, and second the 
enforcement of these regulations is difficult without international support.142 This is 
especially true when one considers that in one contract there can be citizens and companies 
represented and involved in delivering on that contract from several different countries.143  
 
There is an incentive for states to get involved in the creation of a regulatory system at an 
international level owing to the potential backlash should they choose to reap the benefits of 
the industry without seeking to regulate it or become accountable for the actions of private 
military security companies and their personnel. The first back lash is that it is unlikely that 
local and international opinion will be favourable towards a government which fails to act 
against citizens and companies registered within it which commit human right violations.144 
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There is also the very strong possibility of a state being held accountable for their actions if it 
can be proven that they at the very least tacitly agreed to the actions of the private military 
security company or their personnel.145 Whilst states may claim that the regulation of private 
military security companies should remain in the domestic arena, these states do not take 
account of the fact that due to the multi-national composition of most private military security 
companies that there will be competing claims for jurisdictional rights regarding these 
companies and their personnel.146 There is therefore a need for some form of agreement 
between states as to how best resolve these claims; regulation at an international level is 
clearly the best solution.147 Countries which currently dominate the private military security 
industry such as the United States and the United Kingdom also have an additional incentive 
to create legislation for the industry. Their dominance of the market means that they are 
currently in a good position to create regulatory mechanisms which favour how they 
currently operate. In time however and with the possible rise of other countries, such as 
Russia and China, supplying personnel to the industry this advantage may no longer exist and 
they may have to settle for a mechanism which does not benefit them as much as the system 
does now.148 There are also moves being made within local domestic markets to distinguish 
between mercenaries and private military security companies. The effect has been that whilst 
there is still a concern around mercenarism and therefore a desire to ban them there has also 
been an acceptance of the private military security industry and a wish to regulate rather than 
ban this industry.149  
 
The regulatory mechanism itself needs to comprise of two parts. The first is a convention on 
the regulation of the private military security industry150 and the second is a committee 
formed under that convention.151 
 
The convention itself has the aim of ensuring that all private military security companies and 
their personnel are liable in terms of international law, and have to comply not only by the 
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rules of war but also by human right conventions.152 The convention should also address the 
question of the status of private military security personnel during times of war and most 
importantly what their status is once captured. It is the suggestion of this dissertation that as 
they currently best fit under the civilian category153, as such they do not enjoy prisoner of war 
status. However owing to the more direct nature of their involvement that it would be more 
appropriate if they were either declared as acting as combatants or a separate category is 
created.154 The convention should also create a list of good business practices and norms for 
the operation of private military security companies in a similar fashion to those created by 
the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers. One of the more practical areas for the convention to focus on is the enforcement 
of the use of either a uniform or some recognisable insignia for personnel of private military 
security companies to wear, so as to identify themselves as part of the conflict, even if they 
are not state enrolled combatants.155 The only involvement that the convention would have 
with states is requiring signatories to adopt its standards and act as enforcement mechanisms 
in holding their own and other private military security companies to account. 
 
The convention should also create a committee with the sole purpose of granting licences for 
private military security companies.156 This should be licence which acknowledges that the 
private military security company in question is a legitimate company which abides by 
international conventions as well as good business practices.157 The licence is renewed on a 
regular and potentially yearly basis by a report submitted by the company158, as well as any 
reports created on the company by the committee itself so as to allow the committee to 
determine whether or not the company still upholds good practice in terms of international 
law and business practices, as well as being transparent and accountable.159 The committee 
can also create and ask for reports on those in the employ of the private military security 
company in order to determine that former mercenaries or human right violators are not 
operating within the company.160 The criteria should be based only on these two criteria and 
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not vague ideals as the negative consequences of this are best summed up by the problems 
facing the South African FMA and PMA.161 This committee could be assisted in this task by 
expanding the duties of existing bodies within the United Nations such as the UN Special 
Rapporteur and the UN Register of Conventional Arms.162 The committee does not rule on 
each and every contract as this will have the effect of dramatically overloading and therefore 
slowing down the entire private military security industry and with rapid deployment being a 
key advantage of this industry it seems counterintuitive to undermine this.163 It is also argued 
that as the awarding of individual contracts is done by states and NGOs themselves that it is 
best to leave this in the arena of domestic law. The corporate nature of private military 
security companies and their desire to create a strong reputation means that they are likely to 
buy into and accept this licensing mechanism.164 Further evidence for this is and the number 
of companies which are currently signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers.165   
 
There are several benefits of the convention and committee system. By bringing private 
military security companies and their personnel under international law and clarifying their 
position is makes their prosecution for the violation of human rights and rules of war and lot 
easier and in the process dealing with one of the biggest concerns surrounding the private 
military security industry. The international nature of the convention also means that 
companies can no longer relocate in order to avoid regulation as wherever they exist they will 
still be required to conform to the convention.166 The licensing mechanism also has the 
advantage of dealing with mercenarism. The effect of requiring a licence in order to operate 
and therefore the operation of any military or security service without a licence being an 
offence means that mercenaries, who will not be able to acquire licences as they do not 
comply with international law and business practices.167 This makes the prosecution of 
mercenaries much simpler as the question is merely whether or not a licence exists rather 
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than whether or not they fulfil 6 complicated requirements168 as is the current situation. 
Another benefit of a convention, as with any codified law is that it provides certainty which is 
especially important during conflict when very little else is certain.169 Whilst it is 
acknowledged that such a system will take time to develop and for states to reach agreement, 
this does not deter from the importance of an international regulatory system existing and if 
the trend shown by all three countries170 and international discourse171 is towards regulation 
then there should not be much conflict regarding this development.172 The convention would 
also be a clear declaration from the United Nations regarding its stance on private military 
security companies and as the guardian of international peace and security this would carry a 
lot of weight and lend much need support for further regulations of the private military 
security industry at domestic levels.173 A firm international stance would also clear up current 
inconsistencies which exist within domestic regulation of private military security companies; 
such as the acceptance and regulation of the United States legislation and the ban on the 
industry as seen in South African legislation.174  
 
3.2. Domestic regulation 
There are many reasons as to why states would wish to enact legislation in order to regulate 
private military security companies. The first of these is founded in their monopoly over the 
use of violence which means that any actor which has the ability to affect this monopoly 
should be regulated and have the state exercise some degree of control over these actors. The 
regulation of the private military security industry is arguably the best way for states to 
maintain their monopoly on violence.175 Private military security companies also have the 
ability to affect power dynamics within regions as well as create a negative international 
image for a state if a private military security company based in their country abuses their 
power; both these reasons are additional incentives for states to regulate private military 
security companies at a domestic level.176 The continued use of private military security 
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companies is unlikely to stop due to the many benefits gained by the use of this industry. It is 
therefore important for states, who benefit from these companies and their services the most, 
to regulate them.177 It is therefore within the ability of governments to ensure that private 
military security companies are held to account in terms of their contractual obligations, that 
they remain professional and uphold codes of conduct.178 
 
Regulation at a domestic level should consist of the adoption of all international conventions 
surrounding private military security companies and most notably the convention proposed 
above. It should also consist of the creation of national legislation and the formation, under 
that piece of legislation, of a committee to authorise contracts issued to private military 
security companies.179  
 
The adoption of the international convention discussed above, or of similar such conventions 
is essential.180 This is because in order for the licensing system to work best it will require the 
input of all states and especially those from which private military security companies 
originate. Their assistance is required in ensuring that private military security companies 
become licensed, that as governments they only utilise the services of licensed companies and 
that they are involved in reporting and holding to account those companies which violate the 
conventions and any of the norms created in the convention.181  
 
The creation of legislation specifically to deal with private military security companies is so 
that governments can control the issuing of contracts as well as the extension of its 
jurisdiction so as to include the criminal conduct of its citizens when they are outside of their 
borders. The extension of the jurisdiction of the state can follow a similar format as the 
UCMJ and MEJA as found in the United States.182 This is of benefit to the state in that it, 
rather than another country has control over its own citizens and allows it to hold its own 
citizens to account for their actions. With nations around the world creating regulatory 
mechanisms for private military security companies the difficulty confronted by attempts 
such as the UCMJ and MEJA should be dealt with as the authorities of states will have 
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assistance in holding personnel of private military security companies and their citizens to 
account and enforcing international conventions.  
 
The piece of domestic legislation will also setup a committee to deal with the authorisation 
and issuing of contracts to private military security companies.183 Initially this committee will 
also need to license private military security companies184 until such time as the international 
licensing committee is established and running. The committee will be focus on the issuing of 
contracts on behalf of the government in a similar fashion to the NCACC in South Africa and 
the ITAR in the United States as well as authorising the acceptance of contracts by private 
military security companies which are based within their country.185 The use of contracts is 
important as they allow the government to place a legal burden on private military security 
companies to provide data concerning their operations whilst completing the contract and 
ultimately this allows for more transparency as well as accountability.186 The criteria for this 
committee is similar to the criteria for licensing companies in that so far as there is no strong 
potential for the contract to involve the violation of any international convention, especially 
concerning the laws of war and human rights then the contract must be granted.187 The 
criteria should also include a list of allowed188 and prohibited189 activities in order to ensure 
that these international conventions are upheld and that companies do not provide support to 
drug cartels for example.190 These criteria must be applied to every contract and once 
acceptance is granted it cannot be revoked so as to prevent the constitutional challenges 
facing the FMA and PMA.191 These contracts also need to be considered and decided upon as 
quickly as possible, even with the possibility of the contract being automatically awarded 
after a certain period of time so as to ensure that private military security companies are still 
able to operate with the speed necessary in order to remain competitive.192 Whilst the need 
for governments to maintain as much control over their monopoly of violence is important it 
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cannot be abused to prevent companies from performing their jobs or else the problematic 
situation which exists within South Africa will merely reoccur.193 Whilst the existence of all 
these criteria and checks and balances may appear to hamper companies within the private 
military security industry the ultimate effect is that the certainty created by these criteria 
means that companies are able to focus on providing their services.194 There is also the 
additional check and balance of the international licensing mechanism which provides a 
prima facie case of the company operating legitimately and within international conventions. 
The perception in the international community is that the country from which a private 
military security company originates is responsible for the actions of that company, as was 
clearly the case with South Africa and Executive Outcomes, it is because of this that 
countries need to create criteria, committees and regulatory mechanisms.195 The committee 
will also have to provide reports to parliament about which contracts have been given 
approval and which contracts have been issued on behalf of government, as is proposed by 
the Green Paper.196 This is designed to ensure that the executive are not able to operate in the 
shadows and undermine the democratic system of checks and balances.197  
 
Due to the global nature of the international and domestic regulations the ability to enforce 
these mechanisms will be greatly increased, as already discussed, due to the buy in of all 
actors who will be able to monitor the actions of private military security companies on a 
contract by contract and report by report basis.198 There does however exist from for national 
legislation to include monitoring requirements for contracts granted by the committee 
discussed above.199 These could include the use of foreign offices and embassies in other 
countries, the military if the private military security company is being deployed alongside a 
countries armed forces or a diplomatic mission to ensure that the private military security 
company is adhering to the contract as well as other international conventions.200 The use of 
contracts to require companies to provide reports after the completion of a contract, as 
discussed above201, also has the effect of acting as a monitoring mechanism. 
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One of the effects of this domestic legislation is that the regulation of the private military 
security industry provides legitimacy for the companies and personnel which operate within 
it.202 This legitimacy, which as has already been noted is a key motivation for private military 
security companies, is gained via government control and these companies being under the 
control of not only the government but also international conventions.203 This deals with 
several of the biggest concerns raised about private military security companies; that being 
them not being held accountable and undermining the states’ control over the use of 
violence.204 Private military security companies are also incentivised to get on board with 
domestic regulation. This is because effective regulation ensures better competition between 
various private military security companies. Regulation prevents smaller, cheaper and less 
reputable companies from effectively operating. These companies are normally able to 
undercut the larger, better known companies by not having to concern themselves with ethics 
and good practice. Better regulation would mean that reputable companies would be on equal 
footing and not have to be concerned about being undercut by less reputable companies.205 




The last level of regulation which it is proposed should exist is that of self-regulation.207 Even 
before companies started regulating their activities private military security companies began 
a trend towards the formation of associations and professional companies.208 The reason for 
this is so as to distance themselves from the illegitimate activities of mercenaries and to 
present a more acceptable front for their provision of security and military services.209 In her 
article McCoy argues that there are three ways in which organisations promote themselves as 
professional institutes;  
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(1) by providing a stage or setting that makes professional claims credible;  
(2) by supplying a rationale that makes professional practice acceptable; and  
(3) by extending guarantees that professional promises will be institutionalised and upheld.210 
 
The first two are catered for by the companies themselves, this by forming professional 
groups and companies211 and highlighting the good work that they do and the important role 
they play in ensuring human rights and providing stability within regions. This is done by 
highlighting the defensive nature of private military security companies.212 The third way; the 
creation of guarantees, has been somewhat achieved by companies establishing internal 
checks and balances and criteria. This is used to judge their actions and hold themselves 
accountable.213 These internal processes however lack the objectivity and authority of 
regulations passed by states and has therefore not been a particular success.214 This presents a 
perfect opportunity for states as well as regional bodies to step in and provide the necessary 
authority to create regulations and standards by which these companies can hold themselves 
to account.215 There is a clear desire from private military security companies to be regulated 
and have standards set in order to create the image of a professional corporation. Thereby 
distancing themselves from the stigma that used to be attached to private military companies 
and that it still attached to mercenaries.216  
 
Applying this rational of self-regulation and understanding the motivation for private military 
security companies to adopt a self-regulatory model, especially with a lack of international 
and domestic legislation there is a need to analyse the practical application of this for the 
private military security industry.  
 
Self-regulation refers to mechanisms which can include not only licensing of companies but 
also the creation of standards of training or operation or guidelines.217 With the private 
military security industry in particular the main mechanism utilised has been the creation of a 
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code of conduct focused on ethics as well as the creation of standards for security services.218 
Whilst initially the movement to self-regulate was slow219 in more recent times and following 
the drafting of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and 
the widespread and rapid support that it received there has been more support for self-
regulation.220 The biggest and most damaging flaw with self-regulation however is that 
without the backing of a government or an international organisation such as the United 
Nations these codes of conduct and service standards carry very little to no weight.221 These 
standards and codes however fail to make up for a lack of international and domestic 
regulation.222 The solution to this problem is with the proposed way forward of this 
dissertation including the regulation of the private military security industry at an 
international and domestic level these methods of self-regulation now have the backing of an 
international convention as well as domestic legislation, the benefit of being able to promote 
a private military security company as upholding one code of conduct or another now has 
substantial weight when governments and NGOs are searching for a potential private military 
security company.223 self-regulation also benefits other actors within the international arena 
as companies now hold themselves accountable to various standards224, most of which are in 
line with international conventions on human rights as well as codes of good business 
practice.225 Self-regulation has an ability to increase accountability within an approach to the 
private military security industry which involves regulation at an international, domestic and 
now industry level.226 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
At the outset this chapter set the task of taking into account the lessons learnt from current 
legislative attempts at regulating the private military security industry as well as attempting to 
address the concerns which exist around the industry as well as the whole time maintaining 
the benefits which have allowed this industry to flourish. The legislative mechanism which is 
proposed is a layered regulatory mechanism which grants overall control and accreditation to 
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an international committee founded in an international convention which upholds the values 
of conventions on human rights as well as the laws of war. At a national level the regulatory 
mechanism establishes legislation which not only adopts the international values of the 
international convention but also extends the jurisdiction of nations in so far as their ability to 
prosecute their citizens is concerned. The domestic legislation also creates a committee which 
has control over the individual contracts of private military security companies. Lastly there 
is a level of self-regulation created within the private military security industry itself which is 
formed via various codes of conducts and standards.  
 
This mechanism it is argued learns from the lessons of previous international attempts by 
abandoning burdensome and difficult definitions of mercenaries227 and by simply refusing to 
grant licenses to companies which do not conform to international standards is able to 
prosecute these companies with greater ease. The regulatory and extended jurisdiction 
mechanism adopted by the United States228 and proposed in the United Kingdom’s Green 
Paper229 is also utilised whilst the lesson learnt from South Africa’s FMA and PMA is the 
need to strike a balance between over and under regulation.230  
 
The benefits which the private military security industry brings to governments, NGOs and 
developed and developing nations alike have been maintained by adopting a legislative 
mechanism which regulates rather than bans and whilst there may be additional 
administrative burdens there are attempts to not compromise the speed of the industry.  
 
The concerns have also been addressed. The biggest concern arising out of a lack of 
prosecution and abuse of human rights is addressed by creating an international licensing 
system and by ensuring that countries extend their jurisdictions whilst also bringing private 
military security companies under the norms of international conventions on human rights. 
The monopoly on violence is still held by the state via a mechanism which not only allows 
control over each contract but also prevents too much power being held by the executive by 
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ensuring that parliamentary oversight exists. The international nature of the regulation means 
that companies can no longer dissolve and reappear with a clean slate in another part of the 
globe and by ensuring self-regulation, which includes best business practices, and 
understating the competitive nature of the industry the concerns around pricing are better 
understood and controlled. Whilst the motives of private military security companies and 
states may well be different is as been argued that they ultimately have the same effect and 
with government being forced to get more involved within the industry the concern regarding 
the privatisation of risk analysis is also potentially seen to.  
 
It is therefore the opinion of this dissertation that the multi-layered regulatory mechanism 
proposed above is the best way forward for the private military security industry as well as 



























This dissertation began by discussing the development of mercenarism throughout history.1 It 
began in ancient times and  progressed through to the rise of the modern state, with its state 
funded and raised armies, and explored how the decline of these armies has allowed for the 
return of mercenarism as well as the development of corporate mercenaries, or as they have 
become known today; private military security companies. Each chapter then in turn 
discussed the history of mercenarism and private military security companies within three 
particular countries which were selected These three countries have been chosen because they 
represent unique responses or at least stages of response to the rise of the private military 
security industry. The system in the United States is widely regarded as being a model for 
future regulation2, whilst the South African system is seen as being the harshest in the world3 
and the United Kingdom is in limbo and has yet to adopt a system of its own.4 Within each 
domestic jurisdiction how the private security industry emerged was explored, as well as the 
development of legislation in response to mercenarism and the private military security 
industry. The question asked by this dissertation however was not whether or not the private 
military security industry would continue to grow, in fact this dissertation not only took the 
view that the industry was not only a potential good5 but also an inevitable force within 
modern conflict zones.6 The question which this dissertation sought to answer was twofold; 
firstly it sought to analyse whether current international and domestic attempts to regulate 
mercenarism and the private military security industry were effective. By effective is meant 
whether or not the states from which these companies and individuals originate are able to 
control their activities and prosecute any wrong doing. And secondly if they were not 
effective, or not as effective as they needed to be, how was the best way to go forward with 
regulatory attempts. 
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At an international level not only were the attempts to define and ban mercenarism widely 
agreed to have amounted to a clear failure, but there was no convention dealing specifically 
with the private military security industry.7 There were however attempts to regulate the 
private military security industry emanating from within the United Nations and other 
regional body such as the OAU/AU.8  
 
From a domestic perspective  the United States is developing as effective a regulatory system 
with international jurisdiction as possible, so as to hold its citizens accountable for any 
criminal activity which occurred outside of the United States9, although there are still some 
concerns which still exist10. South Africa had a regulatory system which had the net effect of 
banning the private military security industry11, and raising constitutional and administrative 
law challenges12, but which most importantly has yet to yield a successful prosecution.13 The 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 and Prohibition of Mercenary 
Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act of 2006 
(which it must be recalled has still not entered into force 7 years after its being tabled), also 
have the effect of reducing the control which the South African government has over its 
citizens and companies which operate within the private military security industry.14 
Currently the private military security industry in the United Kingdom is regulated 
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companies, a lack of continual oversight of contracts once awarded and the lack of prosecutions against private 
military security personnel who commit offences in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
11 Note 3 above, 102. 
12 See the chapter on South Africa for a full discussion surrounding this issue. 
13 D Avant, ‘The privatization of security and change in the control of force’ (2004) 5 International Studies 




indirectly15, and the Green Paper has not developed since being first introduced in 2002, 
although it does appear to promote the regulation of the industry rather than its banning.  
 
The significance of the lessons learnt from the analysis of international and domestic 
legislative systems is that there is a need to create a unified approach to mercenarism as well 
as the private military security industry and that in all instances there is a need for more 
effective regulation. The significance is also that the lessons learnt from these various 
attempts were able to be used when proposing a regulatory system for going forward. 
 
The second question which this dissertation set out to answer was what should this regulatory 
and legislative mechanism look like? In the previous chapter this was answered by first 
acknowledging the starting point which has been created by the various domestic and 
international approaches discussed previously, as well as discussing the concerns and benefits 
arising out of the private military security industry. This was done so as to ensure that the 
regulatory mechanism which was eventually proposed learnt from previous lessons, 
addressed the concerns surrounding the industry, whilst also allowing the benefits gained 
from the industry to remain. The proposed legislative mechanism was a three level approach 
which instituted an international convention and international licensing body, as well as 
domestic legislation and a domestic committee to award and confirm contracts, and lastly at 
an industry level the benefits of self-regulation were also acknowledged. The significance of 
this proposed regulatory mechanism is that it most importantly acknowledges that the 
majority of the concerns surrounding the private military security industry can be dealt with 
via a better regulated industry from an international and domestic level, with the extension of 
domestic and international jurisdiction to cover the activities of the personnel of private 
military security companies. It is also significant in that is acknowledges that current efforts 
need to be updated and improved upon, and that not only is the private military security 
industry here to stay, but that with sufficient control over their actions they have the potential 
to create benefits not only for states but also for humanitarian efforts around the globe.16 
 
In conclusion this dissertation has acknowledged that at the heart of the concerns around the 
private military security industry is a lack of control and accountability, created by a lack of 
                                                 
15 Via Acts such as; the Export Control Act of 2002, the Landmines Act of 1998 and The Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act of 2001. These are indirect as they were created to deal with other issues and were not created 
for the purpose of regulating the private military security industry.  
16 See page 123.  
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effective legislation and regulation. The proposed mechanism to deal with this problem is 
designed to be a solution to this problem, which will allow all international actors to benefit 
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